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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to be an examination of the army of Alexander the 
Great, concentrating upon questions of organization and equipment. 
Chapter 1 considers the Macedonian heavy infantry, the pezhetairoi. 
Chapter 2 is an examination of the hypaspists, the elite heavy infantry units of the 
Macedonian order of battle. 
Chapter 3 is a discussion of the Macedonian cavalry. This includes the prodromoi as 
well as the more famous Companion cavalry. 
Chapter 4 concentrates on the Thessalian cavalry. 
Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the mercenaries and allied troops employed by 
Alexander. 
Chapter 6 considers Alexander's Mediterranean fleets. 
Chapter 7 is an examination of the siege equipment used by Alexander, particularly 
during siege warfare but also during field operations on occasion. 
Chapter 8 is a summing up of the overall command structure of the army. 
The conclusion reached is that Alexander's army was an extremely complex 
organization with individual elements specifically trained an equipped to perform 
specific tasks. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without his prior consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
I allow consultation by bona fide scholars without delay. 
The material in this thesis has not previously been submitted for a degree in this or 
any other imiversity. 
This thesis contains approximately 48,500 words and thus conforms to the word 
limit set out in degree regulations. 
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Introduction 
"With a small army, but distinguished for its intrinsic perfection, 
Alexander overthrew the decayedfabric of the Asiatic States; 
without rest, and regardless of risks, he traversed the breadth of Asia "' 
Even today, 23 centuries after his death, Alexander is still a figure that inspires 
awe and respect. The sheer numbers of books published every year, both historical 
and fictional, along with the upcoming Hollywood movies are a testimony to the 
enduring quality of the story. 
Alexander's achievements as a general remain unparalleled; this thesis, however, 
is intended to be an examination of the instrument that made his conquest of the 
Persian Empire possible, his army. 
Alexander's career is largely one of a military campaign lasting some 11 years; 
with this in mind it is surprising indeed that the subject of his army has received 
comparatively slight treatment from modem scholars. There are a number of 
journal articles which deal with some of the individual elements within the 
Macedonian order of battle, and many biographies of Alexander that contain some 
information on the subject, but there is still no comprehensive work dedicated 
exclusively to this topic; it is for this reason that I believe this subject to be worthy 
of study. 
During the course of this thesis 1 intend to examine each of the different elements 
within the army, concentrating all the while on questions of organization and 
equipment, as well as numbers. 
The historian is always presented with difficulties of historiography: this problem 
is particularly acute with the historian of Alexander, partly because there are five 
main ancient sources, but more significantly that the earliest was wrifing in the 1st 
century A.D. Of the five sources the most reliable is undoubtedly Arrian, partly 
because his own career as a commander would have given him certain insights, but 
far more importantly that his primary sources were Ptolemy and Aristobulus who 
were both with Alexander and thus can be considered to provide good evidence. I 
do not believe, however, that the other sources should be ignored; indeed much that 
is extremely interesting can be gleaned from them. I also believe that wherever 
appropriate archaeological and visual evidence should be used, as this, again, can 
provide us with information not found in the written sources.^  
Introduction: Footnotes. 
1. Clausewitz 5.111. 
2. Such as the size and weight of the sarissa for example: see chapters 1 and 3. 
Chapter 1. 
Macedonian Heavy Infantry. 
Macedonia had always been renowned for having some of the finest cavalry in the 
Greek world, but it had never been a significant military power until it possessed an 
equally strong body of infantry. It therefore seems appropriate to begin this thesis 
by examining the origins and composition of this force. 
The men that comprised the Macedonian heavy infantry are almost exclusively 
referred to collectively as "the Phalanx" by both ancient and modem authors. The 
adoption of this term is partly due to convenience' and partly due to a lack of 
understanding on the part of some as to the tactical role of the heavy infantry.^ 
Throughout this thesis I have tried to avoid using this generic term, simply because 
in the strictest sense it should not apply to the Macedonian pezhetairoi. In reality 
the pezhetairoi were essentially an evolved version of the standard phalanx. 
The origins of the Pezhetairoi? 
At some point in time it seems clear that the peasantry of Macedonia were 
organized into an infantry body recruited territorially. Anaximenes'' tells us quite 
cleariy that at some point the infantry were given the title pezhetairoi, ^ effectively 
making them equal in status to the Companion cavalry. Theopompus^ defines who 
the pezhetairoi were and how they were recruited; these two fragments together are 
crucial to an understanding of the origins of the Macedonian heavy infantry and 
will be referred to frequently. 
These two fragments unfortunately do not present us with a coherent picture; 
Anaximenes calls all of the Macedonian infantry pezhetairoi, whilst Theopompus 
believes them to have been picked troops, a bodyguard to the king and not front 
line infantry. Anaximenes attributes their creation to Alexander; ^ Theopompus 
makes no statements as to their origins. What can we draw from these two 
accounts, were they even talking about the same thing? And who was the 
Alexander that Anaximenes referred to? Milns** points out that the general tendency 
among scholars has been to accept the testimony of Anaximenes and reject 
Theopompus where there are contradictions; this only leaves open the question of 
which Alexander is meant. Some scholars have claimed that Alexander I I must 
have been the king Anaximenes is referring to, although the brevity of his reign^ 
would tend to eliminate him from such serious reforms. That is i f we assume that 
reforms Diodorus'" mentions occurred at the same time as the creation of the 
pezhetairoi. Diodorus and Anaximenes can only be reconciled i f we assume that 
Alexander II conceptualized the new force and Philip I I actually created it. The 
belief that Philip I I was the originator of the pezhetairoi has had some significant 
proponents, including Tam, Plaumann, Kaerst and Milns." 
Momigliano'^ argued that the Alexander Anaximenes is referring to must be 
Alexander I and dismisses any possibility that it could be Alexander I I simply on 
the grounds that i f it were Alexander I I , then the reforms made by Archelaus 
mentioned in Thucydides'^ would be reduced to nothing. This argument, however, 
is unsound as it relies upon a dubious interpretation of Thucydides"* and ignores 
the evidence of Polyaenus'^ and Xenophon, both of whom tell us clearly that 
even as late as the early 4'*' century, Macedonia still possessed no properly trained 
or equipped infantry forces. 
Milns' ' points out that Demosthenes in the Second Olynthiac^^ makes a clear 
distinction between the privileged position occupied by the pezhetairoi and the 
mass of the Macedonians, who derived no benefits from Philip's policies. His 
conclusion, therefore, is that the pezhetairoi were not the whole body of infantry 
that Macedonia possessed, but a select body of guards, equivalent to the hetairoi 
cavalry, and that it is the creation of this body to which Anaximenes refers. If this 
theory were correct then it was this original unit of guards that was expanded and 
evolved into the pezhetairoi that we recognize from the reigns of Philip and 
Alexander. This theory satisfies Theopompus'^  but does not satisfy Anaximenes, 
who stated that Alexander gave the name to the majority of his men. Griffith^" adds 
the very sensible point that Theopompus could have been referring to the 
pezhetairoi as he knew them in the late 340's and that therefore Theopompus' 
claim that they were an elite group and not the entire body of Macedonian infantry 
is reasonable. I f this is correct then the only way to reconcile the two passages is to 
assume that the Alexander being referred to is Alexander II I , and that the reform 
was not a significant military one, but that Alexander simply widened the use of the 
term pezhetairoi to include all members of the heavy infantry, at the same time 
widening the use of the term hetairoi to include all of die Macedonian cavalry. This 
would have had the effect of bonding the troops more closely to the person of the 
king and slightly reducing their regional ties and the ties to their commanding 
officers.^' 
The most reasonable argument therefore is that at some point in history, perhaps 
the reign of Alexander I , an elite group of infantry was created, whilst at the same 
time the main body of infantry was also trained and equipped in a similar or 
identical manner, and that it was during the reign of Alexander II I that the term 
pezhetairoi was expanded in use to include all of the phalanx infantry. Alexander 
111 was therefore simply changing the nomenclature and status of existing troops 
rather than instituting some major reform. 
What then happened to the original pezhetairoi after Alexander, whichever 
Alexander that may have been, expanded the use of the term? Milns"^ "* argues that it 
would be logical to assume that their elite status and special relationship to the king 
would continue to be recognized in some way and that they would not simply have 
been absorbed into the phalanx along with the rest of the heavy infantry. He 
tentatively therefore proposes that the preexisting elite infantry unit was now given 
the name hypaspists with which we are so familiar from the pages of Arrian.^" 
Creating the army. 
Now that we have seen the origins of the pezhetairoi we should turn to the 
question of their training and how they were persuaded to fight with such ferocity 
and dedication through almost countless battles. 
In order to create an army, civilians need to become militarized. Throughout 
different periods of history this process has involved a number of classic elements; 
these could include the wearing of a uniform, uniformity of equipment amongst 
individual units, the swearing of an oath and training designed to engender 
conformity and solidarity, participation in social events and the playing of 
competitive games etc. The creation of the Macedonian army showed many of 
these classic features: a uniform was probably worn; combining this with 
conformity of offensive equipment amongst the leading units of the army would 
have led to considerable uniformity of appearance.^ ^ To exactly what extent Philip 
and Alexander attempted to create complete uniformity of dress and defensive 
equipment is far from clear. The historical sources mention little on this subject and 
the pictorial evidence is too limited to decide the point, and questions such as a 
possible change from the use of the Phrygian helmet to the Boeotian within the 
cavalry, the usage of the pilos helmet within the infantry and even the use of the 
Macedonian star symbol on shields is all open to debate.'^ *' All we can say is that 
there was probably considerable i f not complete uniformity of dress and equipment 
amongst the leading units of the Macedonian army. 
The swearing of an oath^^ to the king was also a feature of the training of the 
Macedonian troops. The training programme itself was particularly rigorous, a 
revolution in fact: nothing quite like it had been seen in the ancient world before 
this time. '^ ^ Diodorus'^ ^ describes it as follows: -
".. .having put their military organization on a sounder footing and equipped the 
men with appropriate weapons of war, he held unremitting exercises in full kit as 
well as competitive exercises." 
Polyaenus^^ gives us a little more information: -
"Philip used to train the Macedonians before they underwent dangers to march 
with fiill kit often three hundred stades carrying at one and the same time helmets, 
shields, greaves, pikes, and, as well as their weapons, provisions and utensils for 
their daily fare." 
Frontinus^' tells us that the stamina produced by such a training programme was 
quite deliberately used by Philip to wear down his opponents at Chaeronea. 
Alexander clearly understood the importance of these training principles that his 
father had introduced: at the very beginning of his reign Diodorus"''^  tells us that he 
ordered his army to undertake regular manoeuvres. After the campaigns at Miletus 
and Halicamassus, Alexander spent time putting his troops through a rigorous 
training programme, and when 30,000 Persian youths were to be incorporated into 
the army they were ordered to be trained in the Macedonian way of war and with 
Macedonian weapons.'*'* The efficiency of what this system produced is best 
described by Curtius: 
"With attention fixed on the nod of their commander, they have learned to follow 
the standards and keep their ranks; what is ordered they obey to a man. When it 
comes to standing fast, executing enveloping manoeuvres, running to the wing, 
changing battle order, the soldiers are every bit as skilled as their leaders" 
Lloyd describes this discipline as a sort of "corporate unity", a feeling that 
would have been reinforced by ceremonial parades in fiiU battle order, and 
fiirther reinforced by the use of the terms 'Companion Cavahy' and 'Foot 
Companions', the latter which Alexander had expanded in meaning to include all of 
the phalanx infantry rather than simply an elite body-guard, as we saw earlier. 
This solidarity was fiirther reinforced by what amounted to the playing of team 
games; hunting was a particular favourite amongst Macedonians. The scene 
depicted in tomb II at Vergina^probably shows a royal hunt and gives a good 
illustration of this preoccupation, one which can be amply supported by the 
sources: The conspiracy of the pages occurred after a royal boar hunt, and whilst 
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in India Alexander took part in the hunting of elephants.^ ^ Alexander won great 
personal renown by personally hunting and slaying a lion during which episode 
Plutarch"*" links the ethos of hunting with that of the warrior. The hunting of less 
fearsome quarry was also undertaken; apparently the act of hunting was 
enjoyable in itself, even i f the animal being hunted was of no threat to the hunter. 
Highly organized competitive games were also played relatively frequently 
throughout Alexander's reign. It is by no means surprising that they tended to be 
played at critical junctures during the campaign when group solidarity needed to be 
reinforced or when there was some other pressing psychological need. Soon after 
the crossing into Asia Minor, when the army visited Troy, Alexander held a 
competitive race with the Companions in honour of Achilles.'*'^  Whilst in India, 
after the army had refused to follow Alexander any further, he was presented with 
an acute problem of how to restore solidarity and repair the psychological damage 
the army's refusal had caused; part of this process was again to hold competitive 
games."*"* Even during less stressfiil times games played an important role in 
creating and maintaining the army's spirit: Plutarch"*^  tells us of Alexander and his 
Companions playing some kind of ball game together, and it is clear that banquets 
would often be punctuated by contests or games of one kind or another."*^  
A fiirther important factor in the creation of an effective army is its attunement to 
violence; this comes either naturally because of the society from which the 
individuals come, or is imparted artificially."*' In this regard the Macedonians were 
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almost uniquely positioned: even during times of peace, which were rare, they lived 
a vigorous outdoor lifestyle which was not conducive to the development of more 
delicate sensibilities. Further to this, decades of almost ceaseless warfare must have 
left them almost totally desensitised to violence, a sadly desirable quality when 
forging an army. 
The final factor essential for creating an army was leadership. The leadership 
provided by both Philip and Alexander is legendary, but this is far from the whole 
story. We should not forget that quality leadership was spread liberally throughout 
the army. Whether Alexander's officers were new or inherited from Philip they 
were generally of the highest quality, men like Parmenio, Perdiccas, Coenus, 
Cleitus, Ptolemy, etc. It is clear that Alexander took great care in selecting and 
training his officers, time that was evidently well spent. These officers are often, 
unsurprisingly, overshadowed by Alexander in the sources, but they are praised by 
Curtius"^ for their bravery during the battle of Gaugamela. 
Organisation - The Commanders. 
In Greek warfare a phalanx was a heavily armed mass of infantrymen who fought 
as a coherent mass. They wielded spears in their right hands and carried a large 
shield in their left. This led to the tendency described by Thucydides^" for men to 
move not only forward, but to the right as well in order to gain greater protection 
from the shield of the hoplite stationed there. '^ The hoplites that fought in these 
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phalanxes were relatively untrained, being citizens of the various city-states who 
were pressed into service as situations demanded. The hoplite phalanx was 
therefore a relatively inflexible body mostly incapable of complex manoeuvres.^ ^ 
The hoplite phalanx also possessed an individual commander. The Macedonian 
heavy infantry on the other hand were a highly trained professional force; they 
were extremely flexible and capable of fighting on any terrain that Alexander 
encountered during the campaign. Thepezhetairoi were organized into 6 distinct 
taxeis, each having its own taxiarch.^^ Each individual taxis could be used as a 
separate tactical unit, or be grouped together with other taxeis or other units to form 
what the Wehrmacht would have termed Kampfgruppen.^ "* The Macedonian heavy 
infantry possessed no overall commander; these factors being considered as a 
whole it is clear to see that the Macedonian pezhetairoi represent something of an 
evolution from the standard phalanx. 
The army of invasion contained 6 taxis of heavy infantry and 3 of hypaspists, 
totalling 12000 men.^ ^ Each taxis had a nominal strength of 1500 men, giving a 
total of 9000 pezhetairoi with the invasion force. Diodorus tells us that an equal 
number, 12000, infantry were left behind in Macedonia with Antipater.^' We are 
not explicitly told but the obvious assumption is that there were 9000 pezhetairoi 
and 3000 hypaspists, the same as there were with the invasion force. 
The battle of Gaugamela was the first instance where Alexander needed every 
available man and is therefore what Tam^ ** describes as a 'fixed point'. We know 
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for certain that there were 6 taxeis at Gaugamela. Al l are named by Arrian, those 
commanded by: - Perdiccas, Craterus, Coenus, Amyntas, Meleager and 
Polyperchon. Amyntas, although named, was not present at the actual battle; he 
was away recruiting in Macedonia. Who actually commanded his taxis is far from 
clear; Tam^" and Berve^' both opt for Simmias, but Bosworth "^^  points out that this 
is the minority choice, believing that Aristobulus was in command, although the 
vulgate sources name Philippus as the temporary commander. Amyntas died in 
Drangiana^^ and his brother, Attalus, was gives his command. Meleager, 
Polyperchon and Attalus all outlived Alexander and maintained their commands 
until his death; they may therefore be regarded as fixtures. But between the assault 
on the Persian Gates and his return fi-om India we are given the names of 6 other 
taxiarchs, Alcetas, Antigenes, Cleitus the White, Gorgias, Peithon and Philotas; 
whilst 3 of the original taxiarchs, Craterus, Coenus and Perdiccas, were given 
promotions to various positions. What may be regarded as another 'fixed point' 
was the battle of the Hydaspes; here there are clearly 7 taxeis. How do all of 
these names fit together? Berve^ believed that there were in fact 9 or 10 taxeis in 
India but there is no positive evidence of reinforcements fi-om Macedonia arriving 
after 330, and therefore there could not have been the increase in numbers required 
to create another 2 or 3 taxeis after the battle of the Hydaspes as would be required 
by Berve's theory. The additional names can probably be accounted for as being 
temporary commanders such as Simmias^^ at Gaugamela. Let us now look at each 
of the taxeis individually to discover how many taxeis there were and who were the 
commanders. 
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There were three taxiarchs who remained in their positions until after the death of 
Alexander: as mentioned above, these were Meleager, Polyperchon and Attalus, 
and they therefore require no fiirther comment. 
Perdiccas' taxis. 
Perdiccas' taxis is not mentioned again after the battle of Gaugamela and we 
know that he was promoted before Sogdiana; his taxis therefore must have been 
given a new permanent commander and therefore a new name. At the Persian Gates 
Philotas appears as taxiarch. Tam*"^  believes it can only be the taxis formerly 
commanded by Perdiccas that is being referred to. This is unlikely to have been an 
extra battalion as Berve'" supposed, because Alexander had not had the time for 
any reorganization between Gaugamela and the Persian Gates,'' and the only place 
he received any Macedonian reinforcements was Susa and we are told specifically 
that they were incorporated into the 6 existing taxeis^^ There is, however, a 
problem: when Ptolemy was detailed to capture Bessus, he was given command of 
a number of troops that included Philotas' taxis; these were the only heavy 
infantry troops he was assigned. The problem occurs in Arrian 4.24.10: Alexander 
formed two columns, commanded by Ptolemy and Leonnatus, besides that 
commanded by himself Arrian clearly implies that Ptolemy was given 2 taxeis, 
those of Philotas and Philippus. Philippus' taxis cannot have been a heavy infantry 
taxis because there were 7 at the Hydaspes and the 1^ taxis, that of Cleitus, had 
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already been named.^ "* The solution that Tam^^ proposes and Bosworth^^ in general 
terms agrees with is that the term taxis was used by Arrian as a utility word, and 
could refer to units outside of the heavy infantry. Both Philotas and Leonnatus were 
given 2 taxeis, in Leonnatus' case those of Attalus and Balacrus; this latter is 
clearly the unit of javelin-men that Balacrus commanded at Gaugamela^^ and the 
Jaxartes.'* Bosworth^^ is opposed to the view that any heavy infantry were used in 
this campaign: he points out that speed and mobility were all important, and that a 
phalanx battalion would be ill equipped and entirely unsuitable for such an 
operation. I believe that there were in fact two taxeis involved in this campaign, 
those of Philotas and Attalus, and I will hope to show that the Macedonian heavy 
infantry were in fact nothing of the sort when compared to other infantry troops of 
the day, and that at times like these they may well have used a regular infantry 
spear, rather than the sarissa, in order to gain greater speed and mobility. 
Craterus' taxis. 
There was no change in command of this taxis until the army reached Bactra. 
When Alexander set off to suppress the revolt in Sogdiana, he left Craterus in 
military command of the region of Bactria.*" After this time Craterus regularly 
acted as essentially Alexander's second-in-command, often with licence to act 
independently. It is unlikely that he could have held this new post and retained 
command of his taxis; it must then, have been given a new taxiarch. We know that 
4 taxeis were assigned to him in Bactria,**' those of Polyperchon, Attalus, Meleager 
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and Gorgias.*^ The first three names are fixtures as already noted, but this is the 
first time we meet Gorgias as commander of a to/.s, and presumably it must be that 
formerly commanded by Craterus as his former troops would more than likely still 
be under his overall command. When Alexander returned from Sogdiana he sent 
Craterus to Catanes and Austanes to reduce these areas; Craterus was assigned 4 
taxeis for the task, presumably the same 4 which he had formerly commanded: they 
were called those of Polyperchon, Attalus, Alcestas and 'his own'. **"* 'His own' 
probably refers to the taxis formerly commanded by Craterus, but now under the 
command of Gorgias. The third of the taxeis mentioned was commanded by 
Meleager and not Alcestas. Alcestas did not gain a command until Gandhara; 
Tam**^  believes this to be a simple mistake of Arrian. 
Coenus' taxis. 
Coenus was certainly still commanding his taxis in Gandhara*^ but was promoted 
to the command of a hipparchy of cavalry probably at Taxila, a hipparchy which 
he later commanded at the Hydaspes; his battalion must therefore have received a 
new commander. There are 3 names oi taxiarchs that we have not accounted for, 
those of Cleitus the White, Antigenes and Peithon; who therefore was Coenus' 
successor? It certainly was not Cleitus as Alexander had Coenus' taxis with him in 
Gandhara**" whilst Cleitus' taxis was with Hephaestion and Perdiccas.**^  Peithon is 
not mentioned in the narrative until much later and so, Tarn believes, the new 
commander of Coenus' taxis must have been his son, Antigenes.'* The 7 taxeis at 
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the battle of the Hydaspes are therefore those of Alcestas and Polyperchon, ^' 
Meleager, Attalus and Gorgias, Cleitus and Coenus.^ ^ By this time as we have 
just mentioned Coenus was no longer commanding his taxis, he had been promoted 
to command a hipparchy, his battalion now being commanded by Antigenes. We 
can be certain that Antigenes did in fact command a taxis in the battle, and there 
is no real alternative to assuming it was that of his father, Coenus, even though the 
old battalion name was still being used. After the battle of the Hydaspes, Coenus' 
taxis is named as such a fiirther 2 times. It was left behind at the Acesines^ ^ with 
Coenus himself shortly before his death and is referred to as Antigenes' taxis 
thereafter. 
Cleitus' taxis. 
As mentioned previously Alexander originally possessed 6 taxeis; Cleitus' was 
the seventh. It is specifically named for the first time soon after the army crossed 
the Hindu Kush Mountains and its origins therefore can be dated to Bactra.^ 
Alexander took Cleitus' taxis with him when he crossed the Hydaspes, along with 
that of Coenus. Coenus' taxis can legitimately be regarded as one of the foremost 
taxeis of the heavy infantry as it was selected to lead the attacks on both Tyre and 
Aomus. It is likely therefore as Alexander picked these 2 taxeis that the new 7* 
battalion was not made up of raw recruits. Tam^^ believes that it was a seasoned 
taxis sent to Asia by Antipater after his defeat of Agis, the Spartan king. 
18 
On the death of Coenus, which occurred just before Alexander set sail down the 
Indus, Cleitus was promoted to the command of his hipparchy as noted above, and 
Peithon'^ '* took over the command formerly held by Cleitus. This battalion appears 
under the name of Peithon for the first time during the Mallian campaign.^ ^ This 
man is not the same Peithon who was later named as being the son of Agenor, the 
fiiture satrap of Sind. This Peithon is clearly an important individual. He was given 
the temporary command of 2 hipparchies as well as his own taxis during the 
Mallian campaign:this is a position that a mere taxiarch would never have held, 
as a hipparch was of higher rank than a taxiarch and the former therefore would not 
have been placed under the command of the latter. Tarn'"' believes this Peithon to 
be the bodyguard, the son of Craterus, who was holding the interim command of a 
taxis but was in fact no ordinary taxiarch. 
The evidence therefore seems to support the idea that there were 6 heavy infantry 
taxeis until the army reached Bactra, at which point a 7"* was introduced. Whether 
Antipater had sent this 1^ taxis is an interesting idea but not wholly relevant; the 7'*' 
battalion certainly existed, we can also say with reasonable assuredness that there 
were never more than 7 taxeis. 
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Infantry Equipment. 
We should begin this section by discussing the principal offensive weapon of the 
heavy infantry, the sarissa, or pike, before going on to discuss the defensive 
equipment that they used. This section relies heavily upon Manti'"^ and Markle.'"'* 
The literary evidence can tell us much about the sarissa. Appian'"^ describes the 
infantry sarissa as a "long spear," whilst the anonymous Byzantine historian'"^ 
contrasts the "long spear" of the infantry with the "spear" of the cavalry and 
Aelian'"" contrasts the dorata'"' of the peltasts with the sarissa of the heavy 
infantry, noting that the Macedonians were armed with a much longer weapon. 
Lucian'"* tells us that the sarissa had a sharp iron blade at the fore and a spike on 
the aft of the weapon, in order that the pike might be dug into the ground so as to 
impale a charging horseman or infantryman. The butt-spike also acted as a counter 
balance, '"^ allowing the weapon to be held closer to the aft, enabling more of the 
weapon to be projected to the front of the infantryman. 
Theophrastus, a contemporary source, tells us that the longest sarissa was 12 
cubits, or 18 f e e t ; w h i l s t Asclepiodotus"^ adds that smallest pike was not 
shorter than 10 cubits, or 15 feet."^ Soon after the death of Alexander, around 300 
Cleonymus of Sparta had increased the length of the sarissa to 16 cubits,' and in 
addition to this 16 cubit pike a 14 cubit one was also issued; this was the one which 
was most commonly used."^ 
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The shaft of the sarissa was made of cornel wood"^ which gave the best 
combination of straightness, hardness and elasticity, " ' i n these respects cornel 
wood was believed to be superior to all other woods available. Cornel wood was 
also deemed suitable because of its great abundance throughout the Balkans, and 
was common as far east as Syria. 
From a brief examination of the literary evidence we can draw a number of 
conclusions:-
1. The infantry sarissa was longer than the cavalry sarissa, and longer than the 
standard spear and javelin. 
2. The infantry sarissa was issued in 10, 12, 14 and 16 cubit lengths.' "* 
3. The sarissa was constructed from a cornel wood shaft. 
4. An iron blade was affixed to the fore of the weapon, and a butt-spike was affixed 
to the aft to dig into the ground or act as a counterweight. 
The visual evidence can provide us with more information. The Boscoreale mural, 
which probably depicts Alexander IV, the son of Alexander the Great, his wife 
Roxanne and his tutor, '"^ shows the figure of Alexander IV holding a sarissa, the 
upper part of which is hidden by the architrave above and behind him.'^° The 
weapon can be identified as an infantry sarissa because of its evident size, even 
though much of it is not visible, and from the buttspike that is clearly visible in the 
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foreground, distinguishing it from a cavalry sarissa as this had a large weapon head 
on its aft point.*^* The shaft of the sarissa appears to be of approximately uniform 
diameter throughout its visible length. Tightly wound around the shaft at a point 
closer to the aft than the fore of the weapon is a cord of some unknown material, 
most likely leather. This is undoubtedly a handgrip serving two main purposes, to 
ensure that the user was able to hold the weapon i f it became slippery during battle, 
and to define where the weapon was to be held. This essentially ensured that every 
infantryman carried the weapon in the same position so that each pike projected an 
identical length in front of and behind each individual soldier.'^ '^  This corded grip is 
quite distinct from that found on the cavalry sarissa, which consisted of a shoulder 
strap and wristloop.'"^^ 
The Alexander mosaic (Plate 1) is an intriguing piece of evidence; it probably 
depicts Alexander's final charge at the battle of Issus, with the figure of Alexander 
wielding a sarissa (Plate 2). The weapon is something of an oddity: it possesses a 
hand grip but no wristloop as would be expected on a cavalry sarissa, and is in this 
regard identical to the weapon in the Boscorale mural. The sarissa wielded by the 
figure of Alexander is also quite different from that lying broken in the foreground 
in front of Alexander (Plate 5). The portion of the mosaic that would depict the 
aft of Alexander's sarissa is missing, but the large weapon head along with the 
shaft which appears to be both thicker and longer than that of the cavalry sarissa on 
the ground sfrongly suggests that Alexander is being portrayed as wielding an 
infantry sarissa whilst on horseback. Militarily the wielding of a pike by a 
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cavalryman is next to impossible: it would have been simply too long and too 
heavy to have been wielded effectively in one hand, and would have been almost as 
difficult in two. Yet it is the wielding of such a weapon that Markle'"^^ expects us to 
believe when he says that".. .the cavalry sarissa differed in no significant way... 
from the infantry sarissa". '^ ^ It is also more probable that Alexander would have 
used his back-up weapon, his sword, rather than pick up a virtually useless infantry 
sarissa. 
The shafts of the sarissas depicted on the mosaic all appear to be of uniform 
diameter (Plates I , 2 & 4) and all possess the same weapon head. They also all 
appear to be equipped with a small tube just behind the weapon head. This tube is 
of the same colour, and thus presumably the same material, as the weapon head. 
This tube, hereafter referred to as a foreshaft guard (Plate 4), is of such a size that it 
would extend down the shaft to a point roughly equal to the level of the next row of 
sarissas protruding from the line. Its primary purpose therefore is to prevent sword-
armed opponents from hacking the blade off the sarissa and thus rendering the 
weapon useless.'^ '' Markle'^ ** noted the existence of this "tube", but concluded that 
it was a coupling-sleeve designed to join the two halves of the sarissa together, 
therefore obviously assuming that the sarissa was actually a 
two-piece weapon and not a single shaft. This is a highly unlikely conclusion as it 
would be very difficult for any join to be strong enough to hold two very lengthy 
and very heavy halves of a pike together. 
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The pictorial evidence for the infantry sarissa provides a level of support for the 
literary evidence; from the pictorial evidence alone we can conclude: 129 
1. The infantry sarissa had a large bladed weaponhead on the fore part of the weapon 
and a buttspike on the aft. 
2. A foreshaft guard was positioned flush with the weaponhead to protect the shaft 
from being severed by an enemy. 
3. The shaft was uniform throughout its length. 
4. There was a (probably leather) grip wrapped around the shaft of the weapon 
towards the aft, partly designed to ensure the weapon would not slip and partly to 
ensure that every man wielded the weapon in the same position. 
The material remains can provide us with yet more information. The numbers of 
sarissa heads, along with spear and javelin heads that have been found, are of 
sufficient quality and quantity to be able to distinguish between them. The artifacts 
found at Vergina include the iron parts of both infantry and cavalry sarissas along 
with hoplite spears and peltast javelins. The ordinary spear found at Vergina in 
tumulus 68 burial E'^" had an iron spear head 10 7/8 in. long and 4 "/2 oz. in weight 
and an iron buttspike of 2 Vz in. in length and a weight of 1 Vi oz. The spearhead 
and buttspike were found 6ft.2in. apart with some fragments of wood in the 
intervening space; the ordinary spear therefore can be assumed to be 7.32 ft. in 
length and weighing 2.5 lbs. Total. The cavalry sarissa consisted of a double-edged 
flaring aft blade of length 19 Vz in. and weight of 1.16 lbs, and a smaller fore 
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weapon head of 11 in. in length and 0.59 lbs. Total length of around 9 feet and 
weight of 4.2 Ibs.*^ * The infantry sarissa consisted of a 4 sided tapering buttspike, 
total length of 18 in. and weight 2.3 lbs. and a pointed weapon head with a large 
flaring double-edged blade of length 20 3/16 in and 2.7 lbs. Weight. It also 
included a foreshaft guard, discussed above. 
The fragments of the infantry sarissa can be identified as such for several 
reasons:-
1. The presence of the foreshaft guard and buttspike confirms the literary and visual 
sources. 
2. rhe similar socket diameters of both weapon heads and the foreshaft guard show 
they came from a weapon with a larger shaft than the ordinary spear, javelin or 
cavahy sarissa. 
3. The much greater size and weight of the weapon heads of the pike compared to 
the lance, spear or javelin. 
The physical remains of the infantry sarissa clearly confirm the existence of such 
a weapon and fiirthermore confirm the literary and visual sources. The 
archaeological evidence considered in isolation can tell us the following: -
1. The fore weapon head is both longer and heavier than the buttspike; the foreshaft 
guard places even greater weight to the fore of the weapon. 
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2. Both the fore and aft weapon heads of the infantry sarissa are larger and heavier 
than the corresponding elements of the cavalry lance and the spear/javelin. 
3. The similar socket diameter of the weapon heads and the foreshaft guard show 
the shaft of the pike to have had a uniform cross-sectional area throughout its 
length. 
Summing up the evidence. 
Whilst marching in open order each pikeman occupied a space of 4 cubits 
(laterally). The open order was employed for route marching'^^ but was also 
employed in certain combat situations in order to close with the enemy quickly 
whilst at the same time minimising casualties from projectile weapons. It could also 
be employed defensively i f the enemy might be expected to use chariots or even 
carts or wagons.'^" In close order each man occupied 2 cubits of space: '^ ^ this 
formation was the standard formation for manoeuvring on the battlefield'^^ and for 
fighting when a broad front was required or when less disciplined troops were 
encountered.'^ ^ The final formation employed by the Macedonian heavy infantry 
was the compact order, or locked-shield formation, during which time each man 
occupied only 1 cubit of space.''*" The compact order was used to engage an enemy 
which was equally disciplined,'^^ or when weight of numbers was more important 
than frontage; this formation was especially usefiil defensively to combat a charge 
by infantry or especially cavalry.'""^ When wielding the sarissa in both hands it 
would be necessary to rotate the shoulders so that they would essentially face the 
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enemy; thus a smaller space would be required left and right of each pikeman. Thus 
1 cubit spacing could be achieved laterally; it would not realistically be possible for 
each rank to be closer than 2 cubits to the man in front or behind because the 
spacing of the hands on the weapon required additional space, thus 2 cubit intervals 
were maintained from rank to rank. 
The Macedonian heavy infantry taxeis required very disciplined rank-depth 
spacing. Using a 14-cubit sarissa as an example, 4 cubits were taken up by the 
spacing between the infantryman's hands, and by the weighted rear portion of the 
weapon up to the buttspike. This left 10 cubits to project in front of the pikeman. In 
this case 4 ranks of sarissa would extend beyond the front rank at 2 cubit intervals 
and thus 5 ranks of sarissa heads would extend towards the enemy for each rank of 
infantry. The sarissa of the second rank would project 2 cubits behind those of the 
front rank, the 3'^ '' rank's sarissa 2 cubits behind that etc. The 2 cubits of each 
weapon that projects in front of the next rank of weapon heads would be protected 
by its foreshaft guard, preventing an enemy from hacking off the sarissa head.''" 
Projecting towards the enemy, then, was what would have looked like a virtually 
impenetrable wall of large spear heads. At the battle of Issus Curtius''*'^  described 
the Macedonians as an army gleaming not with gold and silver, but with iron and 
bronze; it would have been an awe-inspiring sight indeed. 
The relative effectiveness of this kind of formation required a high degree of 
discipline and training in each member of the taxis, but most particularly in the 
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front few ranks. This is why the front 2 ranks were manned by officers who earned 
a higher rate of pay than the rest, although Curtius tells us that the common soldier 
was no less skilled than the officers.''*"* The formation would only work i f every 
sarissa head was positioned correctly in relation to every other sarissa around it; 
otherwise gaps would form in the front of the line that could be quite easily 
exploited by even a relatively competent enemy. The extreme length of the sarissa 
was a huge tactical advantage for the Macedonian heavy infantry when first 
encountering an enemy who was equipped as a peltast or as a hoplite. Several ranks 
of enemy could be killed before the Macedonians were seriously threatened. It was 
a weapon that also brought with it serious disadvantages. The very size and weight 
of the weapon meant that it was exfremely unwieldy, and crossing broken ground, 
such as a river, was difficult'"^ The very nature of the weapon also meant that it 
provided almost no defensive protection: a short spear or a sword (Plate6) could be 
employed to some extent to fend off an enemy blow, but not a sarissa. I f it were 
dropped so that the infantryman could use his secondary weapon, a sword, in 
combat, then gaps in the line would immediately open in the 'wall of sarissas'; thus 
the main advantage of the weapons around it would be lost. Coupling this with the 
almost complete lack of defensive equipment (discussed below) I would conclude 
that the Macedonian heavy infantry were not at all a defensive formation, but were 
a strike weapon in much the same way as the Companion cavalry. A hammer and 
anvil analogy is often employed to describe the Macedonian army, with the 
Companions as the hammer and the heavy infantry as the anvil. This would imply 
that the phalanx was fiindamentally defensive: it certainly was not. I f this analogy 
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is to persist then the Thessalian cavalry should be described as the anvil, not the 
heavy infantry, as it is they who essentially performed a defensive role on the 
battlefield.'^^ 
Defensive Equipment. 
We have a number of literary clues as to the equipment employed by the heavy 
infantry, Polyaenus'''^ tells us that Philip, in order to train his troops, had them 
march 300 stadia under arms with their helmets, shields, greaves, pikes and also 
their provisions. The Amphipolis Code'"" generally agrees with Polyaenus' list and 
states that fines were imposed for the loss of any pieces of equipment. 
Since the sarissa required the use of both hands in order to wield it, the 
infantryman could only carry a small shield suspended from the neck and covering 
his left shoulder."*** Asclepiodotus"'*^ is our only source for the diameter and shape 
of the shield: he tells us that the Macedonian shield was made of bronze and that it 
was 8 palms in width and not too hollow. There is little doubt that the Greek palm 
equated to 3 inches, so the shield was 24 inches in diameter; the diameter of 
hoplite shields excavated at Olympia ranged from 31 to 39.3 inches.'^' It is 
unfortunate that these small shields are never portrayed in ancient art, '^ ^ but the 
reason for this is obvious enough: i f a depiction of the sarissa armed infantry did 
exist then the sarissa would so dominate the scene that the shields would either be 
left of f by the artist or completely hidden. Markle'^ "* proposed that the sarissa 
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would not have been the only weapon employed by the heavy infantry; he believes 
that they did not use it at the Granicus or at Issus, and that infantry that 
accompanied Alexander on operations that required speed and endurance would 
also not have carried the sarissa and small shield. He believed that at these times 
they would be equipped as regular hoplites, with a spear and hoplite shield.'^ 
Whilst this theory appears superficially interesting, there is no evidence that Philip 
or Alexander ever ordered the production of large numbers of hoplite panoplies for 
the heavy infantry.'^^ The expense alone would have been prohibitive, especially 
early in Alexander's reign when we know that gold was scarce. The training 
required for the heavy infantry to have operated with both types of equipment 
would also tend to indicate that hoplite panoplies were never used.'^ * It seems most 
likely that during situations when the sarissa was inappropriate a regular hoplite 
spear or javelin would be used, along with the small shield. The situations that 
Markle describes'" where speed is required would themselves suggest that 
relatively little equipment was used; a fiill hoplite panoply would probably slow 
down and sap the endurance of troops far more that carrying the sarissa would. It is 
fiirther unlikely that the baggage train would be employed to carry vast panoplies 
of equipment that were not at any given time being used. We know that Philip 
placed the greatest emphasis on speed and mobility, to such an extent that he 
banned carts and severely limited the number of servants that accompanied the 
army.'^" It is far from clear i f Alexander was quite as strict as Philip in this regard, 
but it is likely that he did adopt similar ideas. Although there were certainly more 
people that attached themselves to the army as it advanced through Asia these 
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people would generally have been left to trail miles behind the army; Alexander 
would not have allowed them to slow his progress. 
The heavy infantry wore very little armour. In order that mobility be achieved the 
weight of equipment had to be reduced: it is usually believed that the mass of 
sarissas offered a measure of protection, thus rendering the corslet a burdensome 
and expensive luxury. There was also a financial necessity for reducing the amount 
of equipment as Philip and Alexander could equip far more troops with lighter 
armour than they otherwise could have done. The corslet was not totally 
abandoned, however: officers tended to be issued with one, partly as a status 
symbol and partly as a necessity. These officers were then stationed in the front 2 
ranks of a tcais, these ranks being in the greatest need of protection. Thus the heavy 
infantry achieved the greatest combination of defence with mobility and offensive 
capability. 
The Problem of the Asthetairoi. 
There are 6 instances in Arrian where the correct manuscript reading is asthetairoi 
and not pezhetairoi.'^^ The word itself occurs nowhere else in ancient literature and 
therefore begs the obvious question, what are the asthetairoil. The word appears on 
one occasion'^ in the same sentence aspezhetairoi and Milns'*' argues on this 
basis that this is not simply another name for the pezhetairoi; he suggests a similar 
argument can be applied to the hypaspists. Bosworth agrees with Milns on this 
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general point, that "the asthetairoi are a hitherto unrecognized unit of the 
Macedonian Infantry". '^ ^ It is clear from the context in which asthetairoi is used 
each time that Arrian is referring to a unit of Macedonian heavy infantry with some 
special connection to the king'^^ and performing no discemibly different fimction 
from the pezhetairoi. The first reference to asthetairoi seems to indicate that there 
is only 1 taxis, but all later references describe them in the plural, taxeis, indeed 2 
passages strongly imply that the total number of asthetairoi taxeis is equal to half 
the total taxeis of heavy infantry in the Macedonian order of battle."^ Bosworth'^^ 
notes that at least 2 of the taxeis called asthetairoi, those of Coenus, Polyperchon 
and Alcestas, were originally recruited from the old kingdom of Upper Macedonia, 
he concludes that asthetairoi was a "technical term, used to denote the infantry 
from Upper Macedonia". Bosworth goes on to say that "These troops were 
absorbed into the national army long after the infantry had been organized into 
regular cadres". 
Bosworth then, believes the asthetairoi to be a generic term applied to any unit of 
heavy infantry recruited from Upper Macedonia. Goukowsky'^^ however believes 
the asthetairoi to be not whole taxeis, but a subdivision, a corps d'elite within each 
taxis. This theory is not wholly convincing: at several places, notably 2.23.2, Arrian 
clearly seems to be applying the term to Coenus' taxis in full, suggesting that the 
entire taxis carried the title not simply a part of it.'^'' The context does describe the 
storming of the walls of Tyre using assault bridges mounted on ships, so the entire 
taxis could not have taken part, but neither could the entire unit of hypaspists that 
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accompanied Alexander, and they are still referred to using their standard title. 
Both Coenus and Alexander took as many men with them as they could cram into 
their ships; there is no hint that these men were a specially selected elite. 
Griffith proposed an entirely different answer: '^ * he argued that during the siege 
of Tyre when Arrian makes his first reference to the asthetairoi there is clearly only 
1 unit that is described as such, that of Coenus.'^ '^  He goes on to argue that at Issus 
Coenus' taxis had been "promoted"''^ from the position it had held at the Granicus 
and that during both the battle of Issus and Gaugamela it held the position of 
honour on the extreme right of the heavy infantry,'" next to the hypaspists. On this 
reading, then, the term asthetairoi was a battle honour, recognition of particular 
bravery, and the fact that they were from Upper Macedonia is incidental.'" 
Griffith's case is strengthened when we consider that the number of^asthetairoi 
units did increase over time to a point where half of the taxeis were thus described: 
if this is the correct interpretation it would be an interesting piece of propaganda on 
Alexander's part, as it would have the effect of bonding these units even more 
closely to the person of the king and reduce regional affiliations and loyalties to 
individual taxiarchs. 
The Macedonian infantry seem to have consisted of 3 elements, the pezhetairoi, 
the asthetairoi who were also pezhetairoi, and the hypaspists whom we will 
consider next. 
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Macedonian Heavy Infantry: Footnotes. 
1. Because everyone both uses and (mis)understands it. 
2. The actual tactical role of the heavy infantry, and their differences from a 
standard phalanx, will be discussed later. 
3. The term pezhetairoi is extremely rare in ancient literature; its only occurrence 
outside of the period of Philip and Alexander is Plut. Flam. 17,8; the term also 
occurs infrequently in Arrian (he is the only Alexander historian to use it), e.g. 
1.28.3; 7.2.1; 7.11.3, and seems to refer to the heavy infantry battalions, 
excluding the hypaspists, see Bosworth (1980) 170. 
4. FGrHllVA. 
5. Foot Companions. 
6. FGrH\\5V3A%. 
I. Although he does not make it clear which Alexander, discussed below. 
8. Milns (1976) 91. 
9. 369-8. 
10. Diodorus 17.3; 17.13, attributes the introduction of the phalanx formation and the 
sarissa to Philip II but says nothing about the pezhetairoi as such. 
I I . See Milns (1976) 91 for details. Milns (1967) 509-12 argued that Theopompus 
was referring to the hypaspists and was simply confused by the Macedonian 
military terminology. Milns (1976) 91, however, reverses his posifion by 
claiming that i f any Greek would have been aware of these terms it would be 
someone like Theopompus who had spent time in Macedonia. 
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12. Momigliano{1935)3# 
13. Thucydides 2.100.2. 
14. See Milns (1976) 91 for details. 
15. Polyaenus 2.1.17 (on 394 BC). 
16. Xenophon HG 5.2.40, (on 379 BC). 
17. Milns (1976) 94, quoting a (then) unpublished Doctoral thesis by R.Lock. 
18. 2.19, this rather disparaging reference could refer to either a select body or all of 
the heavy infantry. 
19. FGrH 115 F 348 states that the pezhetairoi were a select group of infantry who 
acted as a royal bodyguard. 
20. Quoted in Milns (1976) 94. 
21. It has been pointed out that Alexander's position at the start of his reign was a 
comparatively insecure one and that he relied heavily upon the support of 
Parmenio and his family: see later. 
22. This is certainly the view of Green (1991) 18, who dismisses Alexander I I on the 
grounds that his reign was too brief 
23. Milns (1976) 96. 
24. See the following chapter. 
25. This conformity would certainly have existed within the heavy infantry taxeis, 
the hypaspists and the companion cavalry. It is likely that there was a certain 
amount of conformity of equipment within other units, but the wearing of a 
uniform amongst, for example, the mercenaries is unlikely. 
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26. See for example, Sekunda (1984), Devine, in Hackett (ed.) (1989) 104-29, 
Kingsley (1981) 39-46. 
27. Hammond (1989). 
28. With the possible exception of ancient Sparta, although even here there was 





33. Arrian 7.6; Plutarch, Alex. 71. 
34.3.2.13-14. 
35. Lloyd (1996) 172. 
36. Arrian 1.18.2; 2.5.8; 2.24.6. 
37. Andronikos (1987) 100-19, Whether this was the tomb of Philip is becoming 
increasingly debated but is not relevant to our discussion here: see Borza (1990) 
260-6,299/ 
38. Arrian 4.14. 
39. Arrian 4.30.7-8. 
40. Plutarch ^ /ex. 40. 
41. Plutarch ^ /ex. 23 mentions the hunting of foxes and birds. 
42. Plutarch ^/ex. 15. 
43. Arrian 5.29. 
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44. Games are frequently referred to on important occasions in Arrian, e.g. after the 
capture of Tyre 2.24.6; after the capture of Memphis 3.1.4; after the capture of 
Susa 3.16.9; after the capture of Zadracarta, the main city in Hyrcania 3.25.1; 
after founding a new city 4.4.1; at Taxila 5.8.3; after the battle of the Hydaspes 
5.20.1; after escaping the Gedrosian desert 6.28.3; at Ecbatana 7.14.1; at 
Hephaestion's fiineral 7.14.10. 
45. Plutarch ^/ex. 73. 
46. On ball games in general see Gardiner (1930) 230#; Harris (1972) 83 ff. 
47. Lloyd (1996) 175. 
48. Diodorus 17.65.3; Curtius 5.2.2-7. 
49. Curtius 4.16.31-3. 
50. Thucydides 5.71.1; cf. Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.18-19. 
51. This is the standard interpretation: for an examination of its veracity see 
Holladay (1982) 94. 
52. Although the actions of the Athenian hoplites at Marathon would tend to suggest 
that this was not always the case. 
53. A fuller discussion of the command structure of the infantry, including all of the 
sub-divisions of command, can be found in chapter 8. 
54. Lucas (1993). 
55. For a discussion of the hypaspists see the following chapter. 
56. Diodorus 17.17.4. 
57. Diodorus 17.17.5 is the only source that records the numbers of froops left 
behind in Europe; he records 1500 cavalry left behind also. 
37 
58. Tarn (1948) 2.142. 
59. Arrian 3.11.9, Heavy infantry taxeis can be identified as they were named after 
their commanders. 
60. Tarn (1948) 2.142. 
61. Berve(1926) 1.116. 
62. Bosworth (1980) 301. Only Ptolemy mentions the name of Simmias, and both he 
and Philippus are very obscure. 
63. Arrian 3.27.3. 
64. Tarn (1948) 2.142. 
65. Arrian 5.12^^ 
66. Berve(1926) 1.116. 
67. Or Philippus or Aristobulus: whichever theory is correct they were certainly 
temporary taxiarchs. 
68. Arrian 4.21.4. 
69. Tarn (1948) 2.143, This is not the son of Parmenio, but some other Philotas; it 
was a rather common name. 
70. Berve(1926) 1.116. 
71. Tarn (1948) 2.144. 
72. Arrian 3.16.11. 
73. Arrian 3.29.7. 
74. Arrian 4.22.7. 
75. Tarn (1948) 2.144. 
76. Bosworth (1995) 164-5. 
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77. Arrian 3.12.3; 3.13.5. 
78. Arrian 4.4.6, It should be noted that Berve made Balacrus another heavy infantry 
taxiarch. 
79. Bosworth (1980) 376; (1995) 164-5; CQ23 (1973) 252-3. 
80. Arrian 4.17.1. 
81. Arrian 4.16.1. 
82. Bosworth (1995) 112, does not believe that these 4 taxiarchs were commanding 
heavy infantry battalions, he sees it as unlikely that Alexander would have 
detached 4 entire taxeis from the main army at this time. He sees these 
commanders as being in charge of mercenaries whilst temporarily detached from 
their commands. This argument of Bosworth's is, however, incompatible with 
the argument presented at Bosworth (1980) 376 and (1995) 164-5, where he 
does not see the logic in Alexander employing heavy infantry troops in terrain 
not suited to their use, yet here he essentially has all of the heavy infantry with 
the king in exactly such terrain. I believe that Craterus was given overall 
command of 4 heavy infantry taxeis; it became increasingly common throughout 
the campaign for taxeis to act singularly or in small groups rather than acting as 
a whole. It should also be noted here that Bosworth (1995) 140 believes that 
Craterus' taxis was taken over by Cleitus (the white) and not by Gorgias. 
83. Arrian 4.22.1; Curtius 8.5.2. Curtius adds that while in this region Polyperchon's 
taxis was detached for operations in an otherwise unknown area called 
Bubacene. 
84. Arrian 4.22.1. 
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85. Tarn (1948) 2.145. 
86. Anian 4.24.1; 4.25.6; 4.28.8. 
87. Tarn (1948) 2.146. 
88. Arrian 4.24.1. 
89. Anian 4.22.7. 
90. Tarn (1948) 2.146. 
91. Arrian 5.11.3. 
92. Arrian 5.12.1. 
93. An-ian 5.12.2. 
94. Arrian 6.17.3. 
95. Arrian 5.21.1. 
96. Arrian 4.22.7. 
97. Tarn (1948) 2.147. Bosworth (1995) 140, believes that Cleitus took over the 
command of Craterus' taxis after his promotion, but I think it more likely that 
Gorgias got that command and that this was a new taxis. Tarn's belief that they 
were veterans from Macedonian seems plausible enough, as Antipater no longer 
needed all of the troops that he had under his command. 
98. Peithon is the last of the taxiarchs that must be accounted for. 
99. Arrian 6.6.1. 
100. Arrian 6.7.2. 
101. Tarn (1948) 2.147; Milns (1976) 108 disagrees with Tarn, believing that the 
distances involved would preclude Antipater from sending troops from 
Macedonian to India; he believes that the 7"" taxeis was made up of Greek 
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mercenaries already with the army. I think this unlikely simply because Greek 
mercenaries were not equipped or trained sufficiently to perform the role of a 
heavy infantry taxis; there is also no evidence that any special training took 
place. 
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The Hypaspists were among the most capable and hard worked troops in the 
Macedonian order of battle, receiving no less than 28 mentions in the pages of 
Arrian.' With this in mind, then, it is perhaps surprising that some of the most basic 
details regarding this corps are far from certain; these include their origins and 
organization as well as their equipment; even their numbers are not directly known. 
Each of these issues w i l l be therefore examined separately. 
Origins o f the Hypaspists. 
The word 'hypaspist' is not a common one in Greek, outside the pages of Arrian; 
indeed amongst the Alexander historians Arrian is the only writer to give the corps 
its correct technical designation; the others tend to rely upon terms like doryphoroi^ 
and somatophylakes, ^ or Latin equivalents like armigerf or custodes corporis.^ 
This fact alone would tend to suggest that the term 'hypaspist' comes directly from 
Ptolemy, Arrian's main source for military and administrative matters, and is used 
in the Macedonian dialect to denote 'bodyguard', having lost its original 
significance o f a 'shield-bearer'.^ It is highly likely that this is because when a 
Greek writer was confronted by a highly specialized Macedonian military term he 
prefeaed to translate it into something more familiar, like doryphoroi. 
46 
The origins o f the soldiers themselves are a little easier to determine; although 
they were a fighting elite they certainly were not recruited from any kind of social 
elite; they were recruited from the same social class as the pezhetairoi, that is to say 
the peasantry o f Macedonia. Unlike the pezhetairoi, however, they were not 
recruited along tribal lines; each hypaspist taxis had no tribal or regional affiliations 
and was therefore connected exclusively to the person o f the king; the very name 
was probably chosen specifically to cement this relationship. Each hypaspist 
trooper was individually selected for his skill and physique^ and they received a 
greater level of training than the ordinary pezhetairoi, because far more was 
expected o f a member o f the king's bodyguard. The king who first instituted the 
corps of the hypaspists was, in all likelihood, Philip I I at some time after 356.^ 
They were, therefore, still a relatively new creation at the time of Alexander's 
accession in 336. 
Hvpaspist Equipment. 
Our lack of knowledge is probably more clearly demonstrated with this most basic 
question than with any other aspect o f the hypaspists. A view that prevailed for 
some time* was that the hypaspists were more lightly armed than the pezhetairoi; 
there were several reasons for this conclusion; representations o f soldiers on coins, 
thought to be hypaspists, wearing no body armour and carrying a spear; the fact 
that Alexander took the hypaspists with him on forced marches, along with the 
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Agrianian javelin men, whilst leaving the pezhetairoi behind to follow at a slower 
pace, " and comparisons between them and the peltasts of Philip V. '^ The main 
passage in Arrian that can be cited to support Parke's view that the hypaspists were 
more lightly armed than the pezhetairoi is 2.4.3, Alexander's march to the Cilician 
Gates. In this case Arrian tells us that in order to surprise the defenders Alexander 
left the heavy infantry with Parmenio and advanced under cover of darkness with 
the guards and the Agrianians. It is dangerous to draw the conclusion that the 
hypaspists were more lightly armed that the pezhetairoi from this passage; as 
Milns'^ points out Arrian is here drawing a comparison between the column that 
Alexander took with him and the rest of the army as a whole, not specifically the 
pezhetairoi. I think it likely that on occasions such as these, Alexander took with 
him the hypaspists because o f their superior training and discipline, and that on 
such occasions it is highly likely that they would have been equipped with a hoplite 
spear or javelin and not with a sarissa which would have been a liability whilst 
marching through mountainous terrain at night. 
We may reasonably conclude that as the hypaspists were stationed to the right of 
the pezetairoi in the front line at Issus and Gaugamela they were equipped in a 
similar manner; their defensive equipment must have been the same because i f they 
were armoured as skirmishers they would have been annihilated in any prolonged 
frontal assault. The main tactical advantage that the pezhetairoi had over enemy 
hoplites was the sarissa, and I think it fiirther safe to conclude that at the very least 
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during the set piece battles this was also the main offensive weapon of the 
hypaspist corps 14 
There is no literary or archaeological evidence that conclusively shows the 
hypaspists as being more lightly equipped than thepezhetairoi, however, the 
circumstantial evidence from their activities and position during the set piece 
battles indicates that they were equipped in a manner that was identical, or at least 
almost identical, to the pezhetairoi, although the lack o f direct evidence for either 
point of view must be remembered. We can also say, however, with rather more 
certainty that the level o f training the hypaspists received was sufficient to allow 
them to use a hoplite spear or javelin as their primary weapon as circumstances 
dictated, and it was at these times that they could be considered as being more 
lightly equipped than the pezhetaeroi. 
Arrian frequently uses military terms in a vague and imprecise manner; his use 
of such terms as 'light' and 'heavy' is often contradictory and confused and he 
cannot be taken as anything more than a general guide as to the equipment o f the 
units involved, and sometimes not even that. A t 3.18.1 / A r r i a n classes the 
Thessalian cavalry as being 'heavy' and the Companions as being 'light'. To the 
best o f my knowledge, however, nobody has taken this passage to mean anything 
of the sort.'^ Arrian is not entirely to blame here, however, as use o f such terms in a 
military context is always rather subjective. Peltasts were lightly equipped whilst 
hoplites were heavy; the main difference was that the former wore no armour. 
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Since we have seen that the only the front couple o f ranks of the pezhetairoi wore 
any armour, it would hardly seem plausible for the hypaspists to have served as 
front line troops with less armour than the pezhetairoi. 
Organisation. 
With regard to the tactical subdivisions within the hypaspist corps we have 
virtually no information from our sources. The very fact that there were 3000 
hypaspists is never explicitly stated in any of the extant historians and is only 
inferred from the fact that the hypaspists occupied the same frontage as 2 
pezhetairoi taxeis at Issus.'^ ^ This general confusion led Berve^' to suggest that 
there were in fact 3 kinds of hypaspist, the 'Royal' hypaspists or bodyguards of the 
king, the actual hypaspist-corps and, after 327, the argyraspids whom he believed 
to be an elite. Tam'^^ showed that this theory was false; there was never anything 
but the original hypaspists. 
With regard to the subdivisions of the hypaspists, Berve,^^ on the basis o f certain 
texts, argued that originally the corps was organized into tactical units of 500 
men, one of which was the agema. Tarn, by implication at least, believed that 
the hypaspists had always been organized into 3 units of 1000 men.^^ It is certain 
that at some point the hypaspists were organized into chiliarchies,^^ but the 
passages in Arrian where he cites the term are all in later books, the earliest being 
at the end o f book 4.^* The term "chiliarch", i.e. the commander of a chiliarchy. 
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does occur in Arrian before book 4; during the siege of Halicamassus, a 
Macedonian officer called Adaeus is given the title chiliarch. There is nothing in 
the text o f Arrian that even suggests that Adaeus was an officer of the hypaspists; 
other bodies of infantry could well have been organized into 1000 men units, the 
mercenaries for example, and therefore this cannot be taken as proof that the 
hypaspists were organized into chiliarchies any time before the capture o f the 
Aomus Rock. 
They key evidence is Curtius 5.2.3 j f . Late in 331, when the army was near Susa, 
Curtius says that "lest the men become slothful through idleness and so relax their 
minds, he (Alexander) appointed judges and put forward novel rewards to those 
who entered a contest concerning military prowess. For those who should be 
judged the bravest were to have the command o f 1000 men each. It was on that 
occasion that the force were for the first time divided up into this number; for 
previously they had been in cohorts o f 500 men and bravery had not been the 
yardstick for rewards". What followed was a list of 8 soldiers who received the 
prizes awarded by the judges; the final verdict apparently was dependent upon the 
approval o f the army: the list o f 8 names appears in descending order of merit. 
Shortly before this contest 6000 Macedonian infantry and 500 cavalry 
reinforcements under the command o f Amyntas, son of Andromenes, reached the 
army.^' Berve"*^ believed that within these 6000 reinforcements were 1000 
hypaspists, taking their paper strength to 4000; he also believed that the change to 
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chiliarchies occurred at or just before the contest in Curtius. The victors of the 
contest, Berve believed, were given the rank o f pentacosiarchs, thus he has 4000 
hypaspists divided into 4 chiliarchies of 1000 men, each chiliarchy being divided 
into 2 pentacosiarchies. 
This argument is suspiciously neat and there are certainly problems with it. Arrian 
strongly implies that the 6000 infantry reinforcements were only pezhetairoi and 
not a mixture of pezhetairoi and hypaspists. There is no evidence in any source that 
the numbers of hypaspists was ever raised to 4000. Such evidence as exists tends to 
suggest that their numbers remained relatively constant at or around 3000: in 
India (Gandahara) for example Ptolemy was given command o f "the third part o f 
the hypaspists"; this is far more likely to be 1/3 o f 3 taxeis rather than 1/3 of 4. 
We also know from Diodorus^^ that by 318 the hypaspists, now called argyraspids, 
numbered not more than 3000. 
What can we make o f Curtius' narrative? We can probably deduce that Curtius is 
referring to the hypaspists even though he does not explicitly say this, as we can 
say that Alexander would not have made such big issue out of reforming the 
League of Corinth troops (who were to be dismissed very shortly after this 
anyway)^^ nor the mercenaries or Balkan allies, and we have no evidence at all that 
the organization of the heavy infantry was ever changed in this manner. The 
question remains, however, is Curtius to be believed? He is, after all, the only 
source to mention this reform. I think the answer is in two parts: we perhaps can 
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believe that there was a reform at this time in which the hypaspists were 
reorganized from pentacosiarchies into chiliarchies. The reform is very simply 
stated and there is nothing particularly sensational about it that would make us 
doubt it. This is not a particularly strong argument, however; all we can really say 
is that the reform is plausible and there are no grounds to reject it. 
The question o f the manner in which the reforms took place is an entirely different 
matter. The chiliarchs of the hypaspists were men of great distinction and at least 
ranked as highly as a taxiarch of the pezhetairoi.It is virtually impossible to 
conceive that a man like Alexander would allow anybody or any process to make 
any officer appointment, let alone an appointment to a command (or significant 
sub-command) o f the elite heavy infantry units in the entire army, his own 
bodyguards. 
Milns^^ proposed a very plausible solution to this Curtius passage: he believed 
that either in Curtius or in one o f his sources there was a conflation of 2 separate 
incidents which both took place whilst the army was at or near Susa. The first was 
the reorganization o f the hypaspists into chiliarchies and the consequent 
appointment of chiliarchs; the second was a military decoration ceremony in which 
men who displayed outstanding bravery in previous campaigns were presented with 
some kind of rewards or awards. During this ceremony Alexander appointed an 
panel of judges for this purpose and rank and file soldiers were encouraged to voice 
their approval or disapproval o f the judges' verdicts; after all there could be no 
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better witness to bravery on the battlefield that the comrades-in-arms of those being 
rewarded. It is easy to imagine such a situation occurring and it would have been 
psychologically sound at this juncture, towards the end o f the war (as far as the 
Greeks were concerned that is!). 
Diodorus^^ appears to be using the same source as Curtius at this point, but his 
narrative is too vague and compressed to be of any real help; all we can say is that 
at this time the army was reorganized; we are not told which elements or what the 
details of these reorganizations were. 
This reform took place during the pivotal year o f 331, at which time many other 
elements in the army were reorganized or disbanded.'*' We can only speculate as to 
the purpose of this reform: the case that is often made for the reorganizations at this 
time is that they were to make the army more mobile, a realization of the changing 
topography that the army was about to enter. This argument can apply to the 
Companions whose new 16 lochoi would certainly have been more flexible than 
their old 8 ilai, but the reverse occurred with the hypaspists, they went from 500 
men to 1000 men units. It may be that Alexander had come to realize, as the 
Romans later did when they switched from the manipular to the cohort legion, that 
500 men was simply too small a tactical unit to operate independently. 
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41. For example, the League of Corinth troops were dismissed soon after this, as 
were the Thessalians, although most reenlisted as mercenaries, only to be 
dismissed a few months later. The Companions were also reorganized from ilai 




The following two chapters are devoted to the core of Alexander's army, his 
native Macedonian troops. Every element in the army was there to undertake a 
specific role, however small that role may have been; there seems little doubt, 
however, that without the Macedonian troops Alexander's conquests would have 
been difficult to say the least. The Macedonian cavalry can be divided into two sub 
sections, the Companions and the prodromoi; each of these will be dealt with 
separately. First, however, we will examine the total number of cavalry Alexander 
had at his disposal in 334. 
Cavalry Numbers. 
Diodorus is the only source that gives us the strengths of individual contingents 
within the army that crossed the Hellespont.' His account leaves us with problems 
in almost every part of the army, not least the cavalry, but with careful study we 
can eliminate many of them. We are fortunate in this regard that although we have 
no details regarding strength from other sources we do have troop totals as listed 
below: -
58 
Source Reference Cavalry Total 
Livy 9.19.5 4000 
Aristobulus FGrHUSFA 4000 
Justin 11.6.2 4500 
Callisthenes FGrH 124 F 35 4500 
Diodorus 17.17.4^ 4500 
Diodoms 17.17.4' 5100 
Ptolemy FGrH US ¥4 5000 
Arrian 1.11.3 Over 5000 
Anaximenes FGrH 72 ¥29 5500 
For the troop totals that they provide, Arrian's source was Ptolemy, and 
Diodorus', Callisthenes.'* The total of 4500 given by Diodorus corresponds nicely 
with that given by his source, Callisthenes, and by Justin. The actual total of 5100 
in Diodorus corresponds almost exactly with that in Arrian, and his source 
Ptolemy. Brunt believes that the difference of 600 lies with a contingent that 
Ptolemy/Arrian included but Diodorus/Callisthenes did not.^  Anaximenes on the 
other hand gives a larger total than any of the other sources. Given that it is highly 
likely that the Alexander historians would have had a general tendency to 
underestimate the size of Alexander's army and its losses etc, we are probably 
drawn towards accepting a figure that is towards the highest end of the estimated 
range, or perhaps a figure even higher still. 
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I f we accept as a starting point Arrian's, Ptolemy's and Diodorus' calculated 
figure of 5100 as being substantially correct, (and Bosworth does not: see footnote 
8), how do we explain the discrepancies with the other sources?. Why does 
Callisthenes give a figure 600 lower that Ptolemy? It is important to realise at this 
point that we do not have the actual words of Callisthenes, only Polybius' 
statement that Alexander possessed 40000 infantry and 4500 cavalry "for the 
crossing into Asia".^ Brunt speculates that Callisthenes gave two detailed army 
lists, the first for the army that was mobilized in Macedonia, the second for the 
army that crossed into Asia; Polybius provides us with Callisthenes' first list, not 
the second,' thus missing out a contingent picked up between Pella and the 
Hellespont; he speculates a contingent of 600 Thracian cavalry.* 
I f Anaximenes is in any way correct with his figure of 5500 cavalry, how can we 
explain the difference of 400 fi-om Ptolemy? I f we accept the idea that Ptolemy 
gave the army total for the crossing and Anaximenes is giving a total that includes 
the remnants of the> expeditionary force, is it likely that this force consisted of only 
400 cavalry? It can almost certainly be assumed that Philip would have realised 
that his enemies'"* main strength was in cavalry, not infantry. With this in mind it 
seems odd that the only cavalry that he sent with the expeditionary force were 
around 400 mercenary cavalry, and even these are not known directly: their 
presence is inferred from the fact the they are not present at Diodorus 17.17.4, but 
are with the army soon after during the siege of Halicamassus, and no 
reinforcements are recorded in the interim. I f the expeditionary force did contain 
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only 400 cavalry, then the figures of Callisthenes, Ptolemy and Anaximenes can be 
made to agree with very little difficulty simply by assuming that they were the 
troop totals at different times on the expedition. 
Were there only 400 cavalry with the expeditionary force, however? It is at this 
point that we first encounter the problems with the prodromoi. It is often assumed 
that Diodorus includes them in his army list: he does indeed use the word 
prodromoi, but actually says ".... 900 Thracian and Paeonian prodromoi with 
Cassander in command". As discussed below, however, the word prodromoi can be 
a generic term simply referring to "scouts", or it can specifically refer to a corps of 
Macedonian light cavalry. In this case I believe Diodorus is using it in the wider 
sense, meaning scouts without the ethnic meaning attached. 
Berve" believed that the 600 Macedonian prodromoi which Alexander 
undoubtedly possessed were included in Diodorus' figure of 1800 Macedonian 
cavalry. It is certainly true that Diodorus does not call the Macedonian cavalry 
Companions, but a figure of 1200 Companion cavalry seems far too low for the 
roles they performed in set-piece battles. We also know that there were 8 ilai of 
Companions and that each He consisted in all likelihood of 200 troops with the 
agema being of double strength; thus 1200 is not possible. 
I f Berve is wrong in his assumption, and Diodorus is talking about the Balkan 
light cavalry and not the Macedonian prodromoi at 17.17.4, then where were they 
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in 334? I believe it highly unlikely that Philip would have only sent 400 cavalry 
with the expeditionary force in 336, and no Macedonians at all.'^ I f the Macedonian 
prodromoi had been with the expeditionary force too, the 10000 troops sent to Asia 
Minor in 336 would have included 1000 cavalry and would have been far better 
equipped to meet and deal with the strength of their Persian opposition. Some small 
corroboration of this is that their commander at the Granicus was Amyntas, one of 
the commanders of the expeditionary force in 336. I f these assumptions are correct 
the cavalry forces would look something like this: -
Number Troops Joined army where? 
1800 Companion Cavalry Pella 
1800 Thessalian Cavalry Pella 
600 Supplied by the 
League of Corinth 
Pella 
300 Paeonian prodromoi Pella 
600 Thracian nrodromoi 
± 
en route to the 
Hellespont 




On this reckoning the troops that set off from Pella totalled Callisthenes' 4500, the 
troops that actually crossed the Hellespont give Ptolemy's 5100, including the 
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mercenary cavalry gives Anaximenes' 5500, but the real total of cavalry soon after 
landing in Asia was closer to 6100,'^ assuming few losses in cavalry from 336-4. 
Reinforcements. 
The first cavalry reinforcements that we hear of are 300 Macedonian horse that 
joined Alexander at Gordium.'"* Very soon after this Callisthenes, reported by 
Polybius, has 500 more reaching the army before it enters Cilicia. Tam'^ 
dismissed the evidence of Callisthenes here, claiming that he was no military 
expert, but this does not seem a necessary qualification to record the numbers of 
troops that arrived at any given point. Arriantells us of a fiirther group of 
Macedonian reinforcements that arrived at Susa, but gives no numbers. These are 
in all likelihood the same as those mentioned in both Curtius"* and Diodorusas 
having arrived at Babylon; they were 500 Macedonian cavalry, along with 6000 
Macedonian infantry. The difference in location is a minor point and is probably a 
mistake by one of our sources. This would mean that by late 331 Alexander had 
removed from Macedonia 3700 native cavalry.^ *^  
Brunt^' goes on to argue that probably 500 more Macedonian cavalry would have 
reached the army in 328/7, at the time the seventh heavy infantry taxis was formed. 
His reasoning seems plausible enough, but there is no positive evidence for the 
hypothesis. In all likelihood Alexander would have received no more Macedonian 
reinforcements until his return from India, during which time his losses would have 
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been serious. Casualties are always difficult to determine: along with the general 
tendency to understate the size of the army, casualties were also underestimated in 
a deliberate effort to make Alexander's victories seem all the more glorious. The 
only occasion where casualties are admitted is the one occasion when Alexander 
was not present^ ^ and therefore could not be blamed. Loses in battle would 
probably have accounted for only a small percentage of the total losses, with 
disease, starvation and fatigue being more significant factors, particularly during 
the Gedrosian disaster.^ ^ 
Prodromoi. 
We should first note, with a certain amount of surprise, that the ethnic origin of 
the prodromoi is far from clear. Frequently Arrian refers to the prodromoi with no 
reference to ethnicity '^* but at 3.8.1 he includes the Paeonians as part of this unit; at 
other times, however, he does differentiate the two.^^ Diodorus' army list for 334 
does not make the situation any clearer, calling the Thracians and the Paeonians 
prodromoi?'^ Tarn goes along with the evidence of Diodorus, calling the prodromoi 
Thracians and linking them with the rest of the Balkan cavalry, but he seems to 
be in a relatively small minority when taking this line. The confusion can in all 
likelihood be cleared up quite simply. The word prodromoi translates as "scouts"; it 
can thus be used to denote not just a specific unit, but a role too. The Balkan horse 
were light cavalry, as were the prodromoi, and thus could both be employed on 
scouting missions. We can probably assume that any confusion over their ethnicity 
64 
arises out of the non-technical or non-specific use of the word. Balkan cavalry 
could act as scouts, but they should not be referred to as prodromoi in any specific 
way. We can, I think, safely assume that the prodromoi were Macedonian, as 
Arrian frequently refers to them together with the Companion cavalry, whom he 
also never calls Macedonian. He similarly never refers to the hypaspists or the 
heavy infantry as being Macedonian, although there can be little doubt, whereas 
non-Macedonian units are carefiilly distinguished: although this is an argument 
from silence, it is not an unreasonable one, I think. We can go a little fiirther than 
this, though: the prodromoi always seem to have been stationed alongside the 
companion cavalry during the set-piece battles, and were quite separate from the 
Balkan cavalry, sfrongly indicating that they were separate units. 
Plutarch, in his account of the battle of the Granicus, says that Alexander 
charged into the river with 13 ilai of cavalry. Brunt^' identifies these 13 ilai as 
being the 8 squadrons of Companions and 5 of prodromoi. As discussed above, 
however, prodromoi in this passage simply refers to light cavalry; Plutarch is using 
the word in its non-specific sense. These 5 ilai of prodromoi therefore include the 1 
squadron of Paeonians, leaving us 4 ilai of Macedonian prodromoi. This figure 
corresponds nicely with Arrian 1.12.7, where he also gives 4 ilai of prodromoi, and 
later 4.4.6, where he lists 4 ilai of sarissophoroi. Bosworth points out that 
Plutarch gives no indication as to the nationality of his 13 ilai; they could 
conceivably have been Thracians or mercenaries. A total of 600 prodromoi seems 
the most likely; corroboration of this figure is given below.^" 
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The prodromoi seem to have been amongst the most versatile troops in the army: 
we could consider them as being the mounted equivalent of the Agrianians. As 
discussed above, the word actually means scouts, and in this capacity they would 
often have been sent well ahead of the main army to gain more accurate 
intelligence of the regions the army was about to enter. They would have been 
looking, not only for the easiest terrain through which the army could traverse, but 
also for sources of fresh water and supplies; this function was quite simply vital to 
the success of the campaign. Whilst on scouting duty they would have been as 
lightly equipped as possible, wearing very little armour and carrying a javelin 
rather than the sarissa.^ ^ The versatility of these troops becomes apparent when we 
consider the great set-piece battles. During these battles the prodromoi were 
equipped with the sarissa and were called sarissophoroi, or lancers. Their function 
was to act as anti-cavalry troops and they were deployed in open order, Bosworth 
noting that this was vital in order to prevent danger from the buttspikes of the 
sarissa to friendly troops riding behind the front line. 
However usefiil the prodromoi were in the early years of the campaign, they were 
evidently far from essential; we hear nothing of them after the reorganization of the 
army in 329. Tarn believed that they were demobilized and sent home, but 
Brunt,^* agreeing with Berve, suggests that this is highly unlikely even given 
Tarn's belief that the prodromoi were Paeonians. The far more likely fate of these 
troops is that they were incorporated into the newly formed hipparchies of the 
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Companion cavalry, discussed below. They were no longer required to perform the 
role ofprodromoi/sarissophoroi as they had previously: their role as scouts was 
taken by the increasing numbers of Persian light cavalry that the army was 
recruiting. Incorporation into the hipparchies meant that they effectively became 
Companions and in any future set piece battle they would be stationed alongside 
the previously existing Companions as they had been previously. 
Companion Cavalry. 
The Companion cavalry were among the most important units in the Macedonian 
order of battle. They were heavy cavalry recruited from amongst the nobility of 
Macedonia, 1800 in number at the start of the expedition. It is unknown i f any were 
left behind in Macedonia with Antipater but it is likely that some cavalry were left 
behind; but what they were specifically is unknown. There were originally 8 ilaf^ 
(squadrons) of companions, one of which was the Royal Squadron, or agema. It 
was the role of the agema to defend the king whenever he fought on horseback; and 
when satrapal governors or unit commanders were required they were usually 
chosen from amongst this group. The Companions seem to have been organized on 
a territorial basis: we know of 5 named ilai, those of Bottiaea, Amphipolis, 
ApoUonia, Anthemus**' and the "so-called Leugaean He". There is very little 
difficulty over the first four of these ilai names; they are areas of Thraceward 
Macedonia where Philip had established settlements.'*^ The exception is the 
Leugaean He: the name itself presents problems; it refers to no known place in 
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Macedonia and emendations to the text of Arrian seem to present more problems 
than they solve.''^  Arrian's qualification "so-called" may gives us a clue as to the 
solution: it may not refer to a specific geographical location at all, but may be a 
"native Macedonian title for the squadron",'*^ Bosworth believing it to be a unit 
recruited from the heartland of Macedonia and thus a much older unit, the other 
named ilai being those formed during the reign of Philip I I in newly settled areas. 
Bosworth does not say this but it would seem likely on these grounds that the other 
ilai, of whom we know little beyond their existence, could well have come from the 
heartland of Macedonia as well and may also have had non-territorial names. 
The average strength of an He at the outset of the campaign was around 215 men, 
with the agema consisting of 300,'*" giving a total cited earlier of 1800 troopers. 
This general organisation'*'' survived until the army reached Susa in 331, at which 
point we see the first of several reorganizations of the Companions. At this time 
Alexander received reinforcements from Macedonia: these were distributed among 
the existing ilai, but each He was hereby subdivided into 2 lochoi, under the 
command of a lochagos. Brunt''* supposes the reason for the reorganization was 
that by 331 there were more Companions than in 334, and that the ilai were 
becoming too large to fiinction satisfactorily as tactical units. 
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Hipparchies. 
In 334 the Companions were under the overall command of Philotas, but upon his 
death in 330 the command was divided between Hephaestion and Cleitus, 
presumably each given command of 4 ilai, although we are only told that the 8 ilai 
were divided between these two commanders, and each was given the title 
hipparch. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the hipparchies proper were 
also formed at the same time; this came two years later in 328. It has been 
proposed by Tam'*^ that after the murder of Cleitus in 328, Alexander took personal 
command of Cleitus' 4 ilai. He points out that in 327, when the army was divided 
in the Parapamisadae, Hephaestion and Perdiccas were sent via the most direct 
route to India^° with a large force that included 4 ilai of Companions. The 
remainder of the Companions, those that were formerly commanded by Cleitus, 
accompanied Alexander himself^' This organization imagined by Tarn does not 
seem likely; Arrian^^ does not say that Hephaestion had sole command of the 
troops that were sent via the direct route to India, indeed he strongly implies that 
Hephaestion and Perdiccas had joint command, presumably of the Companions as 
well as the other elements present. Indeed in 328-7 both Craterus^^ and Coenus^ 
were given commands of detachments of troops that included Companion cavalry, 
indicating that the command structure within the army was becoming more fluid 
and less reliant upon a small group of generals. 
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There are references to hipparchies before the murder of Cleitus^^ late in 328, and 
these deserve some examination as they may reveal an evolving system. The first 
reference is to the winter of 334/3: Alexander sent Parmenio to Sardis with "a 
hipparchy of the companions, and the Thessalian cavalry, and the rest of the allied 
troops and the baggage train". Griffith^' sees this as being a reference to a group 
of ilai; he believes that a single He of 200 men would be an "incongruous detail" 
compared with the many thousands of other troops under Parmenio's command at 
this point. He goes on to note that Alexander's winter campaign in Lycia and 
Pamphylia shows that very few ilai of companions took part as they receive only a 
passing mention in the sources, because the terrain was not suited to their 
employment. He sees the 8 ilai of Companions as being equally divided between 
Alexander and Parmenio, and therefore the term hipparchy would be used by 
Arrian to refer to a group of ilai, essentially what it means later. Simply because the 
Companions are seldom mentioned in Lycia and Pamphylia does not of course 
mean that they were not there, just that they were not used. The tens of thousands 
of Allied and mercenary troops that Alexander undoubtedly commanded are not 
mentioned at the Granicus; again this does not mean they were not present, just that 
they were not used. Both Bosworth^* and Brunt^^ believe that the term hipparchy is 
here anachronistically used by Arrian's source. Bosworth points out that there are 
occasions"^ where a group of ilai is not referred to as a hipparchy before the key 
date of 328 and that this is not an example of Arrian being "scrupulously pedantic", 
but simply of following the term used by his source. 
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The second example occurs in Sogdiana in 330: Ptolemy is given "3 hipparchies 
of the companions and all of the hippakontistaf (discussed below), and charged 
with the capture of Bessus. This reference is far more revealing: it is the first 
mention of the term hipparchy in a passage that definitely derives from Ptolemy."^ 
This passage is confiising because very shortly before this point Artian told us of 
the appointment of Hephaestion and Cleitus as hipparchs, but i f there were indeed 
at least 3 hipparchies then there should be at least 3 hipparchs. Griffith^^ again 
believes this passage to refer to 3 "groups of ilaf rather than 3 ilai with the term 
hipparchy being anachronistically used. Bosworthnotes that from this time the 
term He virtually disapars from Arrian's narrative; he sees a gradual reconstruction 
and reorganization of the cavalry forces lasting from 331 to 328, when the 8 
hipparchies emerge seemingly fully formed. I would tend to think that the 
hipparchy principle was one that evolved from the time of the murder of Philotas in 
330 and the appointment of 2 hipparchs, to 328 when we certainly have the 8 
hipparchies. 
We know then that there were 8 hipparchies in 328, but just how many were there 
at the time of the Indian expedition? Brunt*^ points out that no complete list of the 
hipparchies exists from this period, when Tam^^ believed they were first created, 
just as no list of ilai exists for the period before 328. We can infer from the sources, 
however, that Alexander possessed at least 8 hipparchies in India. Whilst at the 
confluence of the Hydaspes and Acesines rivers Alexander divided the army into 4 
parts (and later 5, see below), commanded by Craterus, Hephaestion, Ptolemy and 
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himself; each of the detachments was given orders to reunite at the junction of the 
Acesines and Hydraotes rivers.^' We know that Alexander had half the 
Companions during the Mallian campaign^* and we can only surmise that this 
would have included the agema, along with the two hipparchies that were are 
specifically told about, those of Perdiccas and Cleitus the White,**^  these both being 
detached for independent operations. When Alexander was at the Hydraotes he still 
had with him 2 hipparchies,one of which was commanded by Demetrius.'' There 
is no evidence that Perdiccas had rejoined Alexander before the attack on the city 
of the Malli.^^ Brunt'^ concludes that 'half the hipparchies' were in fact three. This 
figure is incorrect; just before the assault on the city of the Malli, Perdiccas still had 
not rejoined Alexander, Ptolemy was fighting elsewhere, '* Hephaestion was 
already waiting at the appointed rendezvous'^  and Craterus was in command of no 
Companions.'^ It therefore seems that there were 8 hipparchies along with the 
agema; Brunt has miscalculated. 
There is fiirther evidence for the number of hipparchies, evidence that again 
suggests that Tarn's" figure of 5 is incorrect. Our sources record the names of 6 
hipparchies, and Brunt supposes that the name of a seventh (and presumably the 
eighth) has been lost. '* They are: -
Hephaestion Arrian 5.12.2; 21.5 
Perdiccas Arrian 5.12.2; 22.6; 6.6.4 
Demetrius Arrian 4.27.5; 5.12.2; 16.3; 21.5; 
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6.8.2 
Craterus Arrian 5.11.3 
Cleitus the White Arrian 5.22.6; 6.6.4 
Coenus Arrian 5.16.3 
Although there are six commanders named, Tam^^ believed that there were only 
five hipparchies, believing that Coenus and Cleitus the White were successive 
commanders of the same unit; he believed that Coenus was left behind on the 
Acesines and Cleitus was given command after this. This is not possible, however: 
Coenus was left to supervise the crossing of the rearguard and we are specifically 
told that he had with him his hipparchy,*" so Cleitus could not have been given this 
command, his hipparchy must be a separate one. 
Although I tend to agree with Bosworth's conclusion that there were 8 hipparchies 
along with the agema^^ during the Indian campaign, we can not escape the fact that 
in 324 we are told of the addition of a fifth hipparchy. This would seem to cast 
doubt on Brunt's theory, but it need not. Losses during the Indian campaign and 
during the i l l fated march through the Gedrosian desert must have been heavy and 
it is certainly reasonable to assume that at some point the 8/9 under-sfrength 
hipparchies were reorganized into 4 and later 5. It would further seem likely that 
the initial division into 8/9 hipparchies occurred in 329 or 328 perhaps soon after 
the death of Cleitus. 
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Why the reorganization to hipparchies? 
Without detailed evidence from our sources on this question it is very difficult to 
answer with any degree of certainty. Several different ideas have been proposed, all 
of which carry problems. Hammond*^ believes the change to have been for 
essentially military reasons. He believes that after the discharge of the Thessalian 
cavalry Alexander reorganized his Companions into 8 hipparchies, these were 
subdivided into 2 ilai, each He being further divided into 2 lochoi. Since a hipparch 
was of a higher status than the old ilarches, Hammond sees this partly as a 
deliberate attempt to increase the numbers of senior cavalry officers, perhaps to act 
as a counterbalance to the infantry. He also sees a doubling in the numbers of 
Companions from around 2000 to around 4000. Hammond's other main reason 
for the change seems to be a tactical one, in order to make the heavy cavalry more 
flexible in order to deal with the changing theatre that Alexander found himself in 
and the changing character of the fighting that he was conducting. With this in 
mind Hammond believes that each hipparchy now consisted not only of heavy 
cavalry but also light cavalry. This allowed the new hipparchies to be deployed as 
skirmishers and quick response troops, but also allowed them to retain their role as 
combat troops in the more traditional sense. 
Brunt*^ believed that the reorganization was more for political reasons than 
military ones. He believes that there is a significant difference in the distinction of 
the eight ilarchs named at the battle of Gaugamela, and the later known hipparchs. 
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Of the former ilarchs only three are persons of note, Black Cleitus, who 
commanded the agema, Hegelochus, formerly one of Alexander's admirals, and 
Demetrius who retained his position, as one of the known hipparchs. The ilarchs 
did have some influence, they were allowed to attend councils of war for 
example,*^ but they are, with the three exceptions noted above, nonentities. On the 
other hand the later hipparchs were some of the most powerfiil men in the army, 
Hephaestion, Perdiccas, Craterus, Coenus, White Cleitus and to a much lesser 
extent Demetrius. Brunt believes that the change was at least partly due to 
Alexander's increasing distrust of his principal officers. The sentiments expressed 
by Black Cleitus before his murder, coming from a previously loyal commander, 
would have worried Alexander greatly, and he had no way of knowing how far 
such sentiment went, if other officers felt the same resentment. Thus dividing the 
heavy cavalry between as many senior men as possible would dilute any potential 
risk of an uprising. This does seem to be unlikely at this stage of Alexander's 
career, but he did become increasingly paranoid as time went on; besides, even if it 
was unlikely it was not necessarily unsound to divide the hipparchies in this way. 
This explanation in itself is not a sufficient reason for Alexander to change the 
whole organization of the cavalry so drastically: he could simply have made these 
powerful men ilarchs, and their status would have automatically increased the 
status of the rank the occupied. Brunt, quoting Griffith, says, "I doubt if it is 
military practice in general to change or switch old-established names like lochos 
and He (names universal in Greek practice and not only in Macedonia). And I think 
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an entirely new name (hipparchy) ought to predispose us to expecting an entirely 
new thing."^' It would seem then that the hipparchies were indeed a new creation, 
and not simply a larger version of an ile.^^ 
Bosworth^^ offers a third possible explanation: he believes that between late 331 
and 328 the Companion cavalry units were gradually reconstructed with the aim of 
reducing the regional affiliations of each He. After the arrival of Amyntas' 
reinforcements from Macedonia, new subdivisions of the ilai were formed and 
called lochoi. These lochoi were then grouped into new imits, tetrarchiai, perhaps 
comprising four lochoi each from separate ilai. There would therefore have been 
four tetrarchiai along with the agema. Bosworth fiirther believes that these 
tetrarchiai evolved into the hipparchies that are mentioned from 329 onwards by 
P*tolemy. If this is true then the hipparchies were not only larger than the old ilai 
but were also far more heterogeneous with little or no regional affiliations. This 
would have the effect of reducing their loyalty to their original regional 
commanders, who had more than likely been replaced by the more senior officers 
mentioned above; it would have the further effect that the troops would feel greater 
central loyalty to the person of Alexander himself This would be a further 
indication that Alexander was increasingly distrustful of his unit commanders and 
wanted to break any loyalty felt by the army for anyone but himself 
I do not believe that these theories are mutually exclusive. It is certainly true that 
the hipparchies were larger than the ilai (probably 1000 strong); it also seems 
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likely, judging by their actions, that the hipparchies were more versatile than the 
older units, and therefore may well have comprised some mixture of heavy and 
light cavalry. It also seems likely that Alexander was seeking to increase the status 
of the Companion cavalry to act as a balance against the heavy infantry: several of 
the hipparchs were former taxiarchs; this would no doubt have been presented as a 
promotion. It is also likely that Alexander wanted to make the army loyal to 
himself, and not to individual unit commanders who happened to be from the same 
region as the troops themselves. This reorganization seems to have been necessary 
for several reasons, both military and political, and is an indication of Alexander's 
vision, that one change could solve several actual or potential problems. We can 
also conclude that the change was relatively successfiil, as we seldom hear of the 
Macedonian cavalry causing Alexander serious political problems; their future 
actions also demonstrate how militarily successfiil this change was. 
Orientals. 
There is no doubt that Alexander made an ever-increasing use of oriental troops 
after the death of Darius. Arrian tells us of units of Arachosians, Bactrians, 
Parapamisadae, Scythians, Sogdians^ and Indians:^' all were part of the grand 
army that Alexander assembled by 324; we are told that the army reached the 
remarkable size of 120,000 at one point, only a small proportion of which could 
have been Macedonian. This being said, however, it is difficult to ascertain when 
Alexander first began to employ Oriental troops. At the end of 330 Arrian^^ tells us 
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of a new cavalry unit called hippakontistai; we know that they were something 
new, Arrian says as much, we also know that they were mounted javelin men and 
were as such light cavalry, but their origin is never attested. Berve '^* assumes that 
they were Persian deserters but this seems highly unlikely given that they also 
formed a significant part of the garrison of Areia; if they were Persian this would 
make them unique in that it was Alexander's general practice to employ 
mercenaries or allied Greeks as garrison troops, not Persians. Bosworth sees them 
as being Macedonian^ or European cavalry, the key being that Arrian links the 
hippakontistai with the regular units of the Macedonian army, the Companions and 
the Agrianians. 
The other possible reference to Persian troops employed at an early date are the 
hippotoxotai?^ There is much less confiision surrounding this unit, Arrian 
describing them as Dahae. This region surrendered to Alexander in the winter of 
328/7 and we can only assume that they supplied a contingent shortly after this 
date. They were horse archers but Bosworth^^ believes it is ".... unlikely that they 
were only horse archers." However, he is not specific in what he believes them to 
have been, perhaps a combination of horse archers and javelin men. The Oriental 
troops that we have mentioned to this point have all been brigaded into specific 
national units and used either separately or in conjunction with the Companion 
cavalry. It remains to be discussed if, and how early. Orientals were included in the 
hipparchies, alongside the Companions: there are essentially two schools of thought 
on this. 
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Brunt "^"^  believes that at the latest by 324 Oriental troops had been incorporated 
within the hipparchies themselves, and the complaints voiced at the Opis mutiny 
show this quite clearly. Bactrian, Sogdian, Arachosian along with horsemen from 
the Zarangians, Areians, Parthyaeans and the Euacae were all brigaded in the 
Companion cavalry.''" Further to this a fifth hipparchy (more later) had been 
created which was "not wholly barbarian", and several Oriental nobles had even 
been included among the ranks of the agema; these oriental troops were using 
Macedonian weapons and not native javelins. The Zarangians, Areians and 
Parthyaeans had been incorporated into the army in Carmania in late 325'*^ ^ and the 
Euacae soon after.'°^ The mention of the creation of a fifth hipparchy implies that 
for some time there had been only 4, but we know that in 326 there had been 8. 
Brunt'"'* and Berve'^^ both believe that the reduction from 8 to 4 hipparchies is to 
be connected with the losses incurred during the Indian campaign and the march 
through the Gedrosian desert: at some point during this time the surviving 
Companions were consolidated to prevent them from being seriously under 
strength. Brunt goes on to say that the increase in strength that must have occurred 
for the number of hipparchies to be raised from 4 to 5 was the result of Oriental 
(and possibly Macedonian) reinforcements, only a very few of which were included 
in the fifth hipparchy, which he believes to be what was formerly the agema. At 
this point for the first time the agema was given the designation hipparchy. The 
Opis mutiny passage in Arrian'"' seems to disprove this, noting the fifth hipparchy 
and the agema as separate entities, but Brunt believes the text to be corrupt and 
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proposes emending so that the fifth hipparchy and the agema are from this time 
forth one and the same. In short then. Brunt believes that Orientals were 
incorporated within the hipparchies very late indeed, probably as late as 324 or very 
soon before then. 
The second theory was proposed by Griffith, '"^  and is, at least in part, an 
argument from absence. He notes that all of the Oriental cavalry that are mentioned 
in our sources, be they as separate national units or actually in the hipparchies, 
represent only a small fraction of those that were potentially available to 
109 
Alexander. He notes that by the end of 330 the central and western satrapies 
were securely in Alexander's hands but that there is no mention in our sources of 
any troops from these safrapies having participated in any of Alexander's 
subsequent campaigns. By contrast, however, troops from the north east of the 
former Persian Empire, Bactrians and Sogdians for example, were incorporated by 
328,'before those regions were fiilly "pacified". Griffith agrees with Brunt that 
Arrian 7.6.3 (the Opis mufiny grievances passage) refers to the final reorganization 
of 324, and that this cannot be used therefore to prove Orientals in the hipparchies 
much before this date. Griffith goes on to say that the absence of any mention of 
these western and central Persian troops from our sources is a strong indication that 
they never served as separate units, but their absence may indicate that they were 
incorporated within the hipparchies from a relatively early date, thus achieving 
anonymity. 
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One of the strongest arguments that Griffith uses to argue his point is what he 
calls "an argument from general probability". "' He believes that from 330 there 
were very sound military and political reasons to employ troops from the recently 
conquered central and western satrapies. Militarily Alexander was always short of 
quality cavalry; his Macedonians had proven themselves invaluable many times but 
they were a limited resource. The nature of the warfare that Alexander was facing 
after Gaugamela was significantly different from the large set-piece battles that he 
had fought before this point, but this did not reduce his need for cavalry, it actually 
increased it. Troops that could move rapidly in response to any situation would 
now be at a premium and the Persian empire had always been renowned for its 
military strength being in its cavalry. 
Politically it was also vital, Griffith argues, to employ Iranian troops. Since 
Alexander's rejection of Darius' peace overtures in 333 Alexander had gradually 
been setting himself up as the legitimate alternative to the great king."^ There 
could have been no clearer sign of this status after Darius' death than to employ his 
new subjects in the army. We can probably go a little further than Griffith does and 
suggest that politically it would have had greater impact on the Iranians if they had 
been included in the ilai, alongside the Companion cavalry units, and not simply as 
separate units as happened with the troops from the north east of the empire. 
Griffith cites several passages of Arrian' '^  which he believes suggest at least the 
possibility of the hipparchies containing other than Companion cavalry, but the 
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evidence is far from conclusive. He finds himself returning to 7.6.3, the Opis 
mutiny passage, claiming that it shows that what really upset the Macedonians was 
the equipping of Persian troops already within the hipparchies with Macedonian 
spears, and that this was the recent innovation, but that the Persian troops had 
already formed part of the hipparchies "all through the Indian campaign". 
Hammond"^ follows Griffith's general thinking; including Persians within the 
hipparchies, but incorporates them from the early date of 328, claiming that a 
hipparchy now consisted of 1 He of Macedonian heavy cavalry and 1 He of Persian 
light cavalry. 
I would tend to lean towards Griffith's idea that it seems a very strange decision 
on the part of Alexander not to use any Iranian troops at all; there existed both the 
political necessity and the military requirement for them but there is unfortunately 
very little positive evidence for this poshion. The conclusion must be therefore that 
until fiirther evidence presents itself we have to accept that the earliest evidence for 
the inclusion of Oriental troops within the hipparchies is 324 or shortly before, and 
fiirther accept that we simply do not know why Alexander did not make use of the 
greatest natural resource of the central satrapies, their men. 
Macedonian cavalry equipment. 
In chapter 1 the Macedonian infantry sarissa was discussed; it seems appropriate 
to end this chapter by discussing the possibility of the existence of a specifically 
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designed cavalry sarissa. Until relatively recent times historians have tended to fall 
into one of two camps; either the cavalry did not use a sarissa at all, but something 
more like the standard spear, or the Macedonian cavalry did use a sarissa of 
exactly the same dimensions as that employed by the infantry; the possibility 
that a weapon could have been specifically designed for use by cavalry was ignored 
but will be examined here. 
The great advantage of the sarissa was that it enabled the wielder to outreach his 
opponent, to be able to strike before his enemy had any chance of landing a blow. 
This most basic advantage enjoyed by lancers was not specific to the ancient world 
but has persisted into modem times; the last recorded use of lance-armed cavalry 
was the 3'^ '* September 1939 when the Polish Pomorska cavalry brigade charged the 
German S*^** Panzer Division, with all too predictable results."^ 
Manti"^ begins his discussion of the cavalry sarissa (Plate 5) by attempting a 
'reconstruction' of the weapon; this would seem an appropriate place to start. We 
shall therefore examine the ancient and modem literary sources before looking at 
the pictorial and archaeological evidence for the existence of such a Weapon. 
According to Aristotle'^'' Alexander's cavalry used a sword as well as the sarissa, 
the anonymous Byzantine historian'^' contrasts the infantry's "long spear" with the 
"spear" of the cavalry, Appian'^^ uses similar language for the infantry weapon to 
that of the cavalry. Arrian'^^ also tells us that when Alexander enrolled Persians 
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into his army he replaced the Persian javelin with the cavalry spear, i.e. the sarissa. 
Aelian'^ "* gives us the vital information that the cavalry sarissa'^^ was no shorter 
than 8 cubits'^ ^ in length. Strabo'^^ gives us a good idea as to the weight of the 
cavalry sarissa when he tells us that it could be used both in hand-to-hand combat, 
or it could be thrown like a javelin, something you simply could not do with an 
infantry sarissa. Asclepiodotus'^^ also affirms that the cavalry use something 
different from other cavalry of the day, stating "The cavalry which fights at close 
quarters uses...long spears and is therefore called doratophoroi, or also 
xystophoroi". There are also of course Arrian's numerous references to 
sarissophoroi, as mentioned earlier, these are the prodromoi who are equipped with 
the sarissa during the set piece battles, again illustrating that Alexander's 
Macedonian cavalry used something other than the javelin. 
From the literary sources we also know that the shaft of the sarissa was made of 
cornel wood; '^ ^ this had been used for javelins since at least the 7"" century' 
because of its superior combination of elasticity and strength but also for its 
relatively low impact resistance; it would break rather than unseating the 
cavalryman from his horse. 
The cavalry sarissa had two spear points, one affixed to each end of the shaft. This 
was necessary because if the spear broke the cavalryman could simply turn the 
weapon around and use the other end.'^' In this regard the cavalry sarissa can be 
contrasted with that of the infantry which had only one spear point; on the rear of 
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that weapon was a butt-spike which could be driven into the ground so as to impale 
an onrushing cavalryman or indeed an infantryman. 
Manti'^^ points out that from the literary evidence alone, considering nothing else, 
we can conclude that the cavalry sarissa is: -
1. 8 cubits long. 
2. made from cornel wood. 
3. equipped with a spear point at both ends of the shaft. 
4. light enough to be thrown like a javelin. 
Visual evidence is often problematic due sometimes to the substrate upon which 
the image is placed, its degree of preservation or indeed the size of the image in the 
case of coins, but there is perhaps some supporting evidence. A funerary bas-relief 
from Apollonia in Epirus'''^ shows a mounted figure holding a double-pointed 
cavalry sarissa. The aft point of the weapon can clearly be seen to be larger than the 
forepoint, presumably to add weight to the rear of the weapon so it could be held 
closer to the rear, allowing more of the spear to protrude in front of the cavalryman. 
It is impossible to make a determination of the length of the weapon because of the 
size of the funerary monument; the artist found it necessary to foreshorten the spear 
in order for it to fit within the parameters of the monument. 
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The fresco from the Naoussa tomb depicting a Macedonian cavalryman drilling 
with his groom'^ '' shows the lance being held in the 3:5 position, that is to say 40% 
of the lance protruding to the rear of the cavalryman and the other 60% to the front. 
Therefore confirming that the aftpoint must have been heavier than the forepoint 
allowing the weapon to be balanced at this point.'^ ^ 
The Alexander mosaic (Plate 1), now in the Naples museum, depicts the presence 
of a strap on the lance which the cavalryman would use to prevent the weapon 
slipping in his hand; it would also be used to ensure the weapon would not be 
easily dropped, as the loop of the strap would be wound round the wrist. The sfrap 
would also be used to carry the weapon over the shoulder whilst marching, to 
prevent any accidental injuries to those around him. In the foreground of the 
mosaic (Plate 5), beneath Alexander, is a discarded lance. The lance is discarded 
presumably because both of its spear points are missing, but the strap and wrist-
loop are still present. Behind Alexander and to the left there is a Boeotian-helmeted 
figure that is striking an overhead blow with the aftpoint of his broken sarissa. 
These two figures, the Boeotian-helmeted figure and that of Alexander, depict what 
Manti and Markle'^^ believes to be the two basic combat strokes allowed by the 
cavalry sarissa. 
We can therefore conclude several points from the pictorial evidence: -
1. The cavalry sarissa has weapon points at both ends of the shaft. 
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2. The shaft is of approximately uniform diameter along its length and when used 
in combat is held in the 3:5 position 
3. It is held in one hand and can be used either to thrust underarm or to stab down 
on an enemy using an overarm stroke. 
4. The cavalry sarissa includes a strap for both carrying the lance over the shoulder 
whilst marching, and to help the rider grip and hold on to the lance during combat. 
The number of sarissa heads and hoplite spear and javelin heads that have been 
found are of a sufficient quantity and quality to be able to clearly distinguish 
between them.'^ ^ The hoplite spear found at Vergina in tumulus LXVIII burial E 
had an iron spearhead of 10 7/8 in. and weighed 4 Vi oz. and an vcon butt-spike of 
2 14 in. weighing 1 Vi oz., with fragments of wood found in between the two, 
strongly suggesting that they once belonged to the same weapon. The infantry 
sarissa was considerably larger, the iron head being 20 3/16 in. long weighing 2.7 
lbs. And the iron butt-spike of 18 in. and a weight of 2,3 Ibs.'^ ^ The cavalry sarissa 
on the other hand lies somewhere between the two; its aft spear point consisted of a 
double-edged flaring blade 19 '/a in. long weighing 1.16 lbs. The fore weapon had a 
similarly double-edged flaring blade, but rather smaller at 11 in. long weighing 
0. 59 lbs. The two spear points of the cavalry sarissa can be identified as coming 
from the same weapon because, aside from being found together: -
1. The presence of two spear points of such dissimilar size supports the visual 
evidence. 
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2. The two spear heads have identical socket diameters'^' 
3. The identical method of affixing the heads to the shaft: both spear heads are 
pierced by two diametrically opposed holes through which nails (1/8 diameter) 
could be driven. These holes are set 3/8 in. from the end of each socket. 
4. TTie socket dimensions are similar to some other identified spear points, but the 
large double-edged flaring nature of the lance heads sets them apart from other 
spear points. 
5. The smaller socket diameter of the cavalry sarissa as against the infantry 
weapon and the lighter weight clearly differentiate the two types of weapon. 
A review of the available evidence allows us to make several general conclusions: 
first of all, that the cavalry sarissa did in fact exist; second, it was of a different 
design and construction from that used by the infantry. Manti"*' calculated that the 
cavalry sarissa was around 9 ft. long and weighed 4.2 lbs, thus confirming 
Strabo's''*^ claim that it was light enough to be thrown. The lance itself had two 
spear heads, one considerable larger than the other, the larger of the two being at 
the rear, partially to act as a counter weight, allowing the weapon to be held in the 
3.5 position. The weapon was also fitted with a strap to allow the user greater 
flexibility and to reduce the risk of the lance being dropped in combat. 
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Macedonian Cavalry: Footnotes. 
1. Diodorus 17.17. 
2. 4500 is the total number of cavalry stated at 17.17.4. 
3. 5100 is the total arrived at by adding the strengths of the contingents as given at 
17.17.4. 
4. Bosworth (1980), 98. 
5. Brunt (1963), 32-33. Brunt also believes that the figure of4000 provided by 
Aristobulus is simply rounded down from Callisthenes. 
6. F G r / f 124 F 35 = Polybius 12.19.1. 
7. Brunt (1963), 34. This is of course speculation and unprovable, but I do not think 
it unlikely that Callisthenes, as the official expedition historian, would give two 
detailed lists, especially if the totals would be different after the incorporation of 
the remnants of the expeditionary force. 
8. Bosworth (1980), 99, does not agree with Brunt on this point, stating that "we 
can no longer dogmatically assume that Ptolemy's figures are correct", but does 
not offer a positive answer, only that the discrepancies "cannot be explained in 
the present state of the evidence". 
9. That is to say his Persian enemies, rather than those in Greece. 
10. Diodorus 17.17.4. 
11. Berve, (1926). Spence, (1993), 134, believes that the Macedonian prodromoi 
were the first cavalry units in western history that were specifically equipped 
and trained to act as scouts. 
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12. The infantry of this force were in all likelihood all mercenaries; His Macedonians 
would have been too valuable to him to send to Asia at this time. Mi Ins (1966), 
167 also believes that the prodromoi were already in Asia when the army 
invaded. Hammond (1998), 408 also believes that some Macedonian cavalry 
would have been with the expeditionary force, although he believes it to have 
been 1 He of Companions and not the prodromoi: I believe this to be incorrect as 
Diodorus' army for 334 clearly gives us the location of all 1800 Companions 
that Alexander had access to. 
13. This reasoning comes largely from Brunt (1963), 27-35. 
14. Arrian 1,29.4, Hammond (1998), 62 believes that these 300 cavalry were a 
hastily gathered together group and were not of the citizen class of Macedonia. 
15. Polybius 9.19.2. 
16. Tarn (1948) 2.158, n . l . 
17. Arrian 3.16.10. 
18. Curtius 5.1.40. 
19. Diodorus 17.65.1. 
20. 1800 Companions, 600prodromoi and 1300 reinforcements. Assuming that the 
prodromoi were indeed Macedonian: see below. 
21. Brunt (1963), 37. 
22. Arrian 4.6.2 with 3.7. 
23. Brunt (1963), 37 n.2 showed a total of 50000 casualties for the Gedrosian 
campaign alone, although he concluded that losses amongst the Macedonians 
may well have been relatively small in comparison with other groups. 
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24. Arrian 1.12.7 for example. 
25. Arrian 1.14.6, 2.9.2,3.12.3. 
26. Diodorus 17.17.4. 
27. Tarn, (1948), 2.157. 
28. Arrian 1.12.7; 1.14.1 and 6; 2.9.2; 3.12.3; 3.18.2; 3.20.1; 3.21.2. Hammond 
(1998), 411, also believes that theprodromoi were Macedonian, although in an 
interesting twist suggests they were ".... Macedonian in the geographical sense 
rather than in the political sense". He proposes that only the Companions, both 
cavalry and infantry (along with presumably the hypaspists) were called 
'citizens' and allowed to attend the 'assembly' (Diodorus 17.109.1-2). 
29. For the positions of the prodromoi see Arrian 1.14.6 (Granicus); 2.9.2. (Issus); 
3.12.3 (Gaugamela). For the positioning of the Balkan cavalry see Arrian 1.14.3 
(Granicus); 3.12.4. (Gaugamela). 
30. Plutarch Alexander 16.3; see also Hamilton, (1969), 40. 
31. Brunt (1963), 27. 
32. Prodromoi and sarissophoroi are in all probability the same troops, just equipped 
differently for their different roles, the former being scouts, the latter being front 
line cavalry. 
33. Bosworth (1980), 110. 
34. Markle (1977), 81, 337 also believes that there were 600 
prodromoilsarissophoroi with Alexander and an unspecified number left behind 
with Antipater in Macedonia. This would mean that an He of prodromoi was 
smaller than that of Companions, consisting of 150 troopers. Berve believed that 
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there were 600 prodromoi with the army of invasion too, but that they are 
included in the total of 1800 Companions, but a total of 1200 Companion 
cavalry seems far too low. 
35. The sarissa will be discussed at length in the following chapter. 
36. Bosworth(1988), 262. 
37. Tarn (1948), 2.158. 
38. Brunt (1963), 28. 
39. Berve(1926), 134. 
40. Arrian 1.12.7; 14.1; 2.9.3; 3.11.8 etc. 
41. Arrian 1.2.5; 12.7; 11.9.3. 
42. Arrian 2.9.3. 
43. Bosworth(1988), 261. 
44. Bosworth (1980), 211. 
45. Bosworth(1980),211. 
46. Milns(1966), 167. 
47. For a little more detail see chapter 8. 
48. Brunt (1963), 28. 
49. Tarn (1948), 2.161. 
50. The exact route is not known: see Bosworth (1995), 149 ff. 
51. Arrian 4.23.1. 
52. Arrian 4.22.7. 
53. Arrian 4.22.1. 
54. Arrian 4.17.3. 
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55. Arrian 1.24.3; 3.29.7; 4.4.6-7; Diodorus 17.57.1. 
56. Arrian 1.24.3. 
57. Griffith (1963), 70. 
58. Bosworth (1980), 155. 
59. Brunt (1963), 29. 
60. Arrian 1.18.3; 2.20.4. 
61. Arrian 3.29.7. 
62. Bosworth (1980), 375. 
63. Griffith (1963), 71. 
64. Bosworth (1980), 375. 
65. Brunt (1963,) 29. 
66. Tarn (1948), 2.163, where he believed that they were only 5 in number. 
67. Arrian 6.5.5-7. 
68. Arrian 6.6.1. 
69. Arrian 6.6.4. 
70. Arrian 6.6.1. 
71. Arrian 6.7.2. 
72. Arrian 6.9.1. 
73. Brunt (1963), 29, wrongly assuming that Perdiccas had rejoined Alexander, 
although there is no positive evidence for this: see Bosworth (1980), 375. 
74. Arrian 6.11.8. 
75. Arrian 6.13.1. 
76. Brunt (1963), 29. 
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77. Tarn (1948), 2.163. 
78. Brunt (1963), 30. The table that follows is also from Brunt. 
79. Tarn (1948), 2.163. 
80. Arrian 4.21.4. 
81. Bosworth (1980), 375. 
82. Brunt (1963), 30 believes 328, Hammond (1998), 418 and Bosworth (1980), 375-
6 believe 329, Ptolemy's first reference is certainly in 329. 
83. Hammond (1998), 418; Hammond (1980), 455#, Hammond (1980), 191 / 
84. There were initially 1800 Companions; reinforcements down to 328 take the total 
to 3600, including the prodromoi gives a total of around 4400. There would 
have been some losses, however, so a total of 4000 cavalry in the hipparchies in 
328 seems reasonable: see below for more details. 
85. Brunt (1963), 30-32. 
86. Arrian 2.7.3; 10.2; 16.8; 3.9.3. 
87. Brunt (1963) 31. 
88. Bosworth (1980), 375, agrees with Brunt on this point. 
89. Bosworth (1980), 375-6. 
90. Arrian 5.11.3; 12.2. 
91. Arrian 5.2.2-4; 3.6; 6.2.3. 
92. Arrian M c o 19.5. 
93. Arrian 3.24.1. 
94. Berve 1.151, Griffith (1963), 69, also assumes them to have been of Persian 
origin. 
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95. Arrian 3.25.2,5. 
96. Bosworth (1980), 352, he suggests that the hippakontistai could be the 
Macedonian prodromoi, who are never mentioned after the pursuit of Darius. 
97. Bosworth (1988), 271: he points out that the Paeonians are never again 
mentioned and that the Paeonians and hippakontistai may well be one and the 
same. These two theories are virtually the same; on Bosworth's reckoning the 
hippakontistai were Greek light cavalry and performed essentially the same role 
as the prodromoi. 
98. Arrian 5.12.2; 16.4 cf. Curtius 9.2.24. 
99. Bosworth (1995), 279. 
100. Brunt(1963), 4 3 # 
101. Arrian 7.6.3. 
102. Arrian 6.27.3. 
103. Arrian 6.29# 
104. Brunt (1963), 43. 
105. Berve 1.111. 
106. Brunt also believes that only the Orientals incorporated within the fifth 
hipparchy would have been designated Companions; on this reckonmg only the 
smallest handfiil of Oriental cavalry would have achieved this status. 
107. Arrian 7.6.3. 
lOS.Griffith (1963), 6 8 # 
109. Areas such as Media, Susiana, Hyrcania, Persis and Aria etc. etc. 
110. Arrian 4.17.3. 
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111. Griffith (1963), 69. 
112.1 say alternative rather than successor quite deliberately. The old view was that 
Alexander did indeed portray himself as successor to the Achaemenids, but 
Fredricksmeyer (2000) 137 ff convincingly argues that this is not the case, that 
Alexander in fact used rather different imperial titles and symbolism, and 
therefore was perhaps more alternative than successor. 
113. Arrian 5.12.2; 6.7.2. 
114. Griffith (1963), 72. 
115. Hammond(1980), 191 / 
116. Tam (1948) 2.299, those in this camp tended to argue that the sarissa would 
have been too heavy and cumbersome to be used by cavalry or that without 
stirrups or a saddle a long lance would loose most of its effectiveness. 
117. Markle(1977), 333. 
118. Guderian(1957), 53. 
119. Manti (1983), 74#, see also Mixter (1992), 21-29. 
120. Koechly 3.215.6. 
121. Koechly 3.223-24. 
122. Appian 11.19.7-10. 
123. Arrian 7.6.5. 
124. Aelianrflc/.12. 
125. The terms 'sarissa', or 'cavalry sarissa' are the ones that 1 will try to stick to 
throughout this section, although I will also use 'lance' at times. The ancient 
sources seem to use a range of confusing terminology to refer to what is 
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probably the same thing, the cavalry sarissa. We see sarissa, pike, dory, lance, 
xyston, spear and kontos, all seemingly interchangeable; see Mixter (1992), 26. 
126. Almost all modem authorities would equate 8 cubits to be around 12 feet in 
length. For an altemative see Tarn (1948) 2.169-171 for his theory on the short 
Macedonian cubit: he believed that a cubit was around 13-14 inches. 
127.Strabo 10.1.12. 
128. Asclepiodotus Tact 1.3. 
129. Arrian 1.15.5. 
130. Manti(1983), 75. 
131. Arrian 1.15.6; Polybius 6.25.6,11.8.4. 
132. Manti(I983), 75. 
133. Manti(1983), 79. 
134. Manti (1983), 76, points out that the usual interpretation is of a Macedonian 
cavalryman in battle with an infantryman; however the Macedonian star on the 
infantryman's shield is suggestive of this being the cavalryman's groom. 
135. Markle (1977), 333 believes there to have been no significant difference in any 
way between the sarissa used by the cavalry and that used by the infantry, 
fiirthermore believing there to have been no difference in size or weight between 
Uie spear point at each end of the shaft of the cavalry sarissa. This must be 
wrong for it to have been balanced as it clearly is in the visual depictions we 
have examined; there is fiirther archaeological evidence for this point too: see 
later. 
136. Manti (1983), 76; Markle (1977), 333 ff. 
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137. The following archaeological evidence is drawn largely from Manti (1983) 76 ff, 
and to a lesser extent on Mixter (1992) and Markle (1977) and (1978). As in 
chapter 1 the units are as used by these authors. 
138. Andronicos (1970) 91-107, a more detailed discussion of the infantry sarissa can 
be found in chapter 1. 
139.1.08 in. 






Probably the most important non-Macedonian contingent within the whole army 
during the early stages of the war was the Thessalian cavalry. The Thessalian 
contingent was not newly recruited by Alexander, but had fought alongside the 
Macedonians under Philip for some years before his death. They had, for instance 
gained distinction during the battle of Chaeronea, during which they may have 
taken part in the final cavalry charge led by the young Alexander,' although the 
details of this battle are sketchy at best. 
At the outset of the expedition Alexander commanded 1800 Companions and It 
seems that he had a similar number of Thessalians. These troops had been raised 
from among the nobility of Thessaly, which had a long-standing reputation for 
producing the finest cavalry in the Greek world. The initial 1800 men were 
supplemented by a group of 200 reinforcements that reached the army at Gordium.^ 
These troops were among the first batch of reinforcements received by Alexander. 
Arrian mentions no others during the early stages of the campaign, although 
Bosworth^ believes that there must have been a "wave of new levies" reaching the 
army throughout 333. It should be stated, however, that it is unlikely that any more 
Thessalians arrived at the early stages of the campaign and that their nominal 
strength probably never exceeded 2000. It is unclear from our sources what 
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Alexander did with these reinforcements; Sekunda'' believes that they were 
incorporated amongst existing ilai to make up for losses incurred up to that point. 
Whilst this sounds a reasonable enough assumption, it is based upon a false 
premise; the Thessalian cavalry had not been heavily involved in the most serious 
fighting to that point^ and thus could not have incurred such heavy losses, i.e. more 
than 10% of their previous total. The only other option would be to assume that a 
ninth He was created, but our sources do not even hint at this, so we are left to agree 
with Sekunda, with the qualification that the existing 8 ilai would have been 
somewhat over sfrength for a time. 
We are not told explicitly how the Thessalians were organized, but it would seem 
logical i f it were along the same lines as for the Macedonian Companion cavalry. 
That is to say they were organized into 8 ilai of 200 men, one of which was 
probably double strength, the so-called Pharsalian ile.^ This double strength He is 
the only one Arrian or any of our sources explicitly names, but the others were no 
doubt also named after prominent Thessalian cities or regions, again echoing the 
Companions. 
At the outset of the campaign up to the battle of the Granicus, the Thessalians 
were under the command of Calas, a man whom had served under Parmenio on the 
expeditionary force and surely one of "Parmenio's men". ^ Alexander removed him 
from this position immediately after the battle, however, appointing him satrap of 
Hellespontine Phrygia.* Alexander appointed Philip, son of Menelaus, as Calas' 
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successor.^  Green'" sees this as part of a grand strategy of Alexander to remove 
those who were favourites of Pannenio and replace them with his own men. 
Alexander may well have had this idea in mind; but as Bosworth" points out the 
appointment of Calas is a logical choice as he had local knowledge of the region 
gained during his time with the expeditionary force. We also know that Calas was 
given the satrapy'^  of Paphlagonia by Alexander in 333,'^ so he could not have 
been seen as anything other than loyal by the king. 
The Thessalian cavalry carried virtually the same equipment as the Companions,"* 
but one superficial distinction can be made. The two horsemen depicted on the 
Alexander sarcophagus, one hunting the other in battle, wear the distinctive 
Thessalian cloak'^ and can probably therefore be identified with this contingent. 
The cloak is identified by the two points that hang down both in fix)nt of and behind 
the figures. Other than the cloak there seems very little to distinguish them from the 
Companions in terms of dress or equipment. 
Bosworth'^ states that the Thessalians "...performed much the same functions as 
the Companions..." but this is demonstrably not the case. They did form the 
bodyguard for Parmenio in the same way that the Companions did to Alexander, 
but their actual role in the set piece battles was significantly different. The 
Companions were the main offensive weapon of the army, trained and employed to 
punch a hole in the enemy's line, drive troops through and then to wheel on the 
enemy centre, thus ensuring that it would be attacked in two directions at the same 
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time, from the side and the front by the heavy infantry.The Thessalians on the 
other hand were assigned to fight defensive actions'^ on the left wing, to prevent 
the army from being outflanked or encircled by superior Persian numbers. Their 
role was perhaps equally important as that performed by the Companions on the 
right but was certainly not the same. 
Although the Thessalians were without question amongst the finest troops in the 
Macedonian order of battle, Alexander evidently saw them as being far from 
indispensable. In 331 whilst at Ecbatana, Alexander disbanded the Thessalian 
cavalry and all other allied contingents ordering them back to the Aegean." A very 
generous settlement was given^ *^  and an escort was organized to take them back to 
the Aegean coast.^ ' Any who wished were allowed to re-enroll with the army, but 
their status would no longer be that of allies, they would be mercenaries, and each 
man who remained with the army was given a massive bonus of 3 talents; many 
evidently stayed.^ ^ The distinction between mercenaries and allies is perhaps a fine 
one; they would most likely receive the same rate of pay as they had done 
previously, and would be equipped and probably organized in the same manner. 
Why though, were the allied troops disbanded at this point? Diodorus perhaps 
gives us the answer. While at Ecbatana, Diodorus tells us that Alexander "...was 
aware that the Macedonians regarded Darius' death as the end of the 
campaign..."^' I f Diodorus is right that even the Macedonians felt this way, then it 
is almost certain that the Greek allies did. Beside this point, the Greeks had been 
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obliged to aid Alexander in the destruction of the Persian Empire, the death of 
Darius signaled that this goal had been achieved and thus the obligation of the city-
states was at an end; essentially the League of Corinth's war was at an end. Many 
of them chose to stay, no doubt for the financial incentives offered by Alexander. 
There were purely military reasons for the disbanding of the Thessalians too; 
Alexander would have been aware that the terrain he was about to enter in the north 
east of the former Persian empire would not lend itself to the kind of set-piece 
battles that had given him victory over Darius in the previous few years. There 
would, therefore, be no need for a primarily defensive detachment of cavalry; the 
main fighting would be done by the Companions and the Macedonian heavy 
infantry units. Those allied troops that re-enlisted were finally and fully disbanded 
less than a year later. 
Allied cavalry 
The Greek states of the League of Corinth were obliged to provide cavalry as well 
as infantry to the royal army. Not all states were required or expected to furnish 
cavalry; what was required of each would have depended to an extent on what they 
were best able to provide. Diodorus '^* tells us that 600 Greek cavalry commanded 
by Erigyius crossed the Hellespont with the main body of the army in 334. These 
600 can probably be equated with the 3 ilai of allied horse at Gaugamela. These 
three squadrons were from the Peloponnese and Achaea, from Phthiotis and Malis 
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and the squadron from Locris and Phocis. These troops seem to have been stationed 
on the right wing.^* As a complement to the allied cavalry on the right, there was 
also a contingent stationed on the left wing at Gaugamela.^ ^ This second group 
were commanded by Coeranus and probably numbered 600 divided into 3 ilai, as 
with those on the right. This group may well have contained the Boeotians 
(mentioned below), the Acamanians and the Aetolians, along with perhaps the 
Eleians. No individual state initially seems to have made a contribution of a fiill He, 
rather troops from different states in the same geographical area were brigaded 
together. 
We often do not have a complete picture of what the allied cavalry units were 
doing at any given time for example, when Alexander entered Egypt only part of 
the army accompanied him.^* Whilst Alexander was in Egypt our sources dwell 
upon Alexander's activities and almost totally ignore the rest of the army. We do 
know that the allied cavalry had been attached to the satrap of Syria temporarily, 
after the battle of Issus.^ ^ We can perhaps assume that at some point a batch of 
allied cavalry reinforcements arrived from Greece. Curtius^ *^  reports a conversation 
between Darius and the exiled Charidemus in which Charidemus mentions an 
otherwise unknown contingent of Acamanians and Aetolians. The speech is almost 
certainly apocryphal as Charidemus was exiled from Athens some time before, at 
the orders of Alexander. Curtius in creating this conversation could well be using 
sources that were aware of the existence of these two contingents. If they are 
genuine then they must have been part of a batch of reinforcements of which we 
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otherwise hear nothing. We also know that a contingent from Boeotia reached the 
army in Asia at some point; an inscription found at Orchomenus records a 
dedication made by those who served with Alexander, also mentioning their 
ilarch}' 
Balkan Cavalrv. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter the army also contained a contingent of 300 
Paeonian prodromoi. These froops were probably supplied from two areas; one was 
Paeonian and the other Odrysian. The Paeonians were commanded by Ariston, a 
member of the royal house of Paeonia.^ ^ The Odrysians on the other hand were 
commanded by Agathon, a Macedonian. 
We can assume that these prodromoi were equipped in a similar way to the 
Macedonian prodromoi, as discussed in the previous chapter, but their national 
dress was significantly different. They were dressed in long-sleeved tunics and 
wore a crested helmet and may have used a panther skin saddlecloth. These troops 
are those mentioned as being with the army at the crossing of the Hellespont, 
described by Diodorus as part of the "900 Thracian and Paeonian prodromof\ 
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Thessalian Cavalry: Footnotes. 
1. Hammond (1980) 31. 
2. Arrian 1.29.4. 
3. Bosworth(1980) 174-5. 
4.Sekunda(1984) 18. 
5. Namely the battle of the Granicus and the siege of Halicamassus. 
6. Arrian 3.11.10. The Pharsalian He would have performed the same role as the 
royal squadron of the Companions; they would have been effectively the 
bodyguard of their commander in battle. 
y.Green (1991) 203-4. 
8. Arrian 1.17.1. 
9. Parmenio of course had overall command of these troops during the set-piece 
battles, and indeed at other times. They acted as his personal bodyguard in the 
same way as the Companions did with Alexander. 
10. Green (1991) 203-4. 
11. Bosworth(1980) 127. 
12. Calas was the first satrap appointed by Alexander. In these positions Alexander 
followed the mechanism and nomenclature of the previous Persian 
administration, merely substituting Macedonians in the place of Persians see 
Bosworth (1980) 127. This is one example where he does seem to have 
portrayed himself as successor to, rather than an alternative to, the Aechemenid 
kings. See chapter 3 note 112. 
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13. Arrian 2.4.1. 
14. See previous chapter for details. 
15. Selcunda(1984) 19. 
16. Bosworth (1988) 264. 
17. This strategy is essentially Alexander's hallmark and is eerily reminiscent of the 
German Blitzkrieg strategy developed in the main by Heinz Guderian. See 
Guderian (1937) for a discussion of the need for a new strategy after WWI and 
Guderian (1953) for a discussion of how the strategy was actually employed 
during WWII. Guderian gives no credit to early strategists who employed an 
embryonic form of Blitzkrieg and makes no references at all to any periods 
earlier than Clausewitz. 
18. During at least the battles of Issus and Gaugamela, Their role at the Granicus is 
unclear. 
19. Arrian 3.19.6. 
20. Arrian 3.19.6 states that the Thessalians were given a total of2000 talents, 
Diodorus 17.74.4 and Curtius 6.2.17 claim 1 talent per cavalryman and 10 mina 
per infantryman and so the total of 12000 talents at Curtius 6.2.10 is consistent 
with the allied numbers in 334 in Diodorus 17.17. See Bosworth (1980) 336 for 
more detail. 
21. It seems that the Thessalians were marching on foot with a cavalry escort, 
having evidently sold their horses presumably to the Companions. Attrition 
amongst horses on the expedition must have been particularly high. 
22. Diodorus 17.74.4. 
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23. Diodorus 17.74.3. 
24. Diodorus 17.17.4. 
25. Diodorus 17.57.2. 
26. Arrian 3.12.1. 
27. Arrian 3.12.2. 
28. Arrian 3.2.2, Alexander appears to have taken mainly Macedonian troops with 
him into Egypt, along with the Agrianians. 








Mercenaries and Allies. 
The distinction drawn by Alexander between allied troops and mercenaries was 
not sharp and could lead to some confusion. We must first therefore clarify what 
these terms actually mean before we consider the individual contingents 
themselves. The meaning of the term 'mercenary' would seem at first obvious, a 
soldier who fights for pay, but of course everyone in Alexander's army was being 
paid, including the Macedonian and allied contingents. I believe that we can narrow 
the meaning down to 'someone who fights without a political imperative', i.e. a 
soldier who is not compelled to fight by his city state, but does so solely for 
personal reasons. The distinction therefore becomes a little clearer, but the status of 
the Balkan troops' in the army is still something of a problem. Griffith considers 
them mercenaries, stating, "They came from peoples whose princes were more or 
less formally subject to the king of Macedonia, so that it is hard to say whether they 
were mercenaries or allies. It is probably best to avoid a splitting of hairs, and to 
call them all mercenaries, because i f they were allies in the first place they certainly 
became mercenaries later". ^  I will here consider them amongst the allied 
contingent, as Griffith says they were initially allies and Diodorus^ certainly does 
not include them amongst the mercenaries in his troop list. 
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By the time of the accession of Alexander in Macedon, mercenary soldiers formed 
an integral part, not just of the Macedonian army, but also that of Persia and a 
number of the city-states. The mercenary soldier himself, however, had undergone 
considerable change. In the fifth century, mercenaries were few in number and 
employment opportunities were limited." Their first large scale employment in 
Greece was during the Peloponnesian War and was at first confined to the Spartan 
side, Athens having no access to the large recruiting grounds of Arcadia, and 
Pericles' defensive strategy had little need of mercenaries anyway.^  Persia tended 
not to employ Greek mercenaries in large numbers in the fifth century, the first 
large scale employment being Cyrus' force of 10,000. Mercenaries in the fifth 
century tended to be grouped into one of the following classifications: -
1. Archers, often fi-om Crete. Archery was a specialized field and required 
considerable training. It was very difficult for a citizen hoplite to acquire the 
necessary skills and so specialists were hired. Crete is often mentioned as a source 
of such troops throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, and it even fiimished a 
contingent in Alexander's army. 
2. Cavalry. Usually few in number primarily because of the expense involved, and 
the geography of Greece generally did not lend itself well to cavalry engagements, 
with a few notable exceptions. 
3. Hoplites. Troops armed and equipped in the same manner as a citizen soldier, a 
heavily armed infantryman wearing a breastplate and often greaves and carrying a 
spear. Their main offensive weapon was weight of numbers. Heavily armed 
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hoplites were the main fighting force on either side in the fifth and into the fourth 
century. 
4. Peltasts. Light armed troops carrying a small shield and little or no body armour. 
Their effectiveness was based largely on their mobility. Most mercenaries in the 
fourth century fell into this group after the 'reforms of Iphicrates' early in that 
century. 
Iphicrates' Reforms. 
Iphicrates was bom towards the end of the fifth century into a poor and rather 
obscure Athenian family.^ Despite his lowly background he rose to a position of 
command in Athens, fighting in a number of campaigns including the Corinthian 
War and the Social War; he also spent time in Persian service after the peace of 
Antalcidas. Diodorus places his peltast reforms after 374, after his Persian sojourn, 
using his experiences to that point to develop this new type of soldier.^  The exact 
dating of the reforms is not relevant here, but their nature certainly is as it was this 
type of soldier that constituted the bulk of Alexander's mercenaiy forces. 
The primary sources of information that we have for the peltast reforms of 
Iphicrates are Diodorus* and Nepos,' both of whose accounts are very similar. 
According to them the most significant changes were as follows: - "Iphicrates 
replaced the large (shield) of the Greeks by the light pelte, which had the advantage 
that it protected the body while allowing the wearer more freedom of movement; 
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the soldiers who had formerly carried the (large hoplite shield) and who were called 
hoplites, were henceforth called peltasts after the name of their new shields; their 
new spears were half as long again or even twice as long as the old ones, the new 
swords were also double in length. In addition Iphicrates introduced light and easily 
untied footwear, and the bronze harness was replaced by a linen covering, which 
although it was lighter, still protected the body.""^ Diodorus regards these changes 
as having been introduced into the existing hoplite troops," and in the process 
discounts the possibility of already existing peltasts. Parke writes, "Modem 
commentators have generally been struck with the absurdity of this, and have taken 
up an opposite attitude. For them the change was a trivial one and consisted chiefly 
in the standardizing of the existing, but rather haphazard, peltast equipment". 
This argument, however, simply will not do. It assumes that the light-armed 
skirmishers of earlier narratives were equipped in the same manner that Diodorus 
describes. This simply cannot be the case; light-armed skirmishers would not have 
carried a sword and spear twice the length of those carried by hoplites. Earlier 
narratives also tell of peltasts actually throwing their spears. I f Iphicrates was 
standardizing that which already existed then why did he not provide his troops 
with these throwing spears? We are surely not to believe that they carried these as 
well. Some other explanation must be sought. 
Was Iphicrates actually inventing a new type of peltast, one with specific and 
specialized equipment? Best believes not, seeing the Iphicratean peltast as being 
".. . in no way different fi-om Thracian peltasts", and thus seeing Iphicrates' 
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reforms as being considerably less significant than others have. The truth probably 
lies somewhere between these two extreme positions. There was probably no 
uniformity of peltast equipment before Iphicrates, some using primarily throwing 
spears, some longer spears, some using swords of various sizes. The size of the 
shield probably varied too. I suspect therefore that Iphicrates studied the light 
infantry of his day and based his reforms around choosing from the various groups 
the equipment that best suited the type of soldier that he was trying to create. We 
may see Iphicrates therefore not as creating something entirely new, or as 
standardizing that which already existed, but as refining the equipment and tactics 
of the peltasts of his day. 
Mercenaries had not been a significant part of the military forces of the city-states 
in the fifth century. There was, on the one hand, very little fiscal means to support 
such troops, and, on the other, a generally held belief that it was a citizen's duty to 
take up arms and defend his polls as need arose. Any Greek mercenaries that did 
exist were generally employed in Persia or in Egypt.''* The most significant event 
that sparked a major increase in the employment of mercenary troops on mainland 
Greece was the Peloponnesian War. The Peloponnesian states were the first to 
employ mercenaries in numbers. These mercenaries were initially not light armed 
troops but hoplites from Arcadia. Athens was slow to hire such troops, largely 
because of the geographical difficulty in reaching them, but by the end of the war 
mercenaries of all kinds were finding employment on both sides. The reasons for 
this change lay in the nature of the war itself. The war was prolonged and almost 
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continuous and there were few large-scale set piece battles fought: most 
engagements were on a small scale and fought by troops who were relatively 
lightly equipped and very mobile. Mercenaries were simply better at this kind of 
combat than heavily armoured hoplites. The hiring of mercenaries was made 
possible now, and less so earlier, by the relative prosperity of the warring states as 
compared to earlier in the fifth century. 
The end of the Peloponnesian War did not see an ending of the employment of 
mercenaries in Greece. The peace itself led to a large number of men who had 
become accustomed to earning their living as hired soldiers suddenly becoming 
unemployed. This would generally have a destabilizing effect upon any society, but 
they would not have stayed unemployed for long. The political situation in Greece 
in the fourth century meant that there were always potential paymasters. Their other 
great sphere of employment, Persia, was also undergoing change. "The central 
authority of the Persian empire had begun to weaken. The local governors grew 
more independent and ambitious. Their position needed military support, and they 
found it most readily in Greek mercenaries". It had long been recognized that 
mercenaries formed a more secure power base for tyrants, rather than citizen 
soldiers whose loyalty was more open to question i f a usurper came along. Greek 
mercenary infantry in Persian service continually proved themselves more capable 
than anything that the native Persians were able to achieve, so the great king 
himself was also forced to hire his own contingents to keep pace with his 
potentially disloyal satraps. 
114 
Philip. 
The use of mercenary troops became commonplace in the fourth century, 
spreading ultimately to Macedonia. Our sources give us very little information 
about the composition or effectiveness of the Macedonian army at the accession of 
Philip, save to imply that it was strong in cavalry and very weak in infantry. 
Mercenaries had been used in Macedonia before the reign of Philip, and had 
perhaps even been employed by Philip himself before he became king. Carystius of 
Pergamon relates the following: "Speusippus, on hearing that Philip was speaking 
ill o f Plato, wrote in a letter somewhat as follows: People do not know that Philip 
actually secured the beginnings of his kingship through Plato. For Plato sent 
Euphraeus of Oreus to Perdiccas, who persuaded him to allot a portion of land to 
Philip. From that revenue he kept a standing army, and so when Perdiccas died, 
with his army ready he threw himself into political power".The story does not 
come to us directly and is unlikely to be completely accurate; it may, however, 
contain some degree of truth.'* 
In order to hire any significant numbers of mercenaries vast quantities of gold and 
silver were required. Throughout the fifth century the city-states struggled 
financially to cope with the almost continuous warfare that they were presented 
with. Macedonia, however, was in a very different position. After 357, with the 
capture of Amphipolis, Philip had access to the gold, and perhaps more 
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importantly, silver mines of Mount Pangaeus. These mines were then worked with 
more energy than they ever had been before, to such an extent that they produced 
1000 talents a year for the treasuries of Macedonia, more than Athens had produced 
at the height of her empire, '^ ^ and more than Athens was capable of producing in 
the fourth century. This income ensured that Philip need never be short of 
mercenaries, but to what extent did he actually employ them? The first recorded 
instance of the employment of mercenaries in Philip's army came in 352 when they 
aided in the capture of Pharcedon in Thessaly, ^' although they may well have been 
present the previous year when Philip was defeated by Onomarchus. It was also at 
this same period that Chares the Athenian general hosted a feast in the agora to 
celebrate a victory over the mercenaries of Philip. Mercenaries were certainly 
present in the army of occupation in Phocis in 346 at the end of the Sacred War, 
and they appear several times in later years; as reinforcements to Messene and 
Argos in 344 and at Megara. Four mercenary armies are also known on 
Euboea,^ ^ they are also known in the Chersonese, '^ and probably at Chaeronea in 
338.^ ^ 
Diodorus' account of the career of Philip is lacking in details, in fact it is almost 
totally devoid of detail after 346, and thus it is very difficuh indeed to make any 
kind of assessment as to how important mercenaries were in the Macedonia that 
Philip created. Diodorus' account of the battle of Chaeronea^ ^ is a good example of 
this; he gives no details on the armies themselves and almost suggests that the 
victory was due to the bravery of the young Alexander alone. Demosthenes, on the 
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surface, gives us a little more information. He lays great stress upon Philip's 
reliance upon mercenaries, even to the extent of belittling the heavy infantry: "and 
you hear of Philip going wherever he wants, not by virtue of commanding a 
phalanx of hoplites, but because he has fitted out light-armed infantry, horsemen, 
archers, mercenaries and that sort of army", he also emphasizes Philip's great 
wealth, implying that it was this that enabled him to buy "this sort of army", and 
therefore essentially to buy success rather than earning it with a more traditional 
army of hoplites. Demosthenes, however, was writing for an Athenian audience 
and with a very specific agenda; he said whatever it suited him to say and what his 
audience wished to hear. Demosthenes, therefore, only really tells us that Philip 
employed mercenaries to some extent, which we already knew. The only other 
thing that he tells us is that Philip probably made greater use of mercenaries than 
was usual at the time, but tells us nothing about tactics or numbers. 
The use of mercenaries by Philip can be divided into two distinct parts, separated 
by the year 346. Before this date only three mentions are made of mercenaries in 
the Macedonian army, the first against Chares and the second in the capture of 
Pharcedon in 353-2.^' The third instance was when he loaned a contingent of 
mercenaries to Phocion in 348.^ ^ During the early part of Philip's reign his 
Macedonian national army was in the process of being trained and I believe it 
likely that mercenaries played a far greater role in military operations during this 
period than these sparse references would seem to indicate. After 346 when Philip 
had gained control of much of Greece mercenaries were used to form garrisons at 
117 
strategic points throughout the Greek world; this was a policy that Alexander 
continued and greatly expanded upon, as we shall see. They also continued to be 
used in a combat role as evidenced by the composition of the expeditionary force 
sent to Asia Minor by Philip in 336. 
Alexander. 
The majority of mercenaries employed by Alexander at the beginning of his reign 
would have been with Alexander himself or with the expeditionary force that Philip 
had sent to Asia Minor in 336; it is unlikely that any would have been left behind 
with the standing army in Macedonia; this would have been an unnecessary 
expense, although Alexander had left garrisons at strategic points throughout 
Greece. These garrisons would almost certainly have been mercenaries as this 
was the beginning of a trend that Alexander used throughout his career. 
In his detailed order of battle for 334, Diodorus '^^  tells us that of the 32000 
infantry in the army of invasion, 5000 were mercenaries.^ ^ 5000 seems to be a 
remarkably small number as a percentage of the total, only 15.6%: there are four 
main reasons for this: -
1. Mercenaries, historically, had not constituted a large part of Greek armies. 
2. Philip seems to have seriously depleted the Macedonian treasury, leaving 
Alexander with very little money with which to hire mercenaries.^ ^ 
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3. In 334, Darius was a competing paymaster. The Persians had always been a 
large employer of Greek mercenaries and had the resources to hire as many as 
they required at any given time. Darius was also a seemingly attractive 
prospective employer as the Persian Empire was vast in comparison to 
Macedonia. 
4. Alexander had very little need for mercenaries in his army at the outset of the 
campaign. See later for more details. 
It has long been realized, however, that Diodorus' figure of 5000 mercenaries 
carries with it some serious problems. During the first year of the campaign in 
Asia, up to the battle of Issus, Alexander left behind garrisons at Side,^' 
Mytilene,^* and possibly Ephesus and Miletus too. A force of 3000 mercenary 
infantry was also left to complete the reduction of Halicamassus and to act as a 
garrison for Caria.^ ^ Our sources do not tell us the size of the garrisons left in Side 
and Mytilene, or the numbers of casualties in combat to this point, but we can 
perhaps safely assume that the total left behind before Issus would amount to in 
excess of 5000, more than the number with which Alexander had invaded Asia. To 
the best of our knowledge the only additional mercenaries that Alexander received 
were the 300 that joined from the Persian garrison at Miletus."' 
The problem arises when we look at the battle of Issus. There clearly seem to be 
two bodies of mercenaries that form a reserve line behind the Macedonian heavy 
infantry.'*^ Arrian's description of the dispositions of Alexander's army are not as 
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detailed as we would like; he does not tell us, for example, the number of 
mercenaries present. It is probable that such a force, forming a second line, would 
have been fairly considerable; Griffith argues for between 5000 and 8000."*^  If we 
take the lower of these two figures, this leaves us with a significant shortfall. There 
are only two possible explanations: either we make up the deficit by suggesting that 
these troops were the remnants of the expeditionary force, whose fate we otherwise 
know nothing about, or there was a draft of reinforcements from Greece between 
334 and 333 that our sources tell us nothing about. It would seem that the former 
explanation is the more plausible as it is unsafe to invent troops just for our own 
convenience and to fill a gap in our available evidence.** 
Soon after landing in Asia Alexander seems to have been in the following position 
with regard to his mercenaries: -
5000 Army of invasion Diodorus 17.17.3 
- 2500 Garrison at Ephesus? Bosworth (1980), 134 
- 3000 Garrison of Caria Arrian 1.23.6 




See Footnotes 38 and 
39 
+ 300 Miletus Arrian 1.19.6 
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Assuming 5000 at Issus, this therefore leaves around 7200 mercenaries 
unaccounted for; these must be the remnants of the 10000 sent to Asia as an 
expeditionary force in 336. This does raise the question as to how Philip could have 
afforded so many mercenaries at this time; all we can say is that his financial 
reserves must have been, to say the least, stretched, because it seems undeniable 
that these missing troops were mercenaries. 
Logic may tend to suggest that with every successful campaign of Alexander 
more and more mercenaries would flock to his banner: a successful general is 
always a far more attractive paymaster than an unsuccessful one, and after Issus he 
was not short of funds. This does not seem to have been the case, however, at least 
until that pivotal year of 331. Our sources only record two batches of mercenary 
reinforcements received by Alexander before Gaugamela, 4000 from Sidon"*^  and 
3000 fi-om Chios."*^  We are also told of a mercenary garrison of 4000 left behind in 
Egypt: these must be the reinforcements from Sidon, as they are not mentioned at 
the battle of Gaugamela. Although the total number of mercenary troops may have 
increased slightly during the first 3 years of the campaign, so did the number of 
Macedonian troops, so that the proportion of mercenaries to Macedonians remained 
almost constant. Reinforcements were arriving at roughly the same rate as they 
were required to form garrisons in the newly conquered territory. 
After Gaugamela, when there was essentially no competing paymaster, there 
seems to have been an explosion in the numbers of mercenaries enrolling with 
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Alexander's army, to such an extent that both Arrian and Curtius agree that 
Alexander had 120,000 men with him for the invasion of hidia."^ What follows is a 
table of all of the mercenary reinforcements that our sources record were received 
by Alexander throughout his career: 
At 300 infantry Arrian 
Miletus 1.19.6 




At Sidon 4000 Infantry (Probably left as Egyptian Arrian 
garrison) 2.20.5 
At 400 cavalr>' Arrian 
Memphis 500 Thracian cavalry 3.5.1 
At Susa 4000 infantry from the Peioponnese Curtius 
980 cavalry from the Peioponnese 5.1.41; 
3500 Iranians Diodorus 
600 Thracian cavalry 17.65.1 
In Media 5000 infantry Curtius 
1000 cavalry 5.7.12 




X number of infantry and cavalry from Curtius 
among the Greek allies who volunteered 6.5.6 
to remain with Alexander after their Arrian 
contingents had been demobilized. 3.19.6; 
Diodorus 
17.74.4 
At Bactra 2600 infantry Curtius 
500 cavalry 6.6.35 
3000 lllyrian cavalry 
300 cavalry 
At 16400 infantry Curtius 
Zariaspa 2600 cavalry 6.10.11; 
Arrian 
4.7.2 
In India 7000 infantry Curtius 
5000 cavalry 9.3.21 
30000 infantry 
6000 cavalry Diodorus 
17.95.4 
In 5000 infantry Curtius 
Carmania 1000 cavalry 10.1.1 
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At Unknown'*^ Arrian 
Babylon 7.23.1 
It should be noted that these are only the reinforcements that our sources record; it 
is highly likely that many more were received by Alexander that we hear nothing 
about. It is also true that many mercenaries were hired directly by the city or 
province in which they were to act as garrison: thus they would never have been 
part of the army itself, they would have largely escaped the notice of our sources.^ " 
Organization of the Mercenaries. 
Throughout Alexander's career, most particularly in later years, there was an 
almost constant influx of new troops as existing ones were assigned to garrison 
duty. The organization of the mercenary contingent within Alexander's army was 
therefore, by necessity, fluid and difficult to pin down. Berve^' believed that he had 
made an important discovery with regard to their organization, when he isolated 
what he believed to be a terminological distinction preserved by Arrian. He 
believed that Arrian uses the word xenoi to refer to mercenaries that had been with 
the army from the outset, whilst the word misthophoroi refers to mercenaries 
subsequently recruited in Asia. This distinction generally works down to the battle 
of Gaugamela, particularly with regard to the mercenary cavalry. 
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At Gaugamela two bodies of mercenary cavalry are recorded: those who joined 
the army in Egypt, commanded by Menidas, are called misthophoroi, those under 
the command of Andromachus are called xenoi. It can be presumed that these were 
originally with the expeditionary force of Parmenio, as no mercenary cavalry are 
recorded with the army of invasion in Diodorus^^ and no other reinforcements were 
recorded beside those in Egypt. 
Berve believed that this distinction was universally true in Arrian, but an 
examination of the mercenary infantry will show this not to be the case. 
Misthophoroi infantry are first mentioned just before the battle of Issus: 
Parmenio is sent ahead of the main body with a small force, consisting of 
misthophoroi, the Thessalian cavalry and the Thracians. This incident is, however, 
too early for a significant number of misthophoroi to be present; the only 
mercenary infantry to have been enlisted with the army to that point were the 300 
from the garrison at Miletus, and this seems far to small a number to be taking part 
in the expedition that Arrian is describing, especially when compared to the other, 
significantly larger, contingents being used. Griffith believes it is " much more 
likely that the mercenaries Parmenion took were all the Greek mercenaries with the 
army, a force of perhaps 5000 men or more."^ Griffith goes on to note that the 
same problem recurs soon after this at the battle of Issus, where there are two 
bodies of mercenary infantry mentioned: the xenoi can of course be explained as 
the remnants of the expeditionary force, but the 300 of Miletus are still the only 
new recruits. Are we to believe that of the two bodies, one consisted of in excess of 
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5000 men, the other only 300? I think not. It is far more likely that they were of 
roughly equal size. 
Another problem with Berve's theory, i f one were needed, comes with the 
reinforcements received at Sidon. These were 4000 in number and are the only 
known reinforcements to have arrived before 331. These troops do not appear, 
however, in the Greek order of battle at Gaugamela and therefore must have been 
left on garrison duty in some location before that battle: the only logical place is in 
Egypt, where, coincidentally enough, we know that Alexander left a garrison, 4000 
strong.^ ^ Arrian calls the new recruits received at Sidon misthophoroi, as he should 
if Berve is correct, but the troops left behind in Egypt xenoi. If, however, the 
Egyptian garrison were original mercenaries, which Berve understands xenoi to be, 
this does not solve the problem, as the Sidonian reinforcements are still not 
mentioned at Gaugamela nor are they known to have been left on garrison duty 
anywhere else; this scenario would also mean that there were more xenoi at 
Gaugamela than there could have been (as 4000 of them would have been left 
behind in Egypt). The simplest answer to the problem of this use of terminology in 
Arrian is to assume that although the words could mean exactly what Berve wants 
them to mean, the distinction does not always hold true. Either it is a 
misunderstanding on the part of either Arrian or his sources, or perhaps the terms 
originally referred to the two separate bodies of mercenaries, but the distinction 
between them was lost: as garrison duty and natural wastage reduced the size of 
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both bodies, new recruits could be assigned to either misthophoroi or xenoi to keep 
the numbers at relatively stable levels. 
Role of Mercenary and Allied Troops. 
Mercenaries formed a ftindamental and immensely important part of Alexander's 
army throughout the course of his career, despite their seeming lack of involvement 
in the set piece battles. Their roles can be summed up as follows: -
1. Secondary columns 
2. Garrisons 
3. Front line froops 
4. Colonies 
5. Hostages 
Each of these roles was vital to the overall success of the campaign and each will 
be considered separately. 
Secondary Columns. 
Before 331, Alexander, with very few exceptions, kept his Macedonian troops 
with him. I f any areas needed to be conquered that were not directly on his route of 
march then secondary columns would be detached to deal with these threats. These 
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columns were often, although not exclusively, commanded by Parmenio; as with 
the column sent by Alexander to Magnesia and Tralles when the main body was at 
Ephesus. This column is particularly interesting as Arrian states that it consisted of 
2500 mercenaries, 2500 Macedonians and 200 Companion cavalry.^ ^ This force 
seems excessively large as the two cities had already offered their joint surrender^ ^ 
and so this was not an army of conquest, rather one of occupation. Bosworth notes 
that the mercenaries were probably intended for garrison duty; this does not 
explain, however, the presence of so many Macedonians. This difficulty is 
compounded by Arrian a few lines further on when he states that a similar force 
was sent to "the Aeolian towns and all the Ionian ones still subject to Persia" '^ 
under the command of Alcimachus. It seems highly unlikely that Alexander would 
have detached 5000 Macedonian heavy infantry and 400 Companion cavalry to 
conduct these relatively minor operations*^ at the very outset of the campaign, 
when he was unsure how swiftly Darius could regroup, or even whether the Persian 
force at the Granicus was designed to slow his advance in anticipation of Darius' 
arrival, rather than defeat him itself 
How then, do we deal with this problem? Either Alexander did not do what we 
may reasonably have expected, or Arrian is wrong. In this instance I believe the 
latter to be true. I suspect that when Arrian mentions Macedonians he was actually 
referring to a contingent of Alexander's Balkan allies, an easy enough mistake 
perhaps, especially when we realise that he calls the second detachment*' a 
"similar force", not mentioning the Macedonians directly and therefore perhaps not 
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noticing his earlier slight error. This argument is supported by the fact that neither 
the Illyrian nor the Thracian allied contingents are mentioned as being present on 
the march to Miletus.^^ What the Companion cavalry were on these expeditions is 
more difficult to ascertain: they either were what they appear to be, or they were 
prodromoi, which Bosworth^^ points out are also not mentioned as being in the 
army at 1.18.3. 
These secondary columns were, however, not always successful in their assigned 
tasks. When Satibarzanes and Spitamenes revolted in Aria, Alexander sent two 
expeditions. The first, sent against Satibarzanes, consisted entirely of mercenaries^ 
and was wholly successfiil. The expedition sent against Spitamenes, on the other 
hand, was not. This second expedition consisted of 60 Companion Cavalry, 800 
mercenary cavalry and 1500 mercenary infantry; they were under the overall 
command of Phamuches, a Lydian. This represents a significant break from the 
norm, a non-Macedonian commanding Macedonian troops. Curtius and Arrian give 
different accounts of how the disaster came about but both represent it as a 
crushing blow. Neither account apportions any blame to the mercenary troops; it is 
most likely that "fault lay either with the individual commanders, or more probably 
with the unsound method of appointing a native civilian to the leadership of a 
military expedition". 
The very nature of some of these secondary columns also changed after 331: 
several times a relatively small group, consisting usually of Macedonians, was 
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detached and led by Alexander himself, whilst the main body of the army, along 
with the baggage train, proceeded along safer paths. However, this change probably 
had more to do with Alexander's need for conquest and personal glory rather than 
any judgment on his behalf as to the relative effectiveness of the mercenary troops 
left behind.^^ 
Garrisons. 
One of the most important roles the mercenaries played was that of garrison 
troops. Virtually all of the fighting troops in the newly conquered empire that were 
not with the immediate entourage of the king were mercenaries. Most of the cities 
that Alexander captured were left a garrison of mercenaries, for example Ephesus, 
Halicamassus, Mytilene, Miletus, Egypt; the list of garrisoned towns is, of course, 
as extensive as Alexander's newly forming empire. 
The first certain example of a garrison that is of significant size is that of Caria. 
Alexander left Halicamassus after only a week-long siege, (having captured only 1 
of the 3 citadels) leaving behind 3000 troops, under the command of Ptolemy, to 
complete the capture. We are told nothing more about the organization of a 
mercenary garrison from this example, save that Ada was appointed civilian 
governor of the region. In order to learn more we must move on to the next great 
employment of mercenaries, Egypt. 
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Egypt provides us with the best view of the military organization of a province, a 
model that was to be repeated many times, as we shall see. Alexander appointed 
two native Egyptian governors, and two Companions to command the 
Macedonian garrisons at Memphis and Pelusium; Lycidas, a Greek, was given 
command of the mercenary forces throughout the province. Alexander also 
appointed a "secretary of foreign troops", these being the mercenaries, and two 
commissioners. '^ Bosworth'^ suggests a number of problems, firstly that the 
mercenaries are "implausibly overstaffed, with four separate officers", secondly 
that Curtius seems to have the view that Aeschylus, one of the commissioners, 
and Peucestas, the military commander, are of the same status, seemingly regarding 
Aeschylus as the administrative head of Egypt. We cannot be certain, however, that 
the mercenary troops were "overstaffed" as we have very little evidence of the 
organization of any other provinces, and even less with regard to the organization 
of mercenaries (or allies) in the main army. This organization may well be 
completely normal; there were 4000 mercenaries after all, and only two small 
Macedonian garrisons requiring fewer officers. Bosworth's suggestion that the two 
commissioners, or as he calls them "inspectors of the mercenaries"^^ were in fact 
there to oversee the civilian governors and in reality had little to do with the troops 
seems likely. This would parallel the later situation in Eastern Iran where 
Tlepolemus and Neiloxenus oversaw the work of the native satraps.^ * 
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Front Line Troops. 
The Macedonian elements in the army of course played the leading roles in each 
of Alexander's set piece battles, but we should not overlook the contributions made 
by the mercenary froops. At the battle of the Granicus river, neither the 
mercenaries nor the allied froops are mentioned at all. This should not worry us too 
much as the Granicus was a relatively small battle, in comparison to Issus and 
Gaugamela that is. The question remains, however, what they were doing at the 
time of the battle? The only answers can be either away from the main body of the 
army taking part in the battle, on some secondary mission, or that they formed a 
reserve or second line which is not mentioned because it was not called into use. I 
find this latter argument to be the more likely considering their later roles at Issus 
and Gaugamela. 
At Issus the picture is a little clearer; Alexander drew up his heavy infantry facing 
the Persians, with the Companion Cavalry to the right of the infantry. A strong 
flank guard was assigned to the right wing, where the Persian line overlapped his 
own; on the left it seems that he sent the mercenary froops, along with the 
Peloponnesians and the rest of the allied cavalry. A curious decision, as they 
were essentially hoplites assigned to the sandy area next to the sea, terrain most 
suited to a charge by the Persian cavalry. Alexander seems to have soon realised his 
error and sent the Thessalian cavalry to the left wing. What then happened to the 
mercenaries is unclear: they occupied a position between the Thessalian cavalry 
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and the Macedonian heavy infantry, similar to the role played by the hypaspists on 
the right of the line, or they had a position on the far right of the line, equally 
unlikely, or they were withdrawn from the front to form part of a second line. The 
sources do not provide us with enough information to answer this directly. The 
confusion results from Arrian's use of the word 'epitasso\^^ which can mean 
station either alongside or behind, but as Griffith points out the context of the 
passage "makes it almost certain that here it must mean that the mercenaries were 
placed behind everybody the other interpretation would land us with the 
mercenaries, a medium-heavy infantry division, on the extreme left of the whole 
army, where it was Alexander's practice to put his lightest cavalry and 
skirmishers".*^ It seems certain then that Alexander used a second line, what some 
may call a tactical reserve, at the battle of Issus. 
The role of the allied infantry supplied by the League of Corinth and the Balkan 
allies is more difficuft to ascertain. Bosworth points out that they are not mentioned 
along with the mercenaries as forming the second line, but they are surely too 
numerous to have been left behind to guard the baggage train. Arrian's order of 
battle is not exhaustive for this campaign, "the Odrysian cavalry and Balacrus' 
javelin men are not mentioned either", and so an absence is no doubt an omission 
by Arrian, and not some deeper mystery. The mercenaries and allies therefore 
seemed to form a tactically important second line. It should be realized that by 
"second line" we mean something distinct from the front line, not simply a group of 
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troops that attached themselves to the back of the heavy infantry taxeis, but an 
entirely separate line with a separate tactical role, discussed below. 
Gaugamela provides us with the best evidence for the combat role of the 
mercenary and allied troops. Alexander laid out his heavy infantry, companion 
cavalry and Thessalian cavalry according to his standard plan. The prodromoi and a 
number of other minor contingents were positioned to the right of the Companions, 
and Menidas' mercenary cavalry to the exfreme right of the formation, with 
Cleander's mercenary infantry behind them. On the left of the formation were 
Sitalces' Thracian infantry ^  and three bodies of allied or League cavalry and 
Andromachos' mercenary horse. 
A second line of infantry was positioned parallel to the front: it consisted of the 
allied froops supplied from the League of Corinth and a smaller number of Balkan 
allies and mercenaries not stationed elsewhere. Closing the gap between the two 
lines on the right were Cleander's mercenaries, the Agrianians and archers, and the 
corresponding position on the left; closing the "box" that was thus formed were the 
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remainder of the Thracian infantry, those not commanded by Sitalces. The 
formation thus created was therefore a box with two protrusions to the right and 
left. It was not a closed formation, however: it would seem that the second line only 
extended about halfway along the formation, starting from the left wing, resulting 
in the left hand half of the front line having no froops positioned behind it. This is 
suggested by the fact that when a small group of Bactrian cavalry broke through the 
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front line, they met no further resistance before reaching Alexander's camp. The 
mercenary and allied troops at Gaugamela were positioned in order that if 
Alexander's position were turned, highly likely given the discrepancy in numbers, 
he would not automatically be defeated. The second line could simply tum around 
and fight with their backs to the front line. They were there, in short, to ensure that 
if the battle did not go well, Alexander could still win. Their ability to perform this 
function was not seriously tested but that should not defract from the importance of 
this role. 
Colonies. 
After 331 when Alexander began to enter the northeastern parts of the former 
Persian Empire his mercenary and allied troops began to become increasingly 
important. Alexander founded a series of colonies: this was a move perhaps 
partly designed to spread Greek culture, but was primarilly designed to help pacify 
the outer parts of the empire. It was to be hoped that these new foundations, which 
were, essentially, military colonies, would act as a calming influence on the 
potentially rebellious natives. These colonies, then, had a largely strategic rather 
than a tactical function. They were also partly forced upon Alexander because he 
had ever-increasing numbers of troops who were past service. The best attested 
evidence for a colony that we have is Alexandria in Caucaso, the modem Begram 
in the central Hindu Kush Mountains at the confluence of the Gorband and Panjshir 
rivers. "Here Alexander established a city with a nucleus of 3000 Graeco-
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Macedonian settlers, soldiers no longer fit for service and volunteers from among 
the mercenaries, together with 7000 of the local population". Alexander no doubt 
hoped that, i f there was a native revolt, these retired froops would act to suppress it, 
and that they would also spread Greek culture to the furthest reaches of the known 
world, although this later point would be an added bonus that came with foundation 
of the cities, rather than a primary purpose. These cities were essentially garrison 
towns and administrative centres. 
Later evidence suggests that these Greeks were far from being the willing settlers 
that our sources porfray them as being. On two separate occasions they themselves 
effectively revolted against Alexander. The first revolt occurred in Bactria when 
rumour spread that Alexander had died on the Indus.Some of the Greeks revolted 
under the banner of Athenodoras with the express intent of returning to Greece. 
This insurrection, however, fell in upon itself, with Athenodorus being assassinated 
by Biton, who was in turn tortured for such an act by the Greeks themselves. '^ 
Diodorus' account of the fate of these 3000 rebels is obscure, but Curtius has 
them eventually getting home.^ ^ This small revolt was the precursor to a much 
larger one that occurred after Alexander's death: it seems the Greeks were not at all 
happy with being left on the edge of the civilised world. 
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Hostages. 
It may seem slightly odd to include something with such a negative connotation 
amongst the roles played by the allied, although not the mercenary troops, but it 
was an important one. The main reason that Alexander had for including 7000 
Balkan allies at the outset of the expedition was not to increase his number of front 
line troops, it was to remove a significant number of young men from a potentially 
dangerous region of Europe; dangerous for Antipater that is. Many of these 
Odrysians, Thracians, Illyrians etc. would have remembered the time when they 
were free from Macedonian rule, and with the absence of Alexander and the main 
part of the Macedonian army in Asia, they might very easily have been persuaded 
to revolt.^ '* 
The same argument can be applied to the troops supplied by the League of 
Corinth: i f they had been allowed to stay in Greece the Persians could quite easily 
have created rebellion at home, which may very well have been Memnon's strategy 
when he luckily (for Alexander that is) died in 334. We should also note that the 
League supplied Alexander with a number of ships; Alexander's fleet will be 
discussed in a separate chapter. 
The allies' main fimction on the expedition seems to have been to act as a 
guarantor of the good behaviour of the home states: they are seldom used as front 
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line troops, as discussed above, and are seldom left as garrisons.^ ^ They are always 
kept close to Alexander; their loyalty, it would seem, was questionable. 
Did Alexander Trust His Mercenary and Allied Troops? 
It would seem appropriate to look at this question in two parts, first considering 
the allied troops, then the mercenaries separately. As stated above, it seems that the 
primary reason for the presence of the Balkan troops and those supplied by the 
League of Corinth was to act as hostages. Removing large numbers of young men 
from the native populations, young men who had in all likelihood fought against 
Philip or Alexander in the recent past, would tend to pacify those regions of 
Greece. The question of trust is far more complex than this, though. The allied 
troops were numerically very strong indeed, 7000 supplied by the League of 
Corinth and a further 7000 Thracians, Triballians and lUyrians.^^ 14000 troops 
could easily have caused Alexander's defeat at Issus or at Gaugamela, but they did 
not.^' I f they did form part of a second line, behind the Macedonian front, then they 
were supremely positioned to attack the Macedonians in the rear, which would 
have led to certain defeat: the fact that they did not speaks to their having some 
degree of loyalty. Counter to this argument seems to be the fact that Alexander 
seldom seems to have let them out of his sight. They are seldom used as garrison 
troops, and equally seldom used to form parts of subsidiary expeditions: League 
troops are mentioned under the command of Parmenio in the Troad, at the Amanid 
Gates, in Phrygia and in the march on Persis. 
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It would seem, then, that although the opportunity for disloyalty did present itself, 
the fact that they did not act upon it is suggestive of a certain level of loyalty. This 
sense of loyalty may very well not have been a positive feeling; it could have been 
out of fear of reprisals against their home states by Alexander's regent Antipater. 
Darius and Meninon seem to have made a significant strategic error in not, as far 
as we know, seeking to exploit any anti-Macedonian sentiment. However if 
Memnon had lived longer and carried the war on to mainland Greece we could very 
well have seen the expedition fall into serious difficulties. 
The mercenaries present a different problem; they were with the expedition out of 
choice and not because of some political hold Alexander may have had over their 
home city-states. Their reasons for any potential disloyalty would, therefore, have 
been very different from that of the allied troops. Disloyalty among mercenaries is 
often on financial rather than political grounds, after all. Judeich^^ believed that a 
possible explanation for Alexander's seemingly slight use of mercenary troops in 
his set-piece battles was precisely that he did not entirely trust them. The only real 
evidence, i f we can call it evidence, for this hj^othesis is that Curtius records an 
attempt by Darius to "buy off" some of Alexander's mercenaries.'*''' It seems that a 
letter from Darius to an unnamed recipient was intercepted, some time just before 
the battle of Gaugamela. In the letter Darius was attempting to sow the seeds of 
dissension among Alexander's mercenary troops; Alexander was in favour of 
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reading the letter to a general assembly of troops but was persuaded out of this 
course of action by Parmenio who stated Alexander was vulnerable even if 
only one man were a traitor". Parmenio, then, seems to have had potential 
doubts over their loyalty, but the ultimate proof is simply that they were never 
disloyal, not whilst with the main army or whilst they were attached to 
secondary columns. They had far greater opportunities for rebellion than the allies 
did as they had far more wide reaching roles, for instance as garrisons in every key 
city Alexander captured. The real reason that Alexander did not make great use of 
his mercenaries and allies was not that he did not trust them, but simply that they 
were trained and equipped to perform a different role from that which the 
Macedonian heavy infantry were trained for. 
Demobilization decree. 
Soon after leaving the Gedrosian desert"'^  Alexander issued one of the most 
controversial decrees of his career: he ordered all of his satraps in Asia to disband 
their mercenary armies. The only source that mentions this decree is Diodorus, 
and he does so only briefly. He says that Alexander had come to realize that several 
of his satraps had acted arbitrarily and selfishly" and that some had committed 
serious offences". Upon realizing that they could be potentially in trouble, 
several satraps revolted, others fled with as much money as they could. Diodorus 
tells us "As news of this was brought to the king, he wrote to all of his generals and 
satraps in Asia, ordering them, as soon as they had read his letter, to disband all 
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their mercenaries instantly."'"^ Diodorus sets this decree in the context of 
Alexander's attempts to suppress certain satraps who had been acting more as 
despots than subordinates to the king. Bosworth'"'notes a precedent to this decree: 
in 359/8 Artaxerxes I I I instructed his western satraps to disband their mercenaries, 
thereby precipitating the revolt of Artabazus. Artaxerxes' decree was a security 
measure and Diodorus presents Alexander's decree in the same light, but there is 
more to Alexander's decree than this. 
Alexander did not simply demobilize these troops; he did not intend them to 
disappear, or to return home to Greece, '^ ^ that would have been unrealistic in the 
extreme. Tens of thousands of men who had been mercenaries all or most of their 
adult lives would not simply have returned to Greece to become farmers: they 
would, in all likelihood, have caused great problems for Alexander. Alexander, I 
believe, did not intend to disband these mercenaries, they were intended to become 
part of his field army: it is therefore misleading to speak of demobilization, they 
were to be transferred from the safraps to die mobile field army. Greek mercenary 
troops acted as garrisons in every major town and city throughout the empire and 
their demobilization would suggest that the satrapies were to be left relatively 
defenceless against internal uprisings, a situation that Alexander would never have 
allowed. I f it had been Alexander's intent to demobilize these mercenaries 
completely, to leave the satraps with no garrisons, then we should see evidence of 
this in the sources, and we do not. We in fact see the exact opposite: we know for 
example that Peucestas who was appointed to the satrapy of Persis in early 324 
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raised an army in excess of 20000 strong within a year of taking up his position; 
if Peucestas raised a very strong army within a remarkably short period of time we 
can safely assume that others did too. We know with some certainty, therefore, that 
satrapal armies were not outlawed. 
Why would Alexander require such a huge injection of new troops? Alexander's 
reserves of mercenaries must have been very low at this point in the campaign, 
after the demands of his foundations in India, the constant demands for garrisons 
and the severe losses in the Gedrosian desert. It seems to me, therefore, that this 
decree was not a reactive measure, as Diodorus would suggest, but a proactive one. 
Alexander was using the mercenaries that were already at his disposal in the 
satrapal armies to replenish his army almost instantly after its recent losses. The 
satraps would then be allowed to rebuild their forces at their own leisure: they had 
the time, Alexander did not. Some satraps seem to have misunderstood this decree, 
those who evidently had been exploiting their positions for personal gain. This 
decree, then, led to several satraps revolting, it was not the case that these revolts 
led to the decree. 
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Mercenaries and Allies: Footnotes. 
1. Diodorus 17.17.3 tells us that the army of invasion contained 7000 Odrysians, 
Triballians and Illyrians and 1000 Agrianians and archers. Diodorus is the only 
source that provides us with a detailed troop list for the army of invasion. 
2. Griffith (1935), 14. 
3. Diodorus 17.17.3. 
4. Parke (1933), 14. 
5. Athens' first recorded use of hoplite mercenaries was on the Sicilian expedition 
and even here there were only 250 "Mantineans and other mercenary troops": 
Thucydides 6.43. 
6. Dupuy (1992), 365. 
7. Diodorus 15.44.2-4. 
8. Diodorus 15.44.2-4. 
9. Nepos Iphicrates 9.1.3-4. 
10. Best (1969), 102. 
11. Diodorus' failure to realise the existence of peltast troops before Iphicrates is 
indeed very striking. In this omission Diodorus shows his serious lack of 
understanding of the military situation of the day. 
12. Parke (1933), 80. 
13. Best (1969), 103. Griffith (1980) 162, also takes this line, and believes that the 
reforms of Iphicrates were not major; he points out that they are suspiciously 
absent from the whole corpus of Xenophon's writings. Stylianou (1998) 345, 
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interestingly believes that the reforms of Iphicrates were temporary, only meant 
for a campaign in Egypt and they disappear after 373, with the exception of the 
Iphicratean boots, which certainly did persist. 
14. Mercenaries were also employed in Sicily in significant numbers from an early 
date. "By 481 it seems possible that Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, maintained an 
army that included as many as fifteen thousand mercenaries. They presumably 
constituted a significant part of the army that won the decisive victory over the 
Carthaginians at Himera": Sage, (1996), 148. 
15. Parke (1933), 21. 
16. Polyaenus 4.10.2. 
17. Parke (1933) 21. 
18. For a more detailed discussion of this passage see Parke, (1933), 157, footnote 1. 
19. Diodorus, 16.8.6. 
20. Homblower (1991), 27, claims that the tribute from Athens' subjects totalled 
around 460 talents, although he does concede that some states provided ships 
instead of money. As the empire grew, however, the numbers of member states 
who made their contributions in kind declined; Athens preferred to receive 
financial contributions as this made her position more secure, all of the fleet 
being provided by her and therefore loyal to her alone. 
21. Polyaenus 4.2.8; c f Diodoms 16.35.3. 
22. This was the incident when Onomarchus lured Philip into a frap and used 
catapults for the first time against the Macedonians; see chapter 7 for more 
detail, see also Diodorus 16.35.1. 
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23. Theopompus FGrH 115 F 11. 
24. Demosthenes 19.81. 
25. Demosthenes 7.15. 
26. Griffith (1935), 10-11. 
27. Demosthenes 9.16. 
28. Curtius 8.1.24. 
29. Diodorus 16.86. 
30. Demosthenes 3.49. 
31. Polyaenus 4.2.18. 
32. Plutarch Phocion 12. 
33. For example at Corinth (Polybius 38.3.3), Sicyon (Demosthenes 17.16), and in 
Ambracia (Diodorus 17.3.3). 
34. Diodorus 17.17.3. 
35. This figure assumes that we consider the Balkan troops as allies. 
36. Artian 7.9.6 has Alexander say at Opis that he inherited "... a few gold and silver 
cups and not 60 talents in the treasuries" and that"... 5000 talents of debt were 
owing through Philip". 
37. Arrian 1.26.5; Bosworth (1980), 167, points out that Side was a prominent 
Phoenician port and almost certainly would have supplied ships to the Persian 
navy; Alexander would have been keen therefore to deny this strategic city to 
his enemy. We are not explicitly told that these froops were mercenaries but it is 
highly likely. 
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38. Arrian 2.1.4. In this instance he does speak of ".... mercenary troops sent to fight 
for them (i.e. the people of Mytilene) by Alexander". 
39. Arrian 1.23.6 cf 2.5.7. There could quite easily have been more Macedonian 
garrisons that we hear nothing about: Bosworth (1980), 140, suggests Miletus 
may be such a place. 
40. Alexander did not use mercenaries as front line troops and so their casualty 
figures were probably small. 
41. Arrian 1.19.6. 
42. Arrian 2.9.3. 
43. Griffith (1935), 27. 
44. We can say that the former explanation looks even more implausible when we 
consider that a few days after Alexander sent an expedition of 2500 mercenaries 
toEphesus (Arrian 1.18.1): Bosworth (1980), 134, believes these were intended 
as a garrison, he still had with him a body of4000 at Miletus (Arrian 1.18.5), 
giving him rather more than the 5000 he had at the start of the expedition. 
45. Arrian 2.20.5. 
46. Curtius 4.5.18; cf Arrian 2.13.5; although there is no notice (in Arrian) of them 
joining Alexander before Gaugamela, and Arrian probably conceals them 
amongst a larger batch received after that battle. 
47. Arrian Indica 19.5; Curtius 8.5.4. It should be stated that not all of these troops 
were mercenaries. 
48. The table is an adaptation of that in Griffith (1935), 20-1. 
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49. More on this last batch of mercenary reinforcements and the demobilization 
decree later. 
50. One thinks of the 20,000 mercenaries recruited by Peucestas, the satrap of Sardis 
within 1 year of the demobilization decree of Alexander in 324. These troops 
were never part of the field army and thus are never counted towards troop totals 
but they were potentially available for use by Alexander as required. 
51. Berve(1926), \A44ff. 
52. Diodoms 17.17.3. 
53. Arrian 2.5.1. 
54. Griffith (1935), 29. 
55. Curtius 4.8.4. 
56. Arrian 1.18.1; This column rejoined Alexander at Halicamassus, Arrian 1.24.3. 
57. An-ian 1.18.1. 
58. Bosworth (1980), 134. 
59. Arrian 1.18.2. 
60. It would seem reasonable for Alexander to have assumed that the Ionian cities 
would come over to him without a fight, and so sending the elite troops of his 
army on these expeditions would seem unnecessary. 
61. That commanded by Alcimachus, Arrian 1.18.2. 
62. Arrian 1.18.3. 
63. Bosworth (1980), 136. 
64. This can be assumed as both commanders (Erigyius and Andronicus) were 
mercenaries themselves. 
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65. Arrian 4.3.7; Curtius 7.6.24 on the other hand noted 800 cavalry and 3000 
infantry. 
66. Parke (1933), 193. 
67. For example, in 331-0, Parmenio was given command the main body of the 
army with orders to proceed along the main road towards Pasargadae, whilst 
Alexander campaigned against the Uxii with his Macedonians and Agrianians. 
See also Alexander's final pursuit of Darius. 
68. The siege of Halicamassus was certainly not Alexander's finest hour. It is my 
belief, however, that he abandoned it so quickly, before its capture was 
complete, because his newly formulated naval policy made it essential that he 
capture all the major Persian ports with as little delay as possible. 
69. Arrian 3.5.3, Doloaspis and Petisis: each was to have control over half of the 
country but Petisis refused the appointment (the reason is not known) and so 
Doloaspis was given the whole. 
70. Arrian 3.5.3, Pantaleon was given the command at Memphis whilst Polemon 
commanded at Pelusium. 
71. Arrian 3.5.3, Eugnostus, a companion, was appointed secretary and Aeschylus 
and Ephippus were commissioners of the mercenary troops. 
72. Bosworth (1980), 276. 
73. Curtius 4.8.4. 
74. Griffith (1935), 25, uses this term. 
75. Bosworth (1980), 276. 
76. Arrian 3.22.1; 3.28.4. 
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77. Arrian 1.14.1 f f . 
78. Droysen (1877), 24-7, quoted in Parke (1933), 187, suggested that during the set 
piece battles the mercenaries and allied troops were brigaded with the 
Macedonian front line troops under the relevant tax\s commanders, resulting in 
taxeis of considerably more than the 1500 men that we know each taxis 
contained. This seems, at best, highly improbable, as the Macedonians were 
trained and equipped in entirely different ways, and had an entirely separate 
tactical role, as will be discussed later. It is also likely that Alexander would 
want, as far as possible, the glory to go to his native Macedonian troops. This 
theory also clashes with Arrian's account of the battle of Gaugamela, also 
discussed later. 
79. Arrian 2.9.1. 
80. Arrian 2.9.1; the 1958 Penguin translation, by A. de Selincourt, mentions "the 
Peloponnesian troops and other allied divisions", although the Greek text says 
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84. Bosworth (1980), 210. 
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Chapter 6. 
Alexander's Mediterranean Fleets. 
It may at first sight appear sfrange to use the word fleet in the plural rather than 
the singular in the title of this chapter, but I do so deliberately. There is no doubt 
that Alexander possessed more than one fleet during the eariy years of the invasion: 
he did in fact possess four, each of which will be examined separately. 
The Fleet of the League of Corinth. 
One of the burdens placed on the members of the League of Corinth after the 
allied Greek defeat at Chaeronea and subsequent recognition of Alexander's 
supremacy, was to supply ships to aid the war effort. This fleet was established in 
336 or shortly before, and its main purpose was to act as support to land operations 
being conducted by the field army. This support largely involved them acting as 
transports and maintaining the lines of supply and communication with Macedonia 
and Greece. The fleet must have been remarkably heterogeneous and was of 
moderate size, consisting of 160 ships of which a mere twenty were supplied by the 
strongest naval power in Greece, Athens.' Many of the smaller city-states would 
have supplied the merest handful. Arrian tells us that the fleet was untrained, ^  each 
member state evidently only sending the worst ships and sailors simply to fulfil a 
commitment. The resulting fleet was eflFectively useless as a fighting force, it was 
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poorly trained and consisting of large numbers of contingents who had presumably 
never fought as a cohesive unit before. Realistically it would have been impossible 
for Alexander to have operated with anything but the most basic tactics. This is 
strongly suggested at Arrian 1.18.8 where Alexander, in debate with Parmenio as to 
whether to engage the Persian fleet at sea says that he would not risk making a 
present to the Persians of all the skill and courage of his men". This can only be a 
reference to the potential loss of Macedonian troops, ^ not Greek sailors, and 
suggests that Alexander's naval tactics would rely on boarding Persian ships and 
fighting hand to hand, ^ effectively to fight a land battle at sea. These tactics are not 
wholly surprising in a commander who had no experience at all of naval warfare. 
Despite the evidently poor quality of vessels supplied by his allies, Alexander's 
Greek fleet had proved itself of greater use than simply for logistics and transport 
alone. Whilst Alexander was besieging the city of Miletus by land, the Persian fleet 
of some 400 vessels was heading north to relieve it. I f the Persians had arrived the 
city could presumably have held out for some time, as reinforcements and supplies 
could easily be transported by sea. Nicanor, commander of Alexander's Greek 
fleet, arrived three days before the Persians, however, and anchored his vessels off 
the Milesian coast on the island of Lade.^  The Persian fleet, unable to find any port 
suitable to meet its supply needs, and seemingly unable or unwilling to engage the 
Greeks in these narrow waters, set sail south again. Thus Alexander's fleet had 
proved, quite convincingly, that, despite his unwillingness to offer a naval battle. 
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his fleet could still be of considerable use militarily, making his subsequent 
decision even more baffling. 
Soon after the capture of Miletus and before the commencement of operations at 
Halicamassus Alexander made one of the most debated decisions of his career: he 
disbanded his fleet. Arrian^ gives us five reasons: -
1. Lack of money. 
2. The Persian navy was far superior to his own. 
3. Alexander was unwilling to risk any losses, in ships or men, in a naval 
engagement. 
4. Alexander believed that he no longer needed a fleet as he was now master 
of the continent"^ 
5. He intended to defeat the Persian navy on land by depriving it of its ports. 
Lack of money is the reason most commonly accepted by modem historians as the 
major factor in Alexander's decision; it is also the only reason cited by Diodorus.' 
This conclusion is flawed for two reasons, though. Firstly the fleet was supplied by 
the member states of the League of Corinth; it is therefore reasonable to assume 
that the cost of their upkeep would also fall on these states and not on Alexander. 
The fleet would, effectively, have cost him almost nothing to maintain. Secondly, 
Alexander should not have been short of funds at this point. Just a few months later 
at Gordium, during the winter of 334/3, Alexander invested 500 talents on raising a 
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new fleet and 600 talents were allotted to pay for the upkeep of garrisons on the 
Greek mainland.'" There seems no reason why Alexander's financial position 
should have improved so drastically in just a few short months. 
Arrian is correct to say that the Persian fleet was superior to Alexander's, both in 
numbers and quality. This is not a reason to demobilize the fleet, however, as this 
would leave the islands and the mainland defenceless. Miletus had also shown 
Alexander that a fleet was tactically useful even i f he did not offer a naval battle to 
the Persians. This lack of quality and numbers would be more of an argument for 
increasing investment in the fleet, rather than ridding himself of it. 
Points two and three are certainly linked, Alexander was unwilling to offer a naval 
battle because of the potential ramifications. His strategy would involve a heavy 
reliance on marines, most likely the hypaspists, and he needed every one of these 
troops for the land campaign. Any defeat could also have caused political problems 
back in Greece too. 
The suggestion by Arrian that Alexander did not need a fleet as he already 
controlled the whole continent is extraordinary and very obviously not true. Even i f 
we take Arrian to be referring to Asia Minor rather than the whole of Asia then it 
still was nowhere near true. Besides, as Bosworth points out'' there was now 
nothing stopping the Persians from attacking Alexander's forces in the rear, which 
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they in fact did at Tenedos.'^  This was a tactic that should have been employed far 
more effectively than it ever was by the Persians. 
This strategy of defeating the Persian navy on land is famous and on the surface 
fairly sound. In the ancient world warships could not carry any great quantity of 
supplies and so had to dock at a friendly port every night to re-supply themselves 
with food and fresh water. It is also true that this strategy ultimately worked; the 
Persian fleet did collapse as Alexander captured key cities on the Phoenician coast, 
but the strategy had at least two serious flaws. The first was that a competent 
commander, as Memnon surely was, had a free hand to act as he wished in the 
Aegean, to overrun all of the islands and carry the fight to the mainland, where 
several states would more than likely have revolted given the opportunity. 
Secondly it does not take any account of the fact that a significant portion of the 
Persian fleet was from Cyprus, which would theoretically have been unaffected by 
this strategy; although these ships would still have needed mainland ports in order 
to operate they would still be loyal to the Persians and able to harass Alexander's 
rear. Alexander essentially relied upon luck to overcome these two problems, 
which was uncharacteristic. His planning was usually far more meticulous than this 
and his strategies were well thought out; which leads me to conclude that his 
decision here was not a purely tactical or strategic one, but something else. 
I f the decision to disband the fleet was not taken on military grounds, nor was it 
forced upon him by lack of funds or any of the other reasons Arrian gives, why did 
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he make this decision? I suspect that the truth lies in something that Arrian comes 
close to mentioning. He points out that any loss in battle could lead to disaffection 
and potential rebellion at home, bringing up the question of loyalty. I argued in a 
separate chapter that the allied troops with the army were loyal to Alexander, 
although this could have been because of a fear of reprisals at home i f they were 
not. It could also have been because of the presence of thousands of heavily armed, 
battle hardened Macedonians. The fleet of course, would very quickly have been 
far away from the location of the king or the army, Alexander's personality and 
influence would have had far less of an impact on them and the opportunity for 
disloyalty would have been exponentially greater and far easier to act upon. The 
fact that he retained the twenty Athenian vessels'^  is an indication that he wanted to 
try to retain some specifically Athenian hostages, "* but 160 total vessels was too 
great a risk. 
The Fleet of Proteas. 
We know very little about this fleet, or indeed its commander Proteas. We do 
know that whilst Alexander was at Gordium in the winter of 334/3 Antipater gave 
orders for the reconstruction of a Greek fleet.The fleet was raised principally on 
the island of Euboea and in the Peloponnese, and its primary purpose was to act as 
a defensive force against the possibility of Persian naval action against the islands 
or even the mainland. We know very little about the size of this fleet; Arrian simply 
says "...a number of warships", '^and the only evidence we have of it in action 
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involved fifteen ships attacking a force often Persians off the island of Siphnos. 
The fleet seems to have been in commission only until 332. 
The Fleet of Hegelochus and Amphoterus. 
There is only one reference in Arrian to the construction of a Macedonian national 
fleet, but we know from Curtius^^ that whilst Alexander was marching between 
Gordium and Ancyra in the summer of 333 he invested 500 talents in the 
construction of a Macedonian fleet. This fleet was led by Hegelochus and 
Amphoterus, but it is evident from Artian^'' that Hegelochus was in supreme 
command. Curtius tells us specifically that the former was in charge of the troops 
and the latter was responsible for the ships and therefore presumably their crews.^ ' 
Berve^^ believed that there was a contradiction here in the commander of the naval 
element of a fleet being subordinate to the commander of the marines, but really 
none exists. It was not uncommon in the ancient world for this to be the 
arrangement"^ ^ and it is even less surprising when we consider the wider situation 
with Alexander in which the army was totally dominant. We also know, however, 
that Amphoterus was capable of acting independently when assignments arose: he 
was sent to Lesbos, Chios and Cos at the head of a detachment of the fleet in 332.^ '' 
When the Macedonian fleet joined Alexander in Egypt during the winter of 332/1^^ 
Hegelochus was reassigned, we do not know where. At this time Amphoterus 
assumed command of both the ships and the marines.^ ^ The fleet then seems to 
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have been operating off Crete^^ and the Peloponnese.^ * The fleet seems to have 
been in commission until 331.^^ 
The Cvpro-Phoenician Fleet. 
During the siege of Tyre in 333, soon after the mole was partially destroyed by the 
Tyrian fireship, Alexander along with his hypaspists and Agrianians set off for 
Sidon.^ *^  Arrian tells us that this mission was in order to assemble there all the 
warships he possessed". ^' It is unclear what this line actually means; it could be 
that Alexander intended to summon his Greek and Macedonian fleets to him: i f this 
were the case, however, there was no need to travel to Sidon, and secondly there is 
no evidence that any such summons was issued or acted upon by the fleets. It is 
perhaps more likely that Alexander believed quite simply that as he now possessed 
the ports of Sidon and Byblos, along with many others, he also ovmed their fleets 
and was awaiting their arrival home at the end of the campaigning season. 
Bosworth^^ believes that news of the Persian defeat at Issus in November 333 
would not have reached the fleet until after the end of the sailing season; and so the 
Phoenician and Cypriot contingents were simply in no position to defect to 
Alexander until early April.^^ By the time the Phoenician fleet arrived home the 
siege of Tyre had been under way for two months. 
Arrian gives us a quite detailed account of the numbers of ships Alexander 
acquired: the contingents of Aradus, Byblos and Sidon accounted for a total of 
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about 80 Phoenician vessels. At around the same time he was joined by a 
detachment".... from Rhodes and nine other vessels, three from Soli and Mallus, 
ten from Lycia and a fifty-oared galley from Macedon." '^* Soon after this news of 
the Persian defeat at Issus reached Cyprus, inducing the Cypriot kings to also join 
Alexander at Sidon: their fleet alone totalled some 120 ships. Arrian's total of 224 
ships at Sidon generally agrees with Plutarch's^^ figure of 200 and Curtius'^^ claim 
that 190 ships took part in the surprise attack on Tyre. 
The acquisition of the Cypro-Phoenician fleet was undoubtedly the turning point 
in the siege of Tyre: before this Alexander had no effective fleet and therefore no 
real means of countering Tyrian naval action against him. This fleet assured that he 
could probe the outer defences of the city from all directions; the ultimate 
breakthrough came when a group of hypaspists operating from ships penetrated the 
walls at the southern tip of the fortress, not as a direct result of the construction of 
the mole.^' 
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Catapults were probably first invented in the Greek world in 399, at Syracuse 
under the patronage of Dionysius I . Diodorus tells us that in that year "the entire 
city became one great arsenal".' It seems that Dionysius gathered from all over 
Sicily the finest engineers of the day to construct for him vast quantities of the most 
modem pieces of military technology, and almost certainly to conduct research into 
new forms of armaments. Diodorus goes on to say that "Catapults were discovered 
at that time... a natural consequence of the assembly in one place of the most 
skilful craftsmen from all over the world". ^ 
A problem remains, however, as to what type of artillery Diodorus is describing, 
torsion or non-torsion. More on the technical differences later; for now it is 
sufficient to say that torsion engines were more complex and therefore probably a 
development from non-torsion engines. In order for Diodorus to be describing the 
invention of torsion catapults we must be able to demonstrate the existence, before 
this date, of non-torsion engines, and this is not possible. Diodorus, therefore, must 
be describing the invention of non-torsion engines. As Marsden remarks "It is 
inconceivable.. .that non-torsion engines would have escaped the notice of 
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Thucydides, i f they had been in existence at the time of the Peloponnesian War". ^ 
Thucydides presents the sieges of Plataea" and Syracuse^ as showpieces, giving 
details on the most modem forms of attack and defence, including the use of a 
rather primitive, yet ingenious form of flamethrower. 
In 414 in an interesting line in the Birds, Aristophanes has Euelpides say to 
Peisthetairos "You are already out-shooting Nicias with your machines". ^ Marsden 
believes, however, that the word out-shooting can equally easily mean out-doing 
and probably therefore refers to the construction of higher towers to allow slingers 
and archers to fire their projectiles over greater distances.' Dunbar says this is little 
more than a military metaphor, and in the absence of more evidence we cannot 
use this line of Aristophanes as evidence of the existence of catapults at this time. 
Diodoms also gives no indication that the Carthaginians possessed catapults in his 
descriptions of the sieges of Selinus and Himera in 409 ^ and Acragas in 406."^ We 
can probably infer, then, that catapults were not invented in the Greek world until 
399, and that these catapults were of the non-torsion variety; but what of 
developments outside the Greek world? 
There are two possible references in the Bible to the existence of catapults in the 
east. The first is in the second book of Chronicles; it states "Uzziah made in 
Jerusalem accurately designed machines to be on the towers and breastworks, to 
hurl missiles and large stones".'' Marsden notes, however, that this section of the 
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Bible was written around 250, when siege technique was at a relative high, and that 
the writer could easily have committed an anachronism.'^ The biblical figure of 
Uzziah also lived around the eighth century, making it even more unlikely that this 
passage represents a historical fact. These same objections cannot be used to 
disprove the second reference in Ezekiel, as the section was written around 580. 
In this instance the Hebrew text uses the term battering ram, which was 
mistranslated into Greek as catapult,''' and so again there is no definitive evidence 
of the existence of catapults before 399. 
In Pliny's Natural History "They say that Pisaeus invented hunting-spears and, 
among pieces of artillery, the scorpion; the Cretans invented the catapult, the Syro-
Phoenicians the ballista and sling". '^  Marsden again dismisses this as evidence, 
believing that this was a misunderstanding on the part of either Pliny or of his 
Hellenistic source resulting from the use of "vague and anachronistic 
references...". '^ 
There is one very interesting possible reference to the existence of catapults 
outside the Greek world long before 399, and from much farther east than 
Phoenicia. Sun Tzu'^ makes several references to "machines"; He advises that a 
general should "keep your machines in good repair", '* a little later advising that 
you should "take three months to prepare your machines and three months to 
complete your siege engineering"'^ before undertaking a siege; he then goes on to 
say that he "means that it is necessary to take time to really prepare machines and 
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constmctions thoroughly". Sun Tzu then strongly advises the general not to lose 
patience, but to "wait for the siege machines" '^ to arrive before beginning to assault 
a fortified position. Stone's translation of the same sections of text simply states 
"Attack cities only when there is no alternative, because to prepare big shields and 
wagons and make ready the necessary arms and equipment requires at least three 
months, and to pile up earthen ramps against the walls requires an additional three 
months. The general, unable to control his impatience, will order his froops to 
swarm up the wall like ants, with the result that one-third of them will be killed 
without taking the city". We can probably conclude therefore that Sun Tzu was 
not describing catapults but some other, unspecified, less advanced pieces of 
technology, something like rams, ladders and screens for instance. Diodorus is, 
therefore, in all probability describing the first appearance in the world of artillery, 
created in Syracuse in 399 under the auspices of Dionysius I . 
It is unclear how quickly non-torsion catapults spread to mainland Greece, but a 
significant turning point occurred in 354: when Philip was beginning to become 
involved in the affairs of Thessaly, he met, and was defeated by, Onomarchus of 
Phocis in a brilliant piece of strategy where Onomarchus lured the Macedonians 
into a horse-shoe shaped canyon where they could use catapults stationed out of 
reach on the cliff-tops of the canyon walls (See later). It seems unlikely that the 
Macedonians possessed artillery before this point because this incident had a 
significant impact on Philip, prompting him to instmct his engineers to construct 
siege engines, and no doubt to attempt to improve on the current design. 
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Developments in Macedon were apparently slow, as the Macedonian siege train 
had had little impact until the siege of Perinthus in 340,^ '* and even by this time 
Diodorus only records arrow-shooting catapults^ .^ "Macedonian stone-throwers do 
not appear until Alexander's attack on Halicamassus some years later" (334). 
Early non-torsion engines were, in all honesty, of limited value; they were not 
powerful enough to destroy walls by themselves and they of course had limited 
range. Marsden estimates 200-250 yards for the earliest models: improvements in 
design, therefore, were imperative and "...although definite information simply 
does not exist, a good deal of circumstantial evidence suggests that the principle of 
torsion was first discovered in Macedon under the auspices of Philip 11". The 
discovery of the principle of torsion was a watershed in siege warfare as it allowed 
projectiles to be fired with greater propulsive force over a greater distance.^ ^ 
Torsion engines are first mentioned during the siege of Perinthus, see above, 
although these were arrow-throwers and were only used to assault troops on the 
walls, rather than the walls themselves. This breakthrough was turned into a 
significant advantage for the attacking side when Alexander's engineers applied 
this principle to stone-throwing machines. With the creation of the stone-throwing 
catapult, Alexander had the ability to assault city walls from a distance for the first 
time in history. 
Siege equipment had existed in both Greece and the Near East for a considerable 
length of time before the career of Alexander, but it was, by the standards of the 
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fourth century, rather primitive. The attackers could not assault the walls from a 
distance, and were forced to use rams^° and scaling ladders, ^ ' both of which would 
have resulted in large numbers of casualties among the attackers. A circumvallation 
of earth could also be used, as at Plataea in 429,^ ^ as a means of elevating the 
troops to somewhere close to the top of the city's walls. Towers were also used to 
achieve the same result. Before the invention of the catapult, however, there were 
only two real ways of capturing a fortified position: starvation or befrayal. If a city 
could be completely cut off it could be starved into submission, but this was often 
time consuming and did not guarantee success, and in a world where there were 
very distinct campaigning seasons, commanders often could not afford the time. 
The best hope for an attacking general was to have the city betrayed to him from 
within, either by a faction of his supporters, or by the promise of gold as a reward. 
Before the widespread use of catapults, and particularly torsion stone-throwers, the 
advantage in siege warfare always lay with the defenders. 
Knowledge of catapults seems to have taken some time to spread to other parts of 
the Greek world after its invention in Sicily. The first city-states on the mainland to 
obtain the new weapon were probably Sparta and Athens. Plutarch preserves 
Archidamus' reaction to witnessing a demonstration of a catapult around 370: 
"Heracles, man's martial valour is of no avail any more", an interesting passage 
as it illustrates that the effect on morale was far greater than its actual military 
impact at this time. A fragmentary inscription from Athens that details stockpiled 
items on the acropolis in 371/0 lists "two boxes of catapult bolts", and since it is 
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unlikely that the Athenians would have stockpiled catapult bolts without the 
necessary catapult we can assume that the Athenians possessed them by at least this 
date. 
The spread of catapults to the rest of Greece probably came from direct contact 
with one or both of the two great city-states. The Phocians, for instance, were on 
friendly terms with both at the outbreak of the Sacred War, and the weapons that 
Onomarchus used to defeat Philip probably originated in either Athens or Sparta. 
Their spread was not complete within the Greek world; when Philip besieged 
Perinthus, a relatively important state, there is no indication that the defenders 
possessed artillery of any kind. 
Technical details 
It is usual to divide ancient artillery pieces into two broad categories according to 
the means by which the propulsive force is applied to the projectile, these being 
torsion and non-torsion. In a non-torsion engine, surely the first of the two classes 
to be invented, the propulsive force is supplied by a compound bow, similar to but 
stronger than the standard bow of the day, whereas in a torsion engine the force is 
supplied by a spring of sinew, hair or some other resilient material. Of the five 
surviving ancient sources only Heron gives details on the earliest form of both 
torsion and non-torsion engines. The so-called "•gastraphetes" (belly-bow) was 
the first non-torsion engine. The engine owed its name to the fact that the operator 
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had to rest the end of the machine on his stomach while physically pulling the 
bowstring into place, although later models were fitted with a winch allowing the 
bowstring to be drawn back fiirther, adding to the effective range of this weapon. 
The gastraphetes was constructed and transported in three sections, the bow and 
the base, which itself was in two pieces: this added to the difficulty in deploying 
the weapon in the field (see later). The construction materials used in the actual 
bow are the subject of some debate, but i f it was a compound bow then it would 
consist of a central core of wood with a layer of horn glued to the inside of the bow, 
and a layer of sinew attached to the outer side. The horn was there to resist 
compression and provide propulsive force by trying to return to its original 
position, and the sinew would resist expansion, thus again supplying force to the 
projectile. 
The bolts that were fired from the gastraphetes were essentially large arrows, 
although it appears to have taken a process of experiment in order to determine the 
optimum size and weight distribution for these bolts. Diodorus tells us that 
"catapult bolts of all kinds were prepared": this could of course imply different 
types of catapults being constructed but I think it more likely that this was simply a 
trial and error process to determine the boh for the gastraphetes. 
The gastraphetes was a significant invention but the compound bow was limited 
as to the force that it could apply to a projectile, meaning that it could not be used 
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to attack walls directly. It was with this in mind that Heron reports that the 
Syracusans ".. .wished to increase both the size of the missile and the force of 
projection. They sought to make the arms of the bow more powerfiil, but they could 
not realize their intention by the use of composite bows". Marsden believes that 
in order to increase the propulsive force of the machine the Macedonians first 
investigated the properties of the three resilient materials used in the composite 
bow, namely sinew, wood and horn, and that the principle of torsion was probably 
developed "...because they wished to isolate the sinew which, they believed, 
confributed the major force in composite bows.". 
The realization that sinew on its own gave greater propulsive force led to a 
redesigning of the engine itself. The first torsion engines were similar in design to 
the non-torsion engines of the day, except that the compound bow was replaced by 
two separate wooden struts, ".. .around each of which they wrapped strand after 
strand and layer after layer of sinew cord. The two resulting bundles of sinew, each 
with its own fi^me, formed the new springs".This new design also incorporated 
a certain amount of extra wood in the framework of the device to cope with the 
extra stress that the device would be subject to, especially at the front end where the 
two struts were attacked to the frsme. 
Another innovation, seemingly datable to the reign of Alexander, is the use of 
ship-mounted artillery. This strategy allowed the besieger of a maritime city. Tyre 
being a good example, not only to block off the harbour but, more importantly, to 
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force the defenders to divide their troops along the city's defensive perimeter, not 
allowing them to concentrate on any given sector. This essentially allowed 
Alexander to conduct an outflanking attack, which was in many ways his 
trademark. 
Arrian does not give us precise details as to what these ship-mounted machines 
actually were, but one particular passage does seem to imply an answer. '^ '^  The 
engines themselves, which were mounted on transport vessels, could not approach 
within effective range because there were a large number of rocks in the water 
close to Tyre. The crews of the ships decided to drag these rocks onboard; two 
possible explanations for what happened next are possible. The rocks were either 
transported out to sea and dropped into deeper water, or they were fired from the 
artillery pieces on the ships out to sea. Arrian's use of the word aphiesan seems to 
provide the answer; it implies a throwing motion rather than simply dropping, and 
therefore we can assume that the artillery pieces Alexander had mounted upon his 
ships were indeed stone throwing engines. This is certainly the interpretation 
Bosworth prefers.'*^ 
As mentioned above siege towers were not a new invention but those used by 
Alexander do seem to have been of exceptional size. A description of a giant siege 
tower, designed for Alexander by his engineer Posidonius, can be found in Biton. 
Alexander's towers were constructed and transported in sections for easy assembly 
on site; they were also wheeled for freedom of movement (the wheels sank into the 
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sand at Gaza, causing considerable damage to the flooring of the towers and 
injuries to the troops inside). They were also equipped with drawbridges"** in 
order for the attackers to reach the walls: towers must always be greater than the 
height of the walls they are attacking or they are useless. 
Artillery in Field Campaigns 
When considering the uses of ancient artillery in field campaigns we should resist 
any temptation to draw parallels with modem artillery pieces. Modem artillery is 
often located several kilomefres behind the front and can cause considerable 
damage to the enemies' positions by concentrating fire. Ancient artillery was 
very different: it had limited range, probably not much more than 400 yards, and 
before around 100 A.D.''* no artillery pieces were mounted permanently on mobile 
carriages. This meant that individual pieces had to be transported to the area in 
which they would be used, unloaded, assembled and then fired. This serious lack of 
mobility also meant that the siting of artillery pieces in field operations was of 
prime importance: they had to be located where the enemy was unlikely or unable 
to overrun them. 
By Alexander's day, artillery had the ability to perform two roles, destruction and 
suppression. The discovery of the principle of torsion allowed a besieger to assault 
the walls directly from a distance, an ability that had not existed before. Artillery 
also performed the vital role of suppression, both during sieges when it was used to 
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clear the walls of defenders, and during field operations when it could prevent the 
enemy from attacking until you were ready, such as at the Jaxartes (see later). 
The first recorded incident of artillery being used in a field campaign occurs 
towards the beginning of the reign of Philip, when he was first becoming interested 
in the affairs of Thessaly."*^  Onomarchus the Phocian general had taken up a 
position in a semi-circular range of hills, his artillery being positioned on the ridge. 
When Philip attacked, Onomarchus feigned flight and the Macedonians gave chase. 
At the key moment the Phocians reformed and at the same time the catapults rained 
down a devastating hail upon the disorganized Macedonian infantry, forcing them 
to withdraw. It was probably the surprise and the panic it caused, rather than the 
actual effectiveness of fire, that was so devastating to the Macedonians at this time. 
I f there is one incident that caused Philip to invest so much energy in developing a 
siege train, it was probably this one. 
Despite all of the many battles and campaigns fought by Alexander, there are only 
two instances where he deployed artillery pieces in a field operation, both of which 
were in rather special circumstances. The first was when he had been compelled to 
abandon the siege of Pelium and was withdrawing his troops to a safer area; he was 
forced to ford the river Eordaicus. Most of his troops managed to cross safely, but 
his rearguard, consisting of the Agrianians and some archers, had considerable 
difficulty in disengaging from the enemy. Arrian reports "He deployed his artillery 
on the bank of the river and ordered his men to shoot, at maximum range, all the 
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types of missile that are hurled from machines. He also ordered the archers, who 
had already plunged in, to shoot from mid-stream. Glaucias' men did not dare to 
advance within range. Meanwhile the Macedonians crossed the river safely, so that 
not one casualty was suffered in the withdrawal". Fuller claims this to be "the 
first recorded use of catapults as field artillery", ^' although he is mistaken, since 
the Onomarchus incident occurred some years before. 
The second incident of Alexander's employment of catapults occurred during his 
crossing of the Jaxartes River in 329. A group of Scythians was occupying the far 
bank, making any attempt at crossing extremely hazardous. Arrian records the 
events that followed. "When all the skin floats were ready and the army in full 
equipment drawn up on the river bank, the catapults, at the word of command, 
opened up on the Scythians who were riding along the edge of the water on the 
further side. Some of them were hit; one was pierced through both shield and 
breastplate and fell dead from his horse. The Scythians were taken completely 
aback by the long range of the catapults, and that, together with the loss of a good 
man, induced them to withdraw a short distance from the river, whereupon 
Alexander, seeing their consternation, ordered the trumpets to sound and himself 
led the way over the water, followed by his men.". Curtius records that 
Alexander's catapults were mounted on boats in midsfream. Tarn agrees with 
this, ^  although there is a good chance that Curtius is confusing "modem" Roman 
imperial practice in the crossing of wide rivers under opposition. 
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AH three of these examples of the use of artillery in the field illustrate very well 
the limited theatre in which they could be employed. They had to be close enough 
to the enemy in order for their projectiles to reach, and they had to be on ground 
that was easily defensible or did not need defending. These three examples, and 
particularly the last two, show very clearly that the psychological effect of these 
weapons was out of all proportion to their physical effectiveness. On the two 
occasions when Alexander employed catapults, one man is recorded as being 
killed, and yet they helped in ensuring a successfiil outcome to both operations. 
Their true value in field operations lay in their shock value, and in the confiision 
that they caused. Many of Alexander's opponents, particularly the Scythians, may 
never have seen such a weapon, and, although they may well have been prepared to 
die in combat, they may not have been so prepared to risk their lives with no 
possibility of striking back at the enemy. 
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The command stmcture of the Macedonian army was extremely complex, 
consisting of many separate layers of authority. At the highest levels it is quite well 
known; the same cannot be said of lesser ranks, but there are hints that suggest that, 
even at its lowest levels, it was as complex as the more powerful positions. As with 
many areas of Alexander's empire, and particularly within the army, the command 
stmcture was continually evolving as new positions were created and others 
became obsolete. The most significant changes, however, were probably politically 
motivated, as Alexander gradually changed the army from being that of Philip, 
through the influence of Parmenio and his family, to being his own, particularly 
after 331/0, when Parmenio's influence had been removed. 
Macedonian heavy infantry 
At its lowest levels the command stmcmre of the heavy infantry can be deduced 
from its gradations of pay. The smallest tactical unit of the heavy infantry was the 
dekas or file.' As the name implies the dekas had once consisted often men, but at 
some point long before the reign of Alexander had been expanded to 16.^  Of these 
16 men, 12 were rank and file with the other four being of superior status. Of these 
four, one was the dekadarch or file leader, one was a dimoirites or half-file leader 
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and the other two were dekastateroi or half-file closers.^  Arrian tells us that the 
dekastateroi (ten-stater men) were paid the equivalent of one and a half the pay of a 
rank and file soldier, around 45 drachmae a month. The dimoirites received double 
pay, 60 drachmae a month.'* Bosworth seems to have made a slight error in 
interpreting this passage of Arrian, claiming that there were two dimoiritai and only 
one dekastateros, ^ but Arrian's text seems quite clear on this point. 
Thirty-two dekades formed a lochos consisting of 512 men and being commanded 
by a lochagos. Three lochoi formed a taxis, which was the fiindamental unit of the 
Macedonian heavy infantry, commanded by a taxiarch. Each taxis therefore 
consisted of 1540 men, of whom 1152 were rank and file and in receipt of the basic 
I drachma a day. Initially Alexander crossed the Hellespont with six taxeis, later 
expanded to seven around the time of the invasion of India. Therefore the command 






Rank and File (xl 152) 
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The sfrengths indicated are of course paper strengths, assuming that the tcais was 
at ful l strength. The six taxiarchs appear to have all been of the same rank with 
none holding superiority. Indeed there was no overall commander of the heavy 
infantry* as there was for, say, the companion cavalry; this is because there really 
was no such organization as the 'Macedonian phalanx' (see chapter on Macedonian 
heavy infantry), the taxeis themselves usually being used as separate tactical units, 
or in groups of two or three. This development came largely after 331 when the 
army entered northeastern Iran and smaller, more mobile forces were required. 
Arrian makes a seemingly strange claim at 1.28.4, stating that "On the right wing 
of the attacking force Alexander had the guards' division under his personal 
command. In touch with them were the infantry battalions, forming the whole 
centre of the line and commanded by the various officers whose tum of duty 
happened to fall upon that day". Bosworth suggests' that this is probably a 
rotational system within the phalanx. It could be a reference to the order in which 
the taxeis appeared each day*, or it could be that the minor commands within a 
taxis were rotated to give junior commanders more experience of slightly different 
roles. 
The Macedonian heavy infantry appear to have undergone very few serious 
changes in the command structure over the course of the campaign: the huge 
numbers of reinforcements received between the great set-piece battles of Issus and 
Gaugamela seem to have been incorporated into the existing taxeis, ^ presumably 
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adding to the numbers of rank and file rather than to the officer corps. The first 
evidence for a seventh taxis does not appear until the time of the invasion of India, 
where Arrian names seven taxiarchs operating simultaneously.'° 
Hvpasipsts 
At the time of the invasion of Persia, another of Parmenio's sons, Nicanor, was 
the commander of the hypaspists." The hypaspists were the elite formation of the 
Macedonian heavy infantry; their roles were various, see chapter 2. The hypaspists 
were organized into three chiliarchies of 1000 men, each commanded by 
chiliarchs. One of these chiliarchies was designated the agema, perhaps 
commanded by Alexander himself, or more likely by an unknown individual, as 
Alexander was usually with the Companion cavalry during set-piece battles. The 
chiliarchs themselves were of markedly lower status than the taxiarchs of the heavy 
infantry, being more like a lochagos. This is at first sight rather surprising, 
considering that the hypaspists were the elite units of the heavy infantry, receiving 
only the very best of the new recruits into their ranks, but we should remember that 
unlike the heavy infantry, the hypaspists had an overall commander, Nicanor, who 
was at a significant level within the command structure, ensuring that their status 
was considerably higher than that of an infantry taxis. 
As with the rest of the army, the command structure of the hypaspists was 
significantly changed at the end of 331. The chiliarchies were sub-divided into two 
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new units, pentakosiarchies, thus adding an entirely new layer into the command 
structure, albeit a very lowly one. These new officers were again appointed by 
Alexander on the basis of merit rather than seniority, and again owed their 
allegiance to the king himself. 
Companion Cavalry 
The numbers of the Companion cavalry are not certain (see chapter 3), Diodorus 
gives the figure of 1800,'^ but Tarn doubts this number; most now accept the 
figure of 1800 as at least being very close to the actual figure. We do know that by 
333 the companion cavalry consisted of 8 ilai (squadrons) of 200 men, commanded 
by an ilarch. An He was further sub-divided into two hekatostyes of 100 men. 
Sekunda believes that the smallest division of the Companion cavalry was the 
tetrarchia, believing there to have been four composing each ileP This size of unit 
is only recorded once in Arrian, at the turning of the Persian Gates in January 
330, not before or after. This could represent an experiment on Alexander's part 
that was not continued, 50 men perhaps being too small a tactical unit, or it could 
be an error by Arrian. 
One of the ilai was given the title He basilike, or royal squadron, and was of 
higher status than the rest, usually believed to have been of double strength and 
charged with defending the king when he fought on horseback. The overall 
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command of the Companion cavalry was in the hands of Phi lotas, until his 
execution in October 330. 
The ilarchs seem to have been relatively minor in rank, probably on a par with an 
infantry lochagos?^ Ilarchs are seldom mentioned by name in any of the sources 
and are never given separate commands of their own; the only one that achieved 
any level of distinction was Cleitus the Black, the commander of the royal He. 
After the execution of Philotas in 330 the entire Macedonian cavalry were 
reorganized. The basic tactical formation was now not the He but the "hipparchy".^ ^ 
TTiese first new units are first recorded by Arrian during 329.^ ^ IJai do still appear 
in the sources but they become sub-divisions of a hipparchy, each hipparchy 
comprising a minimum of two ilai and thus a minimum of 400 men. The ilai 
were also sub-divided into two lochoi, the commanders of whom were given the 
title lochagos, as with the commander of an infantry unit. Alexander appointed 
these commanders personally on a basis of merit rather than superiority, thus 
breaking with tradition. Thus a new layer of sub-commanders was added in the 
command structure of the army, one which owed its loyalty directly to Alexander, 
to some extent breaking the link between the troops and their commanders. There 
are two possible reasons for this change: perhaps Alexander came to the conclusion 
that the ilai were simply too small, at 200 men, to cope with the different style of 
fighting in an entirely different theatre that was to be their next challenge. The 
second possible explanation was a desire on the part of Alexander to increase the 
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relative superiority of the companion cavalry over the infantry, each hipparch now 
being of a higher status than a lochagos. 26 
The term "royal He" also disappeared at this time and was replaced by the term 
agema, the nomenclature becoming the same as for the hypaspists. The actual 
number of cavalry hipparchies is unknown, but it is assumed that there were eight 
through the Indian campaign.^' The position left vacant by the death of Philotas 
was not directly filled. He was instead replaced by two men, Alexander's life-long 
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friend Hephaestion and Cleitus the Black, both men being of equal status within 
the command structure. Arrian gives the reason for this step as that "...he did not 
think it advisable that one man - even a personal friend - should have control of so 
large a body of cavalry". 
Some time during 331, probably after Gaugamela, when the last great batch of 
reinforcements arrived from Macedon, Alexander introduced the concept of 
promotion according to merit throughout the army, rather than seniority.^" This was 
the beginning of Alexander's policy of reducing the army's ties of loyalty to its 
individual commanders, ultimately making them loyal to him alone. 
Allies and Mercenaries^' 
The Thessalian cavalry were without doubt the most important contingent of this 
aspect of the army. They were probably equal in number to the Companion cavalry. 
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and very close to them in terms of quality. Overall command of this vitally 
important unit was given to Alexander's second-in-command, Parmenio. The 
command structure of the Thessalian cavalry was very similar to that of the 
Companions, being divided into ilai. They were not, however, allowed their own 
national commanders, but a senior Macedonian officer was appointed to command 
them.^ ^ The Thessalian cavalry also had a unit which performed the same role as 
the Royal Squadron of the companions, the Pharsalian contingent. 
The other allied cavalry contingents, although considerably less important, were 
organized along similar lines, being divided into ilai and each having a 
Macedonian commander. The appointment of a Macedonian commander at the 
head of non-Macedonian, be they cavalry or infantry, units was the general policy 
of Alexander throughout his reign; even the mercenary contingents were treated in 
this fashion, Menander being in overall command. These Macedonian officers, 
however, were relatively unimportant in the overall command structure. 
The fleets that accompanied the army of invasion were almost exclusively non-
Macedonian, being provided by the member states of the League of Corinth. Each 
ship was captained by a native of the contributing city, and where a city-state 
provided more than one ship, they also supplied what Milns calls 'a commodore' 
for their particular contingent. As with other non-Macedonian units however, 
overall command of the fleet was with a Macedonian officer. 
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Bodyguard 
The term 'bodyguard' is quite a confiising one, as there appear to be two entirely 
separate groups within the army that carry this title. The first is an apparently quite 
strong detachment of heavy infantry. Arrian three times" tells us that Alexander 
took with him the bodyguards and some of the hypaspists, strongly suggesting that 
they were not simply a detachment of the hypaspists, who were themselves often 
called "the guards". Diodorus also tells us^ ^ that at the battle of Gaugamela, 
Hephaestion "had commanded the bodyguards". This passage again strongly 
suggests that we are not here talking about a detachment of the hypaspists, as at this 
time Nicanor was still their commander^ ^ and only died later that year.'"' The 
bodyguards seem to have been a relatively minor force, perhaps of the order of a 
couple of hundred strong. The relative position of their commander within the 
command structure of the army is unknown; the only commander named is 
Hephaestion at Gaugamela, who was relatively senior. Hephaestion's seniority 
probably had more to do with his closeness to Alexander than the importance of the 
bodyguards as a military force; his successor after Gaugamela is never mentioned, 
for instance. This group could well represent a carry-over from a much older 
organization that pre-dated Philip's reforms. 
The group that most interests us here are the somatophylakes basilikoi, or "royal 
bodyguard", originally seven, this number being rigidly maintained. The number 
was probably connected to their historical fiuiction of guarding the king's tent; 
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they were increased to eight in India, however, when Peucestas was promoted to 
this rank as a sign of gratitude by Alexander, for saving his life during the attack on 
the capital city of the Malli.''^ 
The bodyguards occupied a position within the command structure that is 
difficult to define. The group as a whole formed part of Alexander's immediate 
entourage, and seem certain to have been among his closest friends and most 
trusted advisors. Membership of the bodyguard was obviously incompatible with 
any post that involved their being away fi-om court for any length of time: both 
Balacrus and Menes were replaced as soon as they were assigned to the command 
of provinces. For reasons that seem less clear, inclusion within the bodyguard 
was also incompatible with a command within the army. Before Gaugamela, there 
is no recorded instance of a member of the bodyguard simultaneously holding a 
senior command. Bodyguards are occasionally reported briefly holding minor 
commands, such as Ptolemy, who commanded a joint force of hypaspists and light-
infantry during the siege of Halicamassus, but this is rare. If any bodyguard were 
promoted to a senior command, he would immediately lose his title, and be 
replaced. This happened, for instance, when Ptolemy (a different individual fi-om 
the one just mentioned) became a taxiarch.'*^ Bosworth believes that as a group they 
enjoyed the same status as a taxiarch, but did not, as such, occupy any position 
within the command structure.'** They were, however, still influential as they were 
among the king's closest advisors. 
191 
This rather rigid system which applied to the bodyguard, as with almost 
everything else in the army, evolved considerably over time. Aflier the death of 
Parmenio we hear of instances of bodyguards actually receiving senior, if 
temporary, commands. In 328, for instance, Alexander left four taxeis of heavy 
infantry in Bactria, along with their commanders, and divided the remaining army 
into five columns, three of which were commanded by known bodyguards.'*^ The 
deaths of Parmenio and Philotas represent something of a watershed in Alexander's 
career, as will be discussed below. 
Evolution of the command structure 
One of the major changes that occurred in the command structure was that the 
cavalry commands became increasingly important, relative to their previously 
equivalent infantry commands. By the time of the execution of Philotas, Alexander 
was becoming increasingly disinclined to place such large numbers of men under a 
single commander, and so divided the command of the Companion cavalry 
between Hephaestion and Cleitus the Black. Individual hipparchs also became 
increasingly important in their own right, becoming roughly equal in status to the 
position of taxiarch. At the beginning of the invasion of India, the commanders of 
the heavy infantry who were most highly favoured by Alexander were promoted to 
command hipparchies of companion cavalry, namely Perdiccas, Craterus and 
Cleitus the White."^ 
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During this process the royal bodyguard evolved into a position within the 
command structure. Perdiccas was promoted to a hipparchy from a taxis of heavy 
infantry in 327, and by 330 he also had the title of bodyguard, a dual function 
which Hephaestion also enjoyed. The Peithon who was a bodyguard by 325 is very 
probably the same Peithon who is attested as a taxiarch in 326/5.''^  The bodyguard, 
however, were usually given commands within the Companion cavalry, in 
alignment with its increasing importance. Bosworth attributes this downgrading of 
the heavy infantry to the fact that Alexander saw them as a potential, and 
increasing, problem. It was from the ranks of the infantry that the mutinies at the 
Hyphasis and Opis had come and " . . . i t would not be surprising i f Alexander had 
deliberately aimed at increasing the prestige and importance of the cavalry". It is 
perhaps just as likely that the heavy infantry had become less prestigious simply 
because they were not as heavily involved in the fighting in which the army was 
engaged in northeastern Iran at this time, as they had been during earlier 
campaigns. 
From 330, when Alexander entered the northeast of the old Persian Empire, he 
was faced with an entirely new situation, that of guerrilla warfare. This led to a 
willingness on the part of Alexander to divide his force, seemingly 
indiscriminately, between various commanders. Before this time if a second 
column was required it would consist of allied and mercenary troops, the 
Macedonians always staying with the king. As mentioned above in 328, Alexander 
left four taxeis of Macedonian heavy infantry in Bactria and divided the rest of the 
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army into five groups. These new commands were given to a fairly select group of 
Alexander's closest friends: Craterus, Hephaestion, Coenus and Perdiccas were 
usually the first choices, with Ptolemy, Leonnatus and Peithon used where more 
columns were being used.^ ' When Alexander entered India, Hephaestion and 
Perdiccas were sent ahead to the Indus with a large force comprising around half of 
the Macedonians and all of the mercenary infantry.^^ 
One of the most important features of the changes in the command structure of the 
Macedonian army towards the end of Alexander's reign was the increasing 
mobility of commands. Individual generals still kept their titles, but were expected 
to command entirely separate units as situations presented themselves. For example 
in 327, three taxiarchs, Meleager, Attalus and Gorgias, were detached from their 
taxeis and were given the commands of a group of mercenary cavalry and infantry 
and employed on diversionary movements along the river banks.^ ^ Aiwther 
example is that Coenus, a taxiarch since 334, was employed as a cavalry 
commander at the Hydaspes.^ '* 
This move towards an increasing mobility of command was for two main reasons: 
the first being military. As Alexander entered the next phase of the campaign after 
331, he increasingly met with opposition that operated on significantly different 
lines from early in the campaign. He was also faced with fighting in a new theatre 
and in different conditions, all of which required the army to be considerably more 
flexible than it had previously been. There is surely a second, and in my opinion 
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significantly more important factor at work here, politics. Alexander seems to have 
been becoming increasingly concerned about assigning large bodies of troops to a 
single commander indefinitely: there was for instance no overall commander of the 
heavy infantry, and the positions vacated by Parmenio and Philotas were never 
filled, the Companion cavalry receiving co-commanders. Alexander increasingly 
detached individuals from their commands and gave them different assignments; he 
also employed new layers in the command structure and made promotions 
according to merit. These changes had a two-fold effect: the commanders became 
loyal to him primarily, as they owed their positions directly to the king's favour. 
Secondly the focus of the army's loyalty was also the king, as their commanders 
often changed. Alexander made himself the sole focus of every individual, 
whatever his rank, within the army. 
The Price of Parmenio's Support 
Parmenio was probably the single most important political figure in Macedonia, 
apart from the king, during the reign of Philip. He had various family members 
well entrenched at court and "...seems to have had connections with both factions 
contending for the succession in the last years of the reign". Thus when Philip 
was assassinated, Parmenio was in a prime position to act as king-maker. Parmenio 
was in a position to offer the support of most of the lowland barons; ^ this would 
leave Amjmtas or any other potential rival with only the possibility of forming a 
. .coalition of the out-kingdoms and rebellious Greek cities". Parmenio was a 
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skilled political operator and knew well the strength of his position; Alexander was 
forced to pay a heavy price for his support, but he was in no position to argue. 
"When the Macedonian army.. .crossed into Asia, almost every key command was 
held by one of Parmenio's sons, brothers, or other kinsmen."^^ 
We have already noted that two of Parmenio's sons were commanders of the 
hypaspists and the Companion cavalry, with Parmenio himself commanding the 
Thessalian cavalry and essentially being second in command of the whole army. 
Parmenio's brother, Asander, probably commanded the light cavalry and certainly 
received the satrapy of Sardis as soon as it was conquered.^ ^ Parmenio's supporters 
were also firmly entrenched in positions of power, men like the four sons of 
Andromenes and the brothers Coenus and Cleander.*'^  Many of the commanders of 
the army of invasion were little younger than Parmenio himself: when Justin tells 
us that headquarters looked "more like the senate of some old-time republic",*^ he 
is probably not exaggerating too wildly. 
The Macedonian army down to 330, therefore, was at its very core, Philip's; they 
were his veterans and his commanders, and Philip's influence was always present 
in the form of Parmenio. This was a situation which Alexander could not tolerate 
indefinitely. He allowed the command structure to remain relatively unchanged 
whilst his success was still in the balance, but after Gaugamela Alexander began to 
make serious changes to the army, changes which were made considerably easier 
by the assassinations of both Philotas and Parmenio.*^ Alexander was gambling 
that the army loved him more than it loved the old general, and he was right.^ 
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After the execution of Parmenio, Alexander would never again allow large bodies 
of troops to be commanded by any one individual, for any length of time; the army 
had at last become his. 
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Parmenio's grip on the army, and the final execution of Parmenio and Philotas as 
the culmination of this plotting; this seems unlikely to be true. AVhy would he, for 
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63. Although the Thessalian cavalry perhaps did not take it well, they were not a 




Alexander's army was an extremely complex organization, consisting of 
numerous contingents each trained to perform different roles. The backbone of the 
army was certainly thepezhetairoi. Although the Macedonian infantry were, in all 
likelihood, organised and trained well before Alexander's reign it seems probably 
that he was the king who extended the term pezhetairoi, foot companions, to 
incorporate the whole of the heavy infantry. This was essentially an act of 
propaganda; to increase the loyalty the troops felt for him and decrease their 
reliance upon their individual taxiarchs, who were frequently changed. 
The pezhetairoi, strictly speaking, should not be called a phalanx, although both 
ancient and modem authors often do use the term. A phalanx was a densely packed 
body of heavily armoured infantrymen who fought as a mass; Alexander's 
pezherairoi were far more flexible, consisting of 6, later 7 taxeis, each of whom 
could operate independently or in connection with other troops. They are usually 
portrayed as the anvil to the Companion Cavalry's hammer, but this is to 
misunderstand their role. Their lack of defensive armour, small shield and the 
sarissa meant that they were a shock weapon every bit as much as the Companions. 
The Macedonian pezhetairoi were essentially an evolved version of the standard 
Greek phalanx. 
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There is little doubt that there were at least two different kinds of sarissa, that used 
by the cavalry and that by the infantry: the literary, visual and archaeological 
evidence all point to this, although the Alexander Mosaic (Plate 1) is confusing in 
this matter as it depicts Alexander actually wielding an infantry sarissa, while there 
is a broken cavalry sarissa (Plate 5) on the floor in the foreground. 
One of the biggest problems with the heavy infantry is that of the asthetairoi. A 
number of suggestions have been made as to what they were, but I believe the most 
likely is that proposed by Griffith' when he argues that the term was an honorary 
one, essentially a recognition for bravery in some previous battle, likened to the 
term "King's Own" in the British army of today. 
The hypaspists were the elite units of the Macedonian heavy infantry. They were 
more than likely 3000 in number, and organized into 3 units of 1000 men each, at 
least after 331, before 331 they may well have been organized into units of 500 
men. They were equipped in the same manner as the pezhetairoi but trained to 
such a degree that they were capable of using more than one type of weapon. 
Where speed was of the essence they were quite capable of using a javelin of 
hoplite spear instead of the sarissa; their versatility made them extremely important 
to Alexander. 
The Companion cavalry units are usually thought to be the main shock troops of 
the army: these were the troops that Alexander personally commanded during the 
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set piece battles and were charged with breaking through the enemy's left flank. 
They were highly trained and recruited from the nobility of Macedonia. The 
Thessalian cavalry were equipped and organized in a virtually identical manner and 
were of almost equal quality. I f the hammer and anvil analogy is to work then it 
should be the Thessalians who were the anvil, not the pezhetairoi, as it was the 
Thessalians who fought the defensive action on the right wing whilst Alexander 
delivered the decisive blow on the right in conjunction with the pezhetairoi and 
hypaspists in the centre. 
The mercenaries and allied troops formed a numerically very large part of the 
army, although the sources provide us with very little information regarding their 
roles. Although the sources downplay their importance they did perform a key role 
during the set piece battles, they formed a second line. Tactically very significant, 
although it did nothing to aid in the victories at Issus and Gaugamela, their role was 
to ensure that i f the army was outflanked by the Persians, defeat would not 
inevitably follow. They were essentially there to ensure Alexander would not be 
defeated, rather than to gain victory themselves. The allies also played a vital role 
as hostages for the good behaviour of the city-states. The mercenaries also acted as 
garrisons in every major town and city that Alexander captured. The controversial 
decree to disband the mercenaries was, in my opinion, nothing of the sort. I believe 
it was an attempt on the part of Alexander to reconstitute his army quickly after the 
losses in India and Gedrosia. He did not have time, or more likely the patience, to 
send out commanders to recruit new troops from Greece and Persia and he 
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probably saw it as being most expedient to simply use troops that were already on 
his payroll. There is no evidence at all that this decree was intended to strip the 
satraps of armies; many recruited thousands of mercenaries to reconstitute their 
own armies within months of the decree.^  
The decree to disband his fleet should also be considered in a new light; 
Alexander in fact possessed at least 4 fleets in the Mediterranean during the first 
few years of his reign. He did not, in fact, disband his fleet at all, just a small part 
of it. This was essentially an acceptance on the part of Alexander that he knew 
nothing about naval warfare and would not risk a defeat that would have 
tremendous political repercussions in Greece. 
The command structure of the army was extremely complex, probably more so 
than any army in history to that point. There were various different grades of pay 
for different ranks, and each rank had a different role to play. It is highly likely that 
almost all promotions were made by Alexander himself, or at the very least met 
with his approval. There seems to have been a gradual process over a period of 
several years of replacing Philip's men with his own. This perhaps reached its 
conclusion with the murder of Philotas and Parmenio. 
The army that Alexander entered Asia with in 334 was a significantly different 
one from that which he commanded after 331. 331 was the single most significant 
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year with regards to the army, the pezhetairoi were probably expanded to 7 taxeis, 
the Companion cavalry were reorganized into hipparchies, the hypaspists were 
reorganized into chiliarchies of 1000 men and all of the allied troops were 
disbanded and sent home. In these reforms Alexander showed his organizational 
skills and the realisation that the battles that would be fought after 331 would be of 
a very different character than the set-piece battles fought in the early years. We 
could perhaps argue fi-om the reforms of 331 that had Alexander not inherited such 
a fine army from Philip, his conquest of Persia might still have been possible; it 
would simply have meant that the invasion of 334 would not have been possible, 
since some years would have to have been spent creating the army. I believe 
Alexander would have been technically capable of this, but would he have had the 
patience? 
Alexander's army, then, was multi-faceted, highly complex and supremely well 
t 
trained. Each element was trained and equipped to perform different roles, be they 
as shock troops, skirmishers, scouts etc. Whatever situation arose Alexander had 
supreme confidence that he possessed an army that, combined with his own tactical 
genius, was capable of dealing with it. Clausewatz^ complimented Alexander's 
army for its "intrinsic perfection"; we can say that although it did not, in reality, 




Plate 1 The Alexander Mosaic - 1st C. BC copy of a 
painting, perhaps by Philoxenos, of c. 300 BC; found in the 
House of the Faun, Pompeii. 
Plate 2 Alexander wielding an infantry sanssa 
Plate 3 Alexander's armour. 
Plate 4 Detail of infantry sarissa 
Plate 5 Cavalry sarissa. 
Plate 6 Macedonian sword. 
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